Hescott v. City of Saginaw
| Decision Date | 31 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10-13713 |
| Parties | JOHN HESCOTT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SAGINAW, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Honorable Thomas L. Ludington
The parties decided to invest four days in a trial to address Plaintiffs John and Benjamin Hescott's contention that their residential property was wrongly demolished and that the debris was wrongly carried away to a landfill. The jury concluded that the demolition was lawful — as the house constituted a public safety risk — but that no emergency required the removal of the debris without first notifying Plaintiffs or acquiring a court order. Plaintiffs were awarded $5,000 as a result.1 Both parties have moved for costs and attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs' motion will be granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants' motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
In 2001 Plaintiffs purchased a house in Saginaw, Michigan. The house was in poor condition, and neither Plaintiff lived there for long. For a while John was able to rent the house to tenants, but that did not last. His attempt to sell the house in 2008 also proved unsuccessful.Throughout this time, John was required to make frequent repairs in order to satisfy local building authorities.
On July 18, 2009, a police officer was called to the area and he noticed that a large part of the house's foundation had given way. Specifically, approximately half of the west basement wall had collapsed, creating an open entry into the building and undermining (literally) the foundation of the structure. The officer contacted Defendant City of Saginaw's "code enforcement" unit and reported the situation, noting that there were children playing in and around the house and that the structure appeared unsafe.
Plaintiffs' house was then inspected by Defendant Scott Crofoot, the City of Saginaw's Dangerous Buildings Inspector. Crofoot observed that the west wall had collapsed into the basement and that the house appeared to have rotated. After assessing the situation, Crofoot contacted the City's Fire Marshal, Greg Barton. Together, the two men determined that the house was dangerous due to its dilapidated condition, and because it appeared abandoned, concluded it should be demolished. Under the City's Dangerous Buildings Ordinance, the Fire Marshal can authorize an emergency demolition.2 See Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. E, at § 151.120.The house was then demolished that afternoon by Defendant Rohde Brothers Excavating, Inc. Rohde Brothers reentered the property and removed the demolished debris to a landfill two days later.3
Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants on August 19, 2010, alleging federal and state law claims arising from the demolition of the residence. Plaintiffs' complaint consumed 18 pages and identified seven causes of action: (1) procedural due process violation; (2) substantive due process violation; (3) Fourth Amendment violation; (4) violation of Article 10 of the Michigan Constitution (inverse condemnation); (5) unlawful destruction or conversion of goods; (6) trespass on land; and (7) exemplary damages under state law. See Pls.' Compl. ¶¶ 42-106. Plaintiffs believed they were entitled to recover the fair market value of the home which their appraiser, Mr. Mornam G. Thomas, estimated to be around $35,000. Defendants' appraiser concluded that the fair market value was substantially less.
On December 29, 2011, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all but Plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim. The Court granted the motion in part, dismissing Counts I, II, V, VI, and VII with prejudice, and Count III in part (leaving Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim concerning the carrying away of the debris on July 20, 2009). See Aug. 7, 2012 Op. & Order, ECF No. 30.4
On October 15, 2012, Defendants served Plaintiffs with an Offer of Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, offering to settle the case for $15,000. Defs.' Mot. Ex. 2.Plaintiffs rejected the offer, and although their own appraiser valued the house at no more than $35,000, they demanded $324,750 to settle the case. Defs.' Mot. Ex. 1, at 2. As one might expect, the chasm between the parties could not be closed and the case proceeded to trial. Defs.' Mot. Ex. 3.
Over four days the jury considered the two triable claims: Plaintiffs' claim against Defendant City of Saginaw for inverse condemnation; and Plaintiffs' claim against the City and individual Defendants John Stemple, Scott Crofoot, and Gregory Barton for the carrying away of any fixtures, personal property, and effects after the house was demolished. The jury reached a unanimous verdict of no cause of action on Plaintiffs' claim for inverse condemnation, concluding that there were emergency circumstances that justified the immediate demolition of the residence. The jury found, however, that no emergency existed to justify reentry of Plaintiffs' property to seize the debris two days later without, presumably, notice to Plaintiffs or obtaining a court order permitting the reentry. The jury awarded Plaintiffs $5,000 for the market value of the debris that was carried away.
At the close of Plaintiffs' case, Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). The Court requested that Defendants briefly outline their motion and took the motion under advisement because of time constraints. The case was then submitted to the jury. After the jury awarded damages on Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim, Defendants renewed their motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).
The Court agreed with Defendants in part, and overturned the jury's verdict as it related to the individual defendants. Because "the individual Defendants took no action to reenter Plaintiffs' property on July 20, 2009," and indeed, did not authorize Rohde Brothers to do so,they were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim. This determination did not relate to Defendant City of Saginaw, and accordingly, did not upset the jury award of $5,000.
Twenty-eight days after judgment was entered, both parties moved for costs and attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs move for costs, including attorney's fees, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Defendants' motion likewise comes under Rule 54(d)(2), and also Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68(d).5 Each motion will be addressed in turn.
Plaintiffs' motion for costs and attorney's fees is grounded in § 1988 and Rule 54. Rule 54 provides that "costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). And while Rule 54 does not establish authority for awarding attorney's fees,6 § 1988(b) "permits the court, in its discretion, to allow the 'prevailing party' in a federal civil rights action 'a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.'" Binta B. ex rel. S.A. v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 608, 620 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting § 1988(b)). Congress enacted § 1988 as an exception to the general American rule that parties are required to pay their own attorney's fees"in order to ensure that federal rights are adequately enforced." Gordon, 710 F.3d at 620 (quoting Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2010)). In their motion, Plaintiffs request $130,180 in attorney and paralegal fees, $1,705 in expert fees, and $300.34 in costs.7 See Pls.' Mot. 19.
In order to qualify for costs under Rule 54 or attorney's fees under § 1988, a plaintiff must be a "prevailing party." Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109 (1992); Andretti v. Borla Performance Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d 824, 835 (6th Cir. 2005). "Prevailing party" is a legal term of art which, over time, has been distilled to "succeeding on any significant issue which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Gordon, 710 F.3d at 620 () (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). As the Sixth Circuit has established, a party "crosses the threshold to 'prevailing party' status by succeeding on a single claim, even if he loses on several others and even if that limited success does not grant him the 'primary relief' he sought." Gordon, 710 F.3d at 620 (quoting McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 603 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiffs' are "prevailing parties" in this case, as they were awarded $5,000 on their Fourth Amendment claim. Indeed, Defendants concede the point: "Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is technically a 'prevailing party.'" Defs.' Resp. 8, ECF No. 77. Accordingly, Plaintiffs will be awarded their costs pursuant to Rule 54.
The costs that courts may tax under Rule 54, however, are "confined to the costs itemized in 28 U.S.C. § 1920." Gibson v. Solideal USA, Inc., 489 F. App'x 24, 33 (6th Cir. 2012)(quoting In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 481 F.3d 355, 359 (6th Cir. 2007)). § 1920 enumerates six categories of costs a court may tax, including:
28 U.S.C. § 1920. As indicated, Plaintiffs incurred $300.34 in costs and $1,705 in expert fees. But the expert was not court appointed, and therefore, his fees are not recoverable under Rule 54. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 n.9 (D. Or. 1996) (...
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