Heupel v. Imprimis Technology, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 July 1991
• Docket Number: Nos. 17338,17357 and 17358,s. 17338
• Citation: 473 N.W.2d 464
• Parties: Lavina L. HEUPEL, Claimant/Appellant, v. IMPRIMIS TECHNOLOGY, INC., Employer/Appellee, and Aetna Insurance Company and Gulf Insurance Company, Insurers/Appellees.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 464

473 N.W.2d 464

Lavina L. HEUPEL, Claimant/Appellant, v. IMPRIMIS TECHNOLOGY, INC., Employer/Appellee and Aetna Insurance Company and Gulf Insurance Company Insurers/Appellees.

Nos. 17338, 17357 and 17358.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued May 21, 1991.

Decided July 17, 1991.

Vicki L. Tucek, Rice & Ewinger Law Offices, Aberdeen, Gary D. Jensen, Rapid City, for claimant and appellant.

Barbara Anderson Lewis, Sioux Falls, for appellees, Imprimis & Aetna.

Greg Strommen, Rapid City, for appellee, Gulf.

WUEST, Justice.

While working for Imprimis Technology, Inc. (Imprimis) in Aberdeen, South Dakota, LaVina Heupel was exposed to certain chemical fumes which caused her serious difficulty in breathing. Heupel informed her manager of her difficulties and steps were taken to limit her exposure to the chemicals. However, Heupel continued to suffer difficulty breathing, and on December 4, 1987, she voluntarily terminated her employment with Imprimis. A voluntary termination document signed by Heupel cited "medical reasons" for her leaving.

Several months after Heupel terminated her employment, she was advised by Dr. David E. Williams of the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, that her lung problems were work-related. Heupel retained an attorney ^* in April 1988, to pursue her claim for workers' compensation based upon her lung problems. However, it was not until April 1989, that Heupel gave Imprimis written notice of her claim for workers' compensation.

Heupel filed a petition dated April 20, 1989, with the South Dakota Department of Labor, Division of Labor and Management (Department) seeking benefits for an occupational disease. Imprimis and its insurers, Aetna Insurance Company and Gulf Insurance Company (Insurers), denied Heupel suffered from a work-related disability and affirmatively alleged her claim was barred for failure to give written notice as required by statute. The Department acknowledged Heupel had not timely filed written notice of her claim with Imprimis, but permitted her to submit evidence that Imprimis and Insurers were equitably estopped from asserting lack of written notice as a defense.

After accepting evidence in her case, the Department found Heupel had failed to timely file written notice pursuant to SDCL 62-8-13 and SDCL 62-8-29, set forth infra. Without specifically acknowledging that equitable estoppel was a defense, the Department also found Heupel had failed to establish the elements necessary to estop Imprimis and Insurers from asserting the written notice defense. Accordingly, Heupel's petition was dismissed with prejudice.

Heupel appealed the decision of the Department to circuit court, which affirmed. She appeals to this court and raises two issues:

I. Whether failure to serve written notice of an occupational disease pursuant SDCL 62-8-13 and 62-8-29 mandates dismissal of the claim, and

II. Whether Imprimis and its Insurers are equitably estopped from asserting lack of written notice as a defense to her claim for benefits.

Imprimis and Insurers cross-appeal; however, we deem it unnecessary to address their contentions under our holding.

I.

Two statutory provisions of SDCL ch. 62-8 are relevant to the written notice issue. SDCL Sec. 62-8-13 provides:

An employer shall not be liable for compensation or other benefits under the provisions of this chapter for disability or death unless notice of disability and claim for compensation has been given and made to the employer in writing within the time fixed in Secs. 62-8-29 to 62-8-32, inclusive. (Emphasis added).

SDCL 62-8-29 provides:

Unless written notice of an occupational disease shall be given by the worker to the employer within six months after the employment has ceased in which it is claimed that the disease was contracted, ... all rights to compensation for disability, ... from an occupational disease shall be forever barred.

It is clear Heupel failed to give timely written notice as contemplated by the occupational disease statutes. The voluntary termination document signed by Heupel when she left Imprimis does not meet the requisite notice criteria and cannot operate as the required statutory notice: The voluntary termination statement gives no indication of the medical problem suffered by Heupel, identifies no alleged causal connection between the workplace and her medical condition and, moreover, makes no claim for compensation. Heupel gave adequate notice when she filed her petition with the Department in April 1989, but this was well over a year after she terminated her employment with Imprimis.

Heupel argues Imprimis had actual knowledge of her occupational disease and, thus, she is excused from meeting the statutory notice requirements. Even assuming Imprimis knew of her disease and claim for compensation, the statutory language of SDCL 62-8-13 and -29 clearly and unambiguously requires written notice of an occupational disease be given by the employee to the employer within six months after employment has ceased. Notwithstanding the general rule that workers' compensation statutes are to be construed liberally, South Dakota Medical Service, Inc. v. Minnesota Mut. Fire and Cas. Co., 303 N.W.2d 358, 361 (S.D.1981), we will not liberally construe a statute to avoid a seemingly harsh result where such construction would do violence to the plain meaning of the statute. Sioux Valley Hospital Ass'n v. Yankton County, 424 N.W.2d 379, 382 (S.D.1988); Simpson v. Tobin, 367 N.W.2d 757, 763 (S.D.1985); Wilhelm v. Narregang-Hart Co., 66 S.D. 155, 279 N.W. 549 (1938). Quite simply, Heupel failed to meet the clear command of the statutory notice requirement. We affirm the Department and circuit court on this issue.

II.

Heupel asserts that Imprimis and Insurers are equitably estopped from defending on the basis of the written notice requirement. The Department permitted Heupel to present evidence on this issue without specifically finding the doctrine...