Hewitt v. Gerber Prods. Co.
| Decision Date | 06 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:12-CV-02152 |
| Parties | DAVID HEWITT II; AARON JOHNSON; JAMES LANE; RALPH LAROSA, JR.; and JERRY OSBORNE; Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated PLAINTIFFS v. GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY d/b/a NESTLE' INFANT NUTRITION d/b/a NESTLE' NUTRITION USA d/b/a NESTLE' NUTRITION USA -INFANT NUTRITION d/b/a NESTLE' NUTRITION USA - PERFORMANCE NUTRITION; and PATRICK MURRAY DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand (Doc. 6) and supporting documents, and Defendant Gerber Products Company's ("Gerber") Response in Opposition (Doc. 18) and supporting documents. Plaintiffs also filed a Reply (Doc. 21) without leave of Court, which the Court, nevertheless, has read and considered. Plaintiffs dispute the existence of both federal question and diversity jurisdiction in this case, contending that their claims arise independently under state law, the parties are not diverse, and the amount in controversy does not meet the jurisdictional requirements. For the reasons described herein, Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand (Doc. 6) is GRANTED, and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Sebastian County, Arkansas.
Named Plaintiffs are hourly employees who are or were employed by Gerber at its Fort Smith, Arkansas, baby food manufacturing and processing facility (the "Facility"). On June 6,2012, Plaintiffs filed this putative collective action against Gerber in Sebastian County Circuit Court, asserting state law claims for unpaid wages under the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act ("AMWA") and for unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs allege they spent time donning and doffing protective gear, sanitizing clothing and equipment, washing their hands, and walking to and from their work stations for which they were not compensated, and also that they were periodically required to work through their lunch breaks without compensation. (Doc. 3, ¶ 3). Plaintiffs aver that they are entitled to compensation for this time under Arkansas state law. According to Plaintiffs, Gerber violated the AMWA and state common law by failing to fully compensate employees for time worked in excess of 40 hours per week.
On July 6, 2012, Gerber filed a Notice of Removal in this Court, alleging three theories of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). First, Gerber asserts that Plaintiffs' claims raise a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because they are completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, which grants exclusive federal jurisdiction over state law claims that are based on or require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). Second, Gerber contends removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 on grounds of traditional diversity jurisdiction. Third, Gerber argues diversity jurisdiction is proper under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA").
Plaintiffs moved to remand on July 23, 2012. Contemporaneously with their Motion, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint adding Patrick Murray, plant manager of the Facility and an Arkansas citizen, as a defendant. (Doc. 7). In support of remand, Plaintiffs argue that their claims arise independently under Arkansas law and are not completely preempted, that diversity jurisdiction does not exist because the parties are no longer completely diverse and Gerber has failed to provethe requisite amount in controversy, and that even if the Court finds that it has jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA, the local-controversy exception would require the Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction.
A defendant in state court may remove the case to federal court if the defendant can demonstrate that the federal court has original jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Once a case is removed to federal court, a plaintiff may move to remand to state court if the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Removal cases are construed more narrowly than originally filed cases to protect the plaintiff's choice of forum and to protect the state courts from usurpation by federal courts. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-109 (1941); Hurt v. Dow Chemical Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 1992). The Court must strictly construe the federal removal statute and resolve any ambiguities about federal jurisdiction in favor of remand. Transit Casualty Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 119 F.3d 619, 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
Gerber claims this Court has removal jurisdiction under three separate theories: federal question jurisdiction, traditional diversity jurisdiction, and CAFA jurisdiction. Plaintiffs dispute each theory, and argue that this Court must remand to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Each of these three theories of federal jurisdiction is analyzed below.
Federal courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In the usual case, the contents of a well-pleaded complaint determine federal question jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.386, 393 (1987). Federal preemption is ordinarily a substantive defense to the plaintiff's suit; as such, it does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, and therefore does not authorize removal to federal court. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). However, "[o]ne corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule . . . is that Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character." Id. at 64-65. Complete preemption converts an ordinary state law complaint into one asserting a federal claim. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. The complaint is viewed as stating a federal claim from the beginning; therefore, complete preemption provides a valid basis for removal to federal court. Carlson v. Arrowhead Concrete Works, Inc., 445 F.3d 1046, 1051 (8th Cir. 2006).
Section 301 of the LMRA is one of the few statutes to which the complete preemption doctrine undoubtedly applies. It provides: "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). "[T]he preemptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]here a complaint raises issues to which federal law applies with complete preemptive force, the Court must look beyond the face of the complaint in determining whether remand is proper." Austin v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 2012 WL 685416, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 2, 2012) (citing Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 2009)).
As a threshold issue, the Court must determine whether there is a clear indication that the Plaintiffs are covered by a CBA. See Pruell v. Caritas Christi, 645 F.3d 81, 83 (1st Cir. 2011) () (citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968)). Plaintiffs' Complaint does not mention either union membership or the existence of a CBA; however, Gerber alleges in its Notice of Removal that Plaintiffs are represented by Lodge 260 International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (the "Union") and that Gerber and the Union are parties to a CBA that addresses wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 3, 4). Plaintiffs do not dispute these allegations, but instead argue that their claims arise independently of any CBA and also that Gerber's preemption argument must fail as to any potential plaintiffs who are not members of the Union. (Doc. 7, p. 11). As a general rule in class action suits, the court looks to the status of the named plaintiffs and their claims. Pruell, 645 F.3d at 83 (citing 5 W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 23.63[1][b] (3d ed. 2011)). Named Plaintiffs do not deny that they are members of a Union, and Gerber's Human Resources Manager submitted a sworn affidavit stating that each of the named Plaintiffs is a member of the Union. (Doc. 19, ¶ 4). The Court therefore finds that, for the purpose of this Motion, Plaintiffs are members of the Union and are subject to the CBA between the Union and Gerber.
Section 301 "does not preempt every employment dispute, and it does not preempt all other disputes concerning CBA provisions." Miner v. Local 373, 513 F.3d 854, 865 (8th Cir. 2008). For complete preemption to be a valid basis for removal jurisdiction in this case, at least one ofPlaintiffs' state law claims must arise under § 301. A state claim arises under § 301 when "the heart of the state law complaint is a . . . clause in the collective bargaining agreement." Avco Corp., 390 U.S. at 558. The Eighth Circuit adopted a narrow approach to § 301 preemption, where the inquiry is only "whether the claim itself is necessarily grounded in rights established by a CBA." Meyer v. Schnucks Mkts., Inc., 163 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398-99 (...
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