Hewitt v. Pioneer-Press Co.

• Decision Date: 23 October 1876
• Citation: 23 Minn. 178
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: GEORGE HEWITT <I>vs.</I> PIONEER-PRESS COMPANY.

Page 178

23 Minn. 178

GEORGE HEWITTvs.

PIONEER-PRESS COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 23, 1876.

Action for libel, brought by plaintiff, the only telegraph operator at Pine City, against the defendant, publisher of the Pioneer-Press newspaper. The paragraph complained of was published by defendant in its issue of June 19, 1875, as an item in a column headed "State News," and was as follows: "The Pine City telegraph operator is a bad one. He is now under arrest for attempting to ravish a Swede woman, and seriously injuring a watchman that came to the woman's rescue." In its answer the defendant pleaded, among other things, in mitigation of damages, that, prior to its publication of the alleged libel, it had seen all the statements and charges therein printed and published in the St. Paul Dispatch, of June 17, 1875, and that the article complained of was published on June 18, 1875, in the Minneapolis Daily Tribune, from which the defendant copied it, believing it to be true, and as a matter of current news.

At the trial in the district court for Pine county, before Crosby, J., the defendant offered to prove the prior publication in the St. Paul Dispatch, and that the article in that paper was seen and read on that day by defendant's business manager, and by its news editor, who afterwards clipped from the Tribune the item complained of. The evidence was excluded, and defendant excepted. The jury found a verdict for plaintiff for $500. The defendant moved for a new trial on all the statutory grounds, the motion was granted, and plaintiff appealed.

Davis, O'Brien & Wilson, for appellant.

Mead & Thompson, for respondent.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

The motion for a new trial in this case was made upon all the grounds for a new trial allowed by the statutes, and there is nothing in the case to indicate upon which of the grounds the motion was granted. We have examined the case as to all the grounds alleged, and can find nothing upon which we can sustain the order granting the new trial, except the ground of misconduct of the jury, and of error of the court in excluding evidence offered by defendant in mitigation of the damages. Upon the first of these the affidavits are very contradictory. At the best, they make out a case of irregularities and improprieties on the part of the jury; and at the worst, they show gross misconduct by some of the jurors, and by those acting in behalf of the plaintiff, and apparently with his assent. The court below, from its knowledge of what took place at the trial, and from the appearance and demeanor of the parties, jurors, and those whose affidavits were taken, was in a much better position than we are to determine which set of affidavits probably contained the most truth. If the new trial was granted upon the facts disclosed by these affidavits — and we cannot say that this was not the ground of granting it — we could not overrule the decision of the court below upon them. The granting of a new trial for such reasons being in the sound discretion of the trial court, it would require a very clear case against its action to justify us in reversing its decision.

The error of the court — and it is the only one which we find —...