Heston v. Odlin

• Decision Date: 06 July 1923
• Docket Number: 17948.
• Citation: 216 P. 845,125 Wash. 477
• Parties: HESTON v. ODLIN.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

216 P. 845

125 Wash. 477

HESTON v. ODLIN.

No. 17948.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 6, 1923

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; Ernest M. Card, Judge.

Action by Edward C. Heston against Edith M. Odlin. From judgment for less relief than demanded, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

H. L Brown, of Roslyn, and Hayden, Langhorne & Metzger, all of Tacoma, for appellant.

Guy E Kelly, Thomas MacMahon, and Robt. B. Abel, all of Tacoma, for respondent.

BRIDGES J.

The parties hereto were husband and wife prior to May 21, 1920. On that date the superior court of Pierce county gave the respondent (plaintiff there) a divorce. The decree gave to her the care and custody of their son, a child now past six years of age. It further provided that the appellant (defendant there) should have 'the right and privilege of visiting said minor child at any and all reasonable times.' The appellant was further required to make monthly payments to the respondent of $75 for her own maintenance, and an additional $75 for the maintenance and care of the minor child. These payments have been seasonably made. Subsequently to the divorce respondent remarried and now lives with her husband at Anacortes, while the appellant resides at Roslyn. In September, 1922, the appellant petitioned the court which granted the divorce for a modification of the decree so that it would relieve him from paying any further sums to the respondent for her own maintenance, and would provide for $25 per month for the maintenance of the minor child, instead of $75 per month, as in the original decree. He also asked that the court make such modification of the original decree as that he would be permitted to have the custody of the child for such definite periods as the court might determine. After a hearing the trial court refused to modify the decree in any respect except to relieve appellant from the payment of any further sums for the maintenance of the respondent. It found that since the divorce respondent had permitted the child to visit appellant at various times, although she was not required by the decree so to do, and said:

'I do think, however, that the father should, as he has in the past, have the child occasionally. I think the court will leave the decree in that respect just as it is.'

It will not be necessary here to recite any more of the details of the testimony. We think the trial court was right in...