State, Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe (In re Doe)

• Decision Date: 17 January 2023
• Docket Number: 50048
• Parties: In the Interest of: John Doe I, A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. v. JANE DOE (2022-39), Respondent-Appellant. STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, Petitioner-Respondent,
• Court: Court of Appeals of Idaho

In the Interest of: John Doe I, A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age.

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
JANE DOE (2022-39), Respondent-Appellant.

No. 50048

Court of Appeals of Idaho

January 17, 2023

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bannock County. Hon. Anson L. Call, II, Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

David R. Martinez, Chief Bannock County Public Defender; Kent V. Reynolds, Deputy Public Defender, Pocatello, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Jason R. Chandler, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

BRAILSFORD, JUDGE.

Jane Doe (Mother) appeals from the magistrate court's judgment terminating her parental rights to her minor child. Mother asserts the court erred by concluding that she abandoned and neglected the child, terminating Mother's parental rights is in the child's best interests, and the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department) met the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963. Mother also argues the court abused its discretion by denying her motion to reopen the case following the termination hearing. We affirm.

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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 11, 2021, Mother gave birth to a child who was born prematurely and suffered from respiratory distress. After the child's birth, the Department petitioned under the Child Protection Act (CPA), Idaho Code §§ 16-1601-1647, for legal custody of the child. In its petition, the Department alleged Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines at the time of the child's birth; the child likewise tested positive; and Mother initially refused to allow medical care providers to transfer the child to another medical facility to receive necessary, specialized care. The Department also moved to remove the child "from his home," although the child was still in neonatal intensive care at the time. On April 15, the magistrate court granted the Department's motion to remove the child, found he was an Indian child^[1] of the Shoshone Bannock Tribes (Tribes) implicating the ICWA, and gave notice to the Tribes that the Department was seeking custody of the child.

In May 2021, the magistrate court held an adjudicatory hearing. Mother attended with her counsel, and the parties stipulated to the court's jurisdiction due to the "lack of a stable home environment." The court noted that the child's foster care placement did not comply with ICWA's preferences. Nevertheless, the parties agreed to the foster placement. Subsequently, the Tribes moved to intervene as a party in the case, and the court granted the Tribes' motion.

In June 2021, the Department notified the magistrate court of a change in the child's foster placement to a placement complying with ICWA. Also in June 2021, the court entered a case plan for Mother's performance. This plan required, among other things, that Mother demonstrate an ability to provide suitable housing for the child, allow the Department to complete a home check, engage in substance abuse treatment, demonstrate an ability to refrain from substance abuse, comply with drug testing, demonstrate an understanding of how Mother's substance abuse affected her mental health, and attend all scheduled visits with the child.

In March 2022, the Department moved for an order approving an adoptive placement for the child with a member of the Tribes, and the magistrate court granted that motion. Thereafter,

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in April 2022, the court changed the permanency goal from reunification to termination and adoption. In May 2022, the Department petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights and had her personally served with both the petition and a notice setting the termination hearing for July 29, 2022.

The termination hearing occurred as scheduled on July 29. Mother did not appear at the hearing, although her counsel did. Mother's counsel represented to the magistrate court that Mother had informed him earlier in the week that she intended to attend the hearing; he had no explanation for why she was not in attendance; and he was "ready to proceed" if she were present. Despite Mother's nonappearance, her counsel addressed the motions in limine he had filed on her behalf and occasionally objected to testimony, but otherwise, he repeatedly stated during the hearing that he was not taking an active role because of Mother's failure to appear.

At the termination hearing, the Department presented the testimony of the Department case manager, the Department case management specialist, an addiction counselor employed by the Tribes, and an ICWA expert. Additionally, the child's guardian ad litem testified. After the termination hearing concluded, Mother moved to "reopen" the case to permit her "to defend, [to] present testimony, to cross-examine testimony, and [to] submit evidence and documentation to challenge the alleged grounds justifying termination of her parental rights." The motion asserted Mother's failure to attend the termination hearing "was not due to neglect or wilful conduct" but rather "due to inability to appear and contest and present evidence." In support, Mother's counsel submitted an affidavit stating that, shortly after counsel left his office for the termination hearing, Mother left him a voicemail message at the office stating, "she would not be able to attend the trial because she did not have any 'gas money, a ride, or nada.'" Further, Mother's counsel attested that, if he had received Mother's message before the termination trial, he would have asked for a continuance.

The magistrate court denied Mother's motion to reopen the case and entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law terminating her parental rights. The court concluded that Mother abandoned the child by "failing to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child" and neglected the child by "failing to provide proper parental care and control, subsistence, and medical care necessary for the [child's] well-being" and that terminating Mother's parental rights is in the child's best interests. The court further concluded the Department met the ICWA requirements for terminating parental rights, including that "the Department made active efforts

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throughout the child protective case to avoid the breakup of the Indian family" and that "there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the reunification would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." Accordingly, the court entered the judgment terminating Mother's parental rights.^[2]

Mother timely appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep't of Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d at 652.

On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court's judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court's finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143

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Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court's decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.

Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the parent-child relationship when it is in the child's best interests and any one of the following five factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.

III.

ANALYSIS

A. Neglect

Mother challenges the magistrate court's conclusion that she neglected the child...