Hewlett v. Probate Court of Clearwater County

• Decision Date: 27 March 1946
• Docket Number: 7251
• Citation: 66 Idaho 690,168 P.2d 77
• Parties: MARLIN HEWLETT, MONTY NEWELL, DONALD ANDERSON, TOMMY JOHNSON and GUY HELM, Minors; OSCAR HEWLETT and STELLA HEWLETT; ASA NEWELL and MRS. ASA NEWELL; ARTHUR ANDERSON and MYRTLE ANDERSON; J. J. JOHNSON and MRS. J. J. JOHNSON; GEORGE HELM and MRS. GEORGE HELM, Parents, Appellants and Cross-Respondents, v. PROBATE COURT OF CLEARWATER COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO (E. B. Steele, Judge of said Court), Respondent and Cross-Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

168 P.2d 77

66 Idaho 690

MARLIN HEWLETT, MONTY NEWELL, DONALD ANDERSON, TOMMY JOHNSON and GUY HELM, Minors; OSCAR HEWLETT and STELLA HEWLETT; ASA NEWELL and MRS. ASA NEWELL; ARTHUR ANDERSON and MYRTLE ANDERSON; J. J. JOHNSON and MRS. J. J. JOHNSON; GEORGE HELM and MRS. GEORGE HELM, Parents, Appellants and Cross-Respondents, v. PROBATE COURT OF CLEARWATER COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO (E. B. Steele, Judge of said Court), Respondent and Cross-Appellant

No. 7251

Supreme Court of Idaho

March 27, 1946

Rehearing denied April 29, 1946.

1. Infants

The information required by statute dealing with procedure for charging juvenile delinquents, has reference to the conduct of the child proceeded against and is intended to be summarily disposed by the court, is civil and paternal in character, and does not partake of the nature of a criminal information. (I.C.A., secs. 19-1201, 31-1303.)

2. Infants

Information charging minors with delinquency because they allegedly committed burglaries and thefts and other crimes, was not defective on ground that the delinquents were being proceeded against for the commission of felonies and that probate court, sitting as a juvenile court, therefore had no jurisdiction. (I.C.A., secs. 19-1201, 31-1303.)

3. Infants

The juvenile court has no criminal jurisdiction in delinquency cases. (I.C.A., sec. 31-1302.)

4. Infants

Fact that parents of minors were not made parties to original proceedings in juvenile delinquency court, did not invalidate proceedings there, when parents were notified of proceedings and were in court at time of hearing and participated in the proceedings. (I.C.A., secs. 31-1301 to 31-1303.)

5. Infants

Minors under the age of eighteen years who are found by juvenile court with having engaged in commission of a series of crimes consisting of burglaries, grand larcenies and robberies, were properly found to be "juvenile delinquents" within meaning of statute. (I.C.A., sec. 31-1301.)

6. Infants

Where probate court, sitting as juvenile court, properly adjudged that minors under 18 years of age were juvenile delinquents as defined by statute, probate court's order committing minors to the State Industrial Training School was proper. (I.C.A., sec. 31-1301.)

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, for Clearwater County. Hon. A. L. Morgan, Judge.

Judgment of District Court reversed and cause remanded with directions.

Paul W. Hyatt and Samuel F. Swayne for appellants.

A juvenile proceeding is a special statutory proceeding and the procedure is purely statutory. (State v. Florez (N. Mex.), 8 P.2d 786; In re Santillanes (N. Mex.), 138 P.2d at 510, column 1; 31 C.J. 1105, column 2.)

Substantial compliance with the terms of the statute is essential to the validity of the proceedings. (31 C.J. 1105-1106.)

The necessity, nature and sufficiency of the accusations are regulated by statute. (31 C.J. 1107.)

The Idaho statute requires the Information of Complaint in a juvenile proceeding to set forth in a general way facts constituting any alleged delinquency, and also that the child is without the care or protection of a parent or guardian, or that any parent or guardian is neglecting such child. (Section 31-1303, I.C.A.)

Frank F. Kimble for respondent.

The courts of the state are established by the Constitution and the laws and their jurisdiction as such are fixed by the Constitution and the statutes. (Sec. 2, Art. 5, Idaho Const.; Sec. 21, Art. 5, Idaho Const.; Sec. 31-1302, I.C.A.; In re Sharp, 15 Ida. 120, 96 P. 563.)

An action under the juvenile law is not criminal in nature, but paternal and remedial in character and is against the juvenile primarily for purpose of saving him. (In re Sharp, supra.)

The court erred in holding that the juvenile court did not have authority to commit to the Industrial Training School. (Sec. 31-1308, I.C.A.)

A substantial compliance with a statute is sufficient when the parties or court are appraised that a probable delinquency exists. (Sec. 5-907, I.C.A.; Sec. 31-1303, I.C.A.; 40 W. & P. 495; Hartley v. Bohrer, 52 Ida. 72, 11 P.2d 616; Mattice v. Babcock, 52 Ida. 653, 20 P.2d 207.)

