Herstine v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 October 1892
• Docket Number: 287
• Parties: Herstine v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

25 A. 104

151 Pa. 244

Herstine v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., Appellant

No. 287

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 3, 1892

Argued March 10, 1892

Appeal, No. 287, Jan. T., 1892, by defendant from judgment of C.P. Northampton Co., Feb. T., 1890, No. 36, on verdict for plaintiff, George R. Herstine.

Trespass for personal injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant.

The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.

The charge of the court was as follows, by SCHUYLER, P.J.:

"This is an action by George R. Herstine, plaintiff, against the Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., defendant, to recover damages for an injury which the plaintiff alleges he has sustained through the negligence of the defendant. It seems that, on the morning of May 24, 1889, the plaintiff was seated in the rear end of a train of cars on the defendant's road, the train being at rest near the South Bethlehem station. The destination of the train was Phillipsburg, to which point the plaintiff had secured a ticket. He was therefore rightfully on the train waiting for it to start. He was seated near the rear of the car, and, while thus seated, another car was added to the train which then became the rear car. It is claimed by the plaintiff that in making this connection the added car was permitted to approach the train at a too great rate of speed, in consequence of which it struck the car in which the plaintiff was sitting with great violence, throwing him back on his seat, and inflicting on his person, as the plaintiff claims, a most serious injury from which, as he says, he has suffered ever since and is destined to suffer to the end of his life.

"The character and extent of this alleged injury have been fully explained by the plaintiff and his witnesses and I need not repeat what they said. It is for this alleged injury -- I say alleged injury, for the fact of the injury is emphatically denied by the defendant -- that the plaintiff is now seeking damages at your hands. The defendant also denies that there was any negligence on the part of itself or its employees in connecting the added car with the train. Of course, if there is no negligence imputable to the defendant, or even if the defendant was negligent and the injury of which the plaintiff complains was not the result of that negligence, the plaintiff will not be entitled to your verdict.

"There are thus presented for your consideration two principal questions: first -- was the connection of the added car made negligently? Negligence is described to be the absence of care under the circumstances. [The degree of care required of railroad companies is thus defined by our Supreme Court Although in legal contemplation such companies do not warrant the absolute safety of passengers they are yet bound to the exercise of the utmost diligence and care. The slightest neglect against which human prudence and foresight may guard and by which hurt or loss is occasioned, will render them liable to answer in damages. Nay, the mere happening of an injurious accident raises prima facie a presumption of neglect and throws upon the carrier the onus of showing that it did not exist. Tested by this rule, was the defendant guilty of negligence?] The evidence bearing on this branch of the case is within a very narrow compass. If, after a careful consideration of this evidence, you should reach the conclusion that there was no negligence in coupling the car then you need inquire no further, for in that event your verdict should be for the defendant.

["If, however, you find that there was negligence, you will next inquire whether the injury of which the plaintiff complains was the result of that negligence. If you find that it was not the result of the defendant's negligence, then again the verdict should be for the defendant.]

"If, however, you find that the defendant was negligent and that the injury of which the plaintiff complains was the result of that negligence, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff for such sum as under the evidence you think he is fairly entitled to.

"Now as to the measure of damages. In cases of this kind the rule is this: [If, in view of all the evidence, the jury find for the plaintiff they should allow, in estimating the damages, not only for the direct expenses incurred by the plaintiff by reason of the injury, but also for the privation and inconvenience he is subjected to, for the pain and suffering he has already endured, bodily and mental, and which he is likely to experience, as well as for the pecuniary loss he has sustained and is likely to sustain during the remainder of his life from his disabled condition.]

"Now, gentlemen, if after you have given to this evidence the careful consideration to which it is entitled you reach the conclusion that in coupling the car the defendant was not guilty of negligence then you need not, as I have already said, inquire any further but should render a verdict in favor of the defendant. If you come to the conclusion that the defendant was guilty of negligence in coupling the car, it does not, however, follow from that circumstance that the plaintiff would be entitled to your verdict, because, however negligent the defendant may have been, unless the injury complained of was the result of that negligence, then, however much the plaintiff might be entitled to your sympathy, he would not be entitled to your verdict.

"On the other hand, gentlemen, if, after carefully canvassing all the testimony in the light that you have before you you find that the defendant has been guilty of negligence -- that it has not used that high degree of care which the law demands at the hands of such companies, and if you find in addition to that that the plaintiff's present condition, whatever it may be -- if it is a condition of injury -- was the result of such negligence, you should not hesitate to say so by returning a verdict for the plaintiff for such damages as you think under all the circumstances of the case he is fairly entitled to.

"[If the plaintiff is entitled to damages at all he is entitled to substantial damages; it would be a travesty of justice if you should find that this defendant was negligent and that the plaintiff through the defendant's negligence has sustained the injuries of which he complains to return a verdict for ridiculously small damages."]

Plaintiff's points, affirmed, were as follows:

"1. If the testimony of the plaintiff shows that there was a violent coupling of the cars, and from that violence there resulted an injury to the person of the plaintiff, there arises a presumption that there was negligence prima facie upon the part of the defendant in causing the alleged personal injury complained of." [1]

"2. In order to overcome this presumption of negligence the defendant must show that its employees exercised the utmost human foresight, the highest skill and the greatest care, prudence and judgment to prevent the collision which caused the alleged injury to the plaintiff." [2]

"4. The jury may allow damages not only for the direct expenses incurred by the plaintiff but also for the privation and inconvenience to which he has been subjected; for the pain and suffering, bodily and mentally, which he has already endured or which he is likely to experience as well as the pecuniary loss which he has sustained and is likely to sustain hereafter during the continuance of his disabled condition." [3]

"5. Under the head of direct expenses incurred are loss of time and wages, disability to work, cost of board and clothing, medical attendance, medicines and nursing occurring from the time of the injury to this date and for those which may hereafter occur as long as his disabled condition may continue." [4]

Defendant's request for binding instructions was refused. [5]

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $19,800. Subsequently the plaintiff filed a remittitur of all damages in excess of $13,000, in accordance with an order of court that if such remittitur were not filed, a new trial would be granted. Defendant appealed.

Errors assigned were (1-5) answers to points, quoting points and answers; (6) that the charge as a whole was not a fair and adequate presentation of the case; (7) that the charge to the jury failed to present at all that part of defendant's case which was based upon the evidence that plaintiff was suffering from lumbago or rheumatism of long standing; (8) that the charge to the jury entirely omitted to refer to the testimony attacking plaintiff's character for truth and veracity, or to instruct the jury as to what weight should be given to his testimony in the case, in view of the evidence given on the question of his character; (9-12) portions of charge as above, quoting them; (13) that the damages were excessive; (14) that the verdict was against the evidence, and the great weight of the evidence, and against the law; (15-16) rulings on evidence not material to this report.

The judgment is reversed and a venire facias de novo is awarded.

Wm. Fackenthall and Robert E. Wright, with them J. Davis Brodhead and Francis I. Gowen, for appellant. -- There was no negligence on the part of the company, and the plaintiff cannot recover: Redfield on Railways, 324; Laing v. Colder's Est., 8 Pa. 479; New Jersey R.R. Co. v. Kennard, 21 Pa. 203; R.R. v. Layer, 112 Pa. 414.

The company omitted no duty which it was bound to perform. While a carrier of passengers is bound to use every care and precaution for safety of passengers carried by it, it is not an insurer of the passengers: Taylor on Private Corporations, § 350; Redfield on Railways, ed. 1867, 174; Meier v. P.R.R., 64 Pa. 225.

Negligence will not be presumed where an injury results from one of the ordinary incidents of travel, but the...