Heslep v. State Highway Dept. of South Carolina

• Decision Date: 05 December 1933
• Docket Number: 13728.
• Parties: HESLEP v. STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

171 S.E. 913

171 S.C. 186

HESLEP v. STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA et al.

No. 13728.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

December 5, 1933

Action in original jurisdiction of Supreme Court by J. C. Heslep against the State Highway Department of South Carolina and another, to have a certain act declared unconstitutional and for an injunction.

Petition dismissed.

D. W Robinson, Jr., of Columbia, for petitioner.

John M Daniel, Atty. Gen., J. Ivey Humphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. Ingram Wilson, of Sumter, for respondents.

STABLER Justice.

The petitioner, Heslep, a resident of Richland county and owner of two motor vehicles, brings this action in the original jurisdiction of the court, seeking to have declared unconstitutional an act of the General Assembly (38 Stat. at Large, p. 541), approved May 22, 1933, and to have the respondents enjoined from interfering with the operation of his automobiles on the highways of the state during the months of November and December, 1933.

There is no dispute as to the material facts. In December, 1932 Heslep made application to the highway department, in accordance with the requirements of chapter 125 of the Code of 1932 (section 5867 et seq.), for registration and licensing of his Packard sedan for the year 1933 he paid the required annual license fee of $24, and the vehicle was duly registered and assigned license No. F-- 740, the registration card and license plates corresponding to such number being duly received and accepted by him. The 1933 act, the constitutionality of which is here challenged, fixed the new license year to begin November 1, 1933, and provided that licenses should be procured by the owners of motor vehicles as required by the terms of that act. After the passage of this statute, Heslep acquired another automobile, an Auburn sedan, which, upon the payment by him of a license fee of $11, was registered in July, 1933, and assigned license No. E--4080.

The validity of the act is attacked upon two grounds. It is contended, in the first place that the purchase by Heslep of the 1933 license for his Packard sedan, in December, 1932, constituted a contract between him and the state highway department; and that the act of May 22, 1933, impairs the obligation of this contract, in that it deprives the petitioner of the right "to operate his car in November and December, 1933, except upon certain other conditions which were not attached to the original contract," and so violates section 10 of article 1 of the Federal Constitution, and section 8 of article 1 of the state Constitution.

The following provisions of section 5894 of the Code were of force and effect at the time of the issuance of the license for the Packard sedan: "All licenses shall expire on the 31st day of December, following the day of issuance. Annual license shall thereafter be issued between the first day of January and the first day of February of each year."

One of the purposes of the statute of 1933, as indicated by its title, was "to Establish the License Year for Motor Vehicles." Section 1 provides "that annually on or before the thirty-first day of October every owner of a motor vehicle *** shall procure from the State Highway Department motor vehicle licenses for the next succeeding license year beginning on the first day of November ***"; and subjects any person to the penalties provided by law who operates any motor vehicle on or after the 1st day of November without the license provided for in the act.

The authorities are in general agreement that a license is in the nature of a special privilege, and is not a property right, or a contract.

In 17 R. C. L. 476, with regard to the obligation of contracts in general, we find: "Following the general principle that a license is not a contract, it is clear that it does not in itself create any vested right, or permanent right, and that free latitude is reserved by the legislature to impose new or additional burdens on the licensee, or to alter the license, or to revoke or annul it. And this is the general rule notwithstanding the expenditure of money by the licensee in reliance thereon, and regardless of whether the term for which the license was given has expired."

To the same effect is 37 C.J., page 168: "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation."

In Huddy on Automobiles (7th Ed.) page 81, the writer says: "A license to operate an automobile is merely a privilege. It does not constitute a contract, and hence does not necessarily pass to a purchaser of the vehicle. It is personal to the one to whom it is granted."

As to the general purpose of registration, the same writer, at page 83, has this to say: "The reason assigned for the necessity of registration and licensing is that the vehicle should be readily identified in order to debar operators from violating the law and the rights of others, and to enforce the laws regulating the speed, and to hold the operator responsible in cases of accident. The legislatures have deemed that the best method of identification both as to the vehicle and the owner or operator, is by a number on a tag conspicuously attached to the vehicle. In case of any violation of law this furnishes means of identification, for, from the number, the name of the...