Ailshie, J. Budge and Givens, JJ., concur. Holden, J., dissenting.

OPINION

Ailshie, J.

January 30, 1945, the probation officer of Clearwater county filed complaint in the probate court, sitting as a juvenile court, against Marlin Hewlett, Duane Harvey, Monte Newell, Donald Anderson, Tommy Johnson and Guy Helm, minors, under the provisions of chapter 13, Title 31, I.C.A., and charged them with being juvenile delinquents and as such, breaking and entering store buildings, belonging to others, removing "from cars and other places property not their own, and did habitually wander the streets and highways at night and in the nighttime without being on any lawful business"; and praying that "each of them may be cared for and corrected according to law and as provided by Chapter Thirteen of Title Thirty-one Idaho Code Annotated of 1932." On the same date, after an investigation made by the court, it was ordered that a formal hearing be had upon the information charging them with being juvenile delinquents, and that the parents be notified and served with notice of hearing.

The action against Duane Harvey was dropped as he was a resident of the state of Washington and was transferred to that state. The other minors, all under the age of eighteen years, were found to be residents of Clearwater county.

February 9, 1945, the probate court of Clearwater county, sitting as a juvenile court, made and entered a decree adjudging Marlin Hewlett, Monty Newell, Donald Anderson, Tommy Johnson and Guy Helm, minors, to be juvenile delinquent persons, under the provisions of Chapter 13, title 31, I.C.A., and also adjudged and decreed that "each of them be and they each are committed to the Industrial Training School of Idaho at St. Anthony until they reach the age of twenty-one years or are sooner released from said school under the regulation thereof." All statutory requirements prior to entry of decree were complied with. At the time of entering the decree the minors were all under the age of eighteen years. The findings of fact disclose that, during the latter part of 1944 and the early part of 1945, the minors, collectively, were engaged in the commission of a series of crimes consisting of burglaries, grand larcenies and robberies, committed in Nez Perce and Clearwater counties. All of the minors and their parents are residents of Clearwater county and were in court at the time of entry of the decree.

February 12, 1945, the parents of the minors, jointly and severally, appealed to the district court of Clearwater county from the decree of the juvenile court, committing the minors to the Idaho Industrial Training School, and from the whole thereof, upon questions of both law and fact. Also, on the same date, on application of the minors' parents, a writ of review issued from the district court, directed to the probate court, with a return date of March 5, 1945, requiring the probate judge to certify and send up the record in the juvenile court, wherein the minors were adjudged delinquent persons and committed to the Idaho Industrial Training School. The respondent probate judge demurred to the sufficiency of the application and moved to quash the writ, which demurrer and motion were by the district court overruled and denied.

March 13, 1945, (filed March 15, 1945) the district court entered judgment affirming the decree of the juvenile court adjudging the minors to be delinquent persons, but holding that that part of the decree committing the minors to the Idaho Industrial Training School was a nullity.

The appellants have appealed from the judgment, on the grounds that the complaint in the juvenile court did not state sufficient statutory grounds to give the court jurisdiction to adjudge the minors to be delinquent persons. The respondent cross-appealed from the judgment holding that the juvenile court had no authority to commit the minors to the Idaho Industrial Training School.

The appellants submit two assignments of error, to the effect that the district court erred in affirming the judgment of the probate court, that the juveniles are, and each of them is, delinquent; and in remanding the matter to the probate court, sitting as a juvenile court for further proceedings; and erred in not vacating the order, judgment or commitment of the probate court in its entirety, and in not adjudging the entire proceedings, findings, judgment and orders of the probate court to be a nullity, for the reasons and upon the same grounds as set forth in assignment numbered one.

Sec. 31-1301 provides: ^[1] Section 31-1302 vests the jurisdiction of juvenile delinquents in the probate court. ^[2]

Section 31-1303 provides the procedure for charging delinquents and trial of the case. ^[3]

These provisions of the statute were passed upon and held to be constitutional in In re Sharp, 15 Ida. 120, 96 P. 563, 18 L.R.A., N.S., 886, and the Sharp case has been followed by this court ever since. (In re Small, 19 Ida. 1, 2, 116 P. 118; Jain v. Priest, 30 Ida. 273, 282, 164 P. 364; Allen v. Williams, 31 Ida. 309, 311, 171 P. 493; Martin v. Vincent, 34 Ida. 432, 435, 201 P. 492; In re Farnsworth, 46 Ida. 47, 49, 266 P. 421; Bannock County v. Coffin, 46 Ida. 531, 534, 269 P. 90; In re Allmon, 50 Ida. 223, 225, 294 P. 528; Kelley v. Prouty, 52 Ida. 743, 745, 19 P.2d 1061; Porter v. Estate of Porter, 54 Ida. 99, 103, 28 P.2d 898.

It seems clear that the "information" required by sec 31-1303 has reference to the conduct of the child proceeded against and is intended to "be summarily disposed of by the court" and is civil and paternal in character. ( In re Sharp, supr...