State v. Gibbs
| Decision Date | 03 August 1972 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 10957,10958,s. 10957 |
| Citation | 94 Idaho 908,500 P.2d 209 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gary D. GIBBS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Donart & Higgins, Weiser, for defