Hestad v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 09 February 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 43540,43540 |
| Citation | 295 Minn. 306,204 N.W.2d 433 |
| Parties | Anna HESTAD, as Executrix of the Estate of Alert Ona, Decedent, Respondent, v. PENNSYLVANIA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A death certificate may be introduced to show the cause of death but not to indicate the manner in which death occurs.
2. A medical expert who prepared the death certificate may not testify as to the manner of death unless foundation has been laid to show that his opinion is based on the application of special skill, learning, or experience. If based on facts or assumptions equally available to the jury and understandable by them, the opinion of the expert should not be admitted.
3. The opinion of a sheriff as to manner of death should not be admitted unless proper foundation can be established.
4. In Minnesota there is a presumption of accidental death as against suicide. Where the evidence permits different conclusions, the determination of the jury should stand.
5. The evidence in this case sustains a finding by the jury that the death was accidental.
Affirmed.
Padden, Dickel, Johannson & Wall, Crookston, for appellant.
Wurst & McDowell, Thief River Falls, for respondent.
Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and OTIS, TODD, and OLSON, JJ.
Defendant appeals from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial following a jury verdict determining that defendant was obligated to pay insurance benefits under its policy. Defendant had claimed that the insured's death was by suicide and that it was therefore not obligated to pay under the terms of the policy. Defendant alleges that the trial court erred in excluding a medical opinion of the deputy coroner that death was by suicide and not accidental and also in excluding an opinion of the county sheriff on the same issue. Defendant further contends that the evidence does not justify the verdict. We affirm.
Decedent, Alert Ona, was a 46-year-old bachelor farmer who farmed 480 acres of land just outside Thief River Falls, Minnesota. He purchased a life insurance policy from defendant company in the amount of $3,750, payable in the event of his death by accidental bodily injury. The terms of the policy specifically excluded payment in the event of death by suicide. At approximately noon on January 10, 1970, decedent had placed a call to the home of a neighbor, Kenneth Carlson, requesting his help in repairing a tractor at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Mr. Carlson prepared to go to the decedent's farm, which was adjacent to his, and was planning to ride a horse that he owned. However, after going a short distance, he turned back because, he testified, it was so windy that the horse was balky from the wind and cold weather. He then drove to decedent's farm and upon alighting from his car proceeded toward the barn area. As he passed the garage, he heard an engine running. When he opened the side door of the garage, he observed that the garage was full of exhaust fumes and that the overhead door was down. He opened the overhead door and attempted to reach the car, but was driven back by the fumes. He then went home, called the sheriff, and returned to decedent's farm. The sheriff and Dr. A. F. Scheuneman, a deputy county coroner, arrived shortly and the coroner determined that Mr. Ona was deceased. After turning off the engine, the men pushed the vehicle out of the garage in order to remove the body.
The testimony indicates that the car doors and windows were shut, that the hood of the car was open, and there was no hose or tubing from the exhaust to the interior of the car. The testimony indicated the car was idling faster than normal and that decedent's foot was pressing to some extent on the accelerator. The car was subsequently examined, and it was determined that the automatic choke would not release, causing the car to idle faster, that the piston rings and valve lifters were defective, and that the exhaust system was faulty and leaking just below the rear seat of the car.
There was testimony that on at least two separate occasions the overhead door had been blown shut by strong winds. Examination of decedent's personal effects in the house disclosed no suicide note, but rather indicated that he was preparing his income tax estimate due on January 15. Further, the evidence showed that before noon of that day he had mailed payment of a bill and a census report on his farming operation. Other evidence disclosed that decedent had been at a party 8 days prior to his death and had been jovial and joined in group singing.
There was further testimony that the previous summer decedent had suffered some stomach disorders requiring medication and that he was somewhat disturbed because of this. However, other testimony indicated that the medicine was effective and decedent was apparently enjoying reasonably good health at the time of his death. There was no indication of any suicidal manifestations by decedent. The trial court excluded testimony that decedent's brother had committed suicide some years previously.
Defendant sought to introduce an opinion and made an offer of proof that the coroner would testify that the cause of death, carbon monoxide poisoning, was brought about by suicide and was not accidental. There was also an attempt to solicit such testimony from the sheriff, but no offer of proof was made, and the trial court refused to allow the opinions in evidence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff. Based on the instructions of the trial court, the general verdict was a finding that the death was accidental and not suicidal.
1--2. The admission of an expert's opinion is normally within the discretion of the trial court, and the reviewing court will not reverse unless there is an apparent error. Teslow v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 273 Minn. 309, 141 N.W.2d 507 (1966). In this case, the trial court excluded the medical opinion of the deputy county coroner on the basis that he was not possessed of any knowledge superior to that of the jury; he was not qualified to state an opinion as to the state of the mind of the deceased prior to death because he had no specific psychiatric training; and no foundation had been laid for such testimony....
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...examination of the victim's body.The court further noted that Dao Xiong was unlike its prior decision Hestad v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co., 295 Minn. 306, 204 N.W.2d 433, 436 (1973). See Dao Xiong, 829 N.W.2d at 397. There, the trial court excluded testimony from a coroner who would ha......
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