Hertz Corp. v. Heltzel, U-D

• Decision Date: 15 July 1959
• Docket Number: U-D
• Citation: 217 Or. 205,341 P.2d 1063
• Parties: HERTZ CORPORATION, a corporation, Respondent, v. Charles H. HELTZEL, Commissioner of Public Utilities of the State of Oregon, Defendant, and Theodore M. Snyder, dba Bee Hive Truck Rental Co.,rive of Northwest, Elbert Stiles and Wyoming Stiles, dba Bee Hive Truck and Car Reutal Co., Thomas H. Chapman, dba Tom Chapman rive, and O. K. Transfer Co., an Oregon Corporation, Intervenors-Appellants.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 1063

341 P.2d 1063

217 Or. 205

HERTZ CORPORATION, a corporation, Respondent, v. Charles H. HELTZEL, Commissioner of Public Utilities of the State of Oregon, Defendant, and Theodore M. Snyder, dba Bee Hive Truck Rental Co., U-Drive of Northwest, Elbert Stiles and Wyoming Stiles, dba Bee Hive Truck and Car Reutal Co., Thomas H. Chapman, dba Tom Chapman U-Drive, and O. K. Transfer Co., an Oregon Corporation Intervenors-Appellants.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.

Argued June 10, 1959.

Decided July 15, 1959.

Courtney R. Johns, Albany, argued the cause and filed a brief for intervenors-appellants.

Samuel B. Stewart, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were White, Sutherland & White, Portland.

Before McALLISTER, C. J., and ROSSMAN, LUSK, WARNER, SLOAN, O'CONNELL and CRAWFORD, JJ.

SLOAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court for Marion County which granted plaintiffs' prayer to declare subd. (8) of § 6, ch. 488, Oregon Laws 1949, as codified, to be in violation of the Constitution of Oregon and of the United States. The only appellants are the intervenors in the proceedings below. The defendant Public Utilities Commissioner did not appeal.

The section referred to has since been codified as ORS 767.115 and 767.160. Chapter 488, Oregon Laws 1949, was a rather general overhaul of the Motor Transportation Code enacted in 1947. Subdivision (8) of § 6 of the 1949 legislation was an amendment to § 9 of the 1947 Act. Section 9 of the 1947 Act made it unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state as a common, contract or private carrier without first obtaining a permit from the Public Utilities Commissioner for that purpose. Section 9 also prescribed certain qualifications and limitations not pertinent here. It will be more readable to set forth in full subd. (8) of § 6 of the 1949 Act rather than as divided by the codification. The section reads:

'It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the business of leasing, renting or otherwise providing motor vehicles for the temporary use of others in the transportation of property, or for the transportation of persons in vehicles having seating accommodations for more than seven passengers, upon the public highways of this state without first obtaining from the commissioner a permit covering such operation and filing with the commissioner an insurance policy as provided in section 22(1) of this act. The application for such permit shall be in such form and contain such information as the commissioner may require. Hearing on such application shall be held, and notice thereof given, as provided in section 11(2) of this act. Such application shall be denied unless the evidence shall, in the judgment of the commissioner, justify the findings provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g) and (h) of said section 11(2); provided, however, that any person engaged in such business on April 1, 1949, shall be entitled to such permit as a matter of course upon filing with the commissioner within 90 days from the effective date hereof application for such permit and upon complying with the other provisions of this act. Every person to whom such a permit is issued shall keep the records and make the reports required of carriers by this act, and shall pay the fees prescribed by section 17 of this act unless provision shall be made, with the approval of the commissioner, whereby such fees shall be paid by the lessee or user of such motor vehicles.'

The pertinent paragraphs of § 11(2) (ORS 767.135) above referred to are as follows:

'Upon the filing with him of application for permit to operate as a common carrier, or for the transfer of any such permit, the commissioner shall investigate the application and if the proposed operation is competitive with existing carriers or there is protest against the granting of the permit, shall fix a time and place for a hearing thereon. The commissioner shall cause notice of such hearing to be served upon every person operating in any manner or by any means as a common carrier, or who has applied to operate as a common carrier in the territory proposed to be served by the applicant and on other interested parties; and any such common carrier or applicant hereby is declared to be an interested party to said proceedings and may offer testimony for or against the granting of such permit. Any other interested party including the public may give testimony at such hearing.

'If the commissioner finds from the record and the evidence that:

'(a) The applicant, if an intrastate operator, is financially responsible and adequately equipped to perform the service proposed;

'(b) That the equipment listed is safe for operation in so far as can be determined at the time of inspection;

'(c) That the operation proposed is in the public interest;

'(d) That the service proposed will not be attended with substantial damage to the highways or danger to other users thereof or to the public;

'(e) That the granting of a permit will not result in the impairment of the ability of existing operators adequately to serve the public;

* * *

* * *

'(g) That the application can and will furnish and file the insurance, bond or substitute security or qualify as self-insurer as provided in this act;

'(h) That applicant has agreed to pay the privilege taxes provided for herein, comply with the provisions of this act and obey all of the rules and regulations of the commissioner; then the commissioner, upon compliance by the applicant with the law, and the rules and regulations of the commissioner, shall issue a permit, but unless said findings are so made by the commissioner the application shall be denied or the permit issued with such conditions imposed by the commissioner as will, when complied with, meet the requirements of this act.'

We will refer to these sections as the 'statute.' The vehicles involved in this proceeding are all trucks. The plaintiff, and, we assume, intervenors do not rent passenger vehicles as defined in the statute. The trucks were rented without drivers.

Plaintiff requires no introduction; nor should it be necessary to identify its business with the statute just quoted. The intervenors are engaged in the motor vehicle rental business in various communities of the state. Their interest in this proceeding is perhaps best explained by a quote from their counsel's argument here:

'* * *. The intervenors are all named here as appellants. There are several of them, and [they] got permission to intervene in this particular proceeding and they, of course, are vitally interested. They wanted to keep the regulation and their permits and have this little more or less--I should say--a monopoly in some of these little towns. They had a vital interest in this business.'

The statement just quoted poses the issues we deem it necessary to consider. Do the needs of the public require the legislatively imposed monopoly attempted to be imposed by this enactment? Is the business of renting motor vehicles so affected with public interest or right as to sustain the validity of the attempted regulation thereof? We are told that the answer to these queries is to be found in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the numerous decisions of the courts construing statutes alleged to have violated that amendment.

The only record before us consists of the pleadings filed below. The original defendant, Heltzel, filed a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. The intervenors filed a complaint in intervention and an answer. However, the case was submitted to the trial court upon the demurrer. The court overruled the demurrer, and the decree of the court was entered upon that pleading alone. The intervenors did not seek leave to plead over, nor does the record reflect any effort on their part to seek the trial court's consideration of the facts alleged in the intervenors' complaint or answer. They appeal from the decree overruling the demurrer and allowing the relief prayed for in the complaint. The only facts before us, therefore, are the allegations of plaintiff's complaint.

The material allegations reveal that:

'(a) Plaintiff's truck rental business consists of acquiring, conditioning, servicing and renting to others for their temporary use a number of small late model trucks which are used by the lessees in hauling for themselves various commodities such as produce, household goods, fuel, fertilizer, and other materials and supplies in small lots. Three of such trucks are flat bed vehicles, four are panel delivery trucks and thirteen are van-type trucks. All such trucks are fully insured for the protection of the public and are rented at various hourly charges dependent upon the size of the truck. The lessees of such trucks operate on the public highways and on private drive or road ways as the occasion may require.

'(b) The majority of plaintiff's partons [sic] are individuals living in the Portland, Oregon area. Occasionally, trucks are rented for emergency use to various businesses in the Portland area. The service offered by plaintiff is a local community service to meet local needs for vehicles for the every day type of hauling which people desire to do for themselves.'

Other allegations specify wherein plaintiff contends the statute is invalid and that the commissioner is attempting to enforce the statute as against plaintiff. The only issue presented by the demurrer and considered by the court and argued here is the constitutionality of the statute. It is not contended the complaint is insufficient for any other reason.

As we have mentioned, we will limit our consideration to the public need for the kind of regulation proposed by this statute. The plaintiff concedes that its business is properly subject to police regulation requiring adequate safeguards for safety, for the imposition of licenses and taxes and for reasonable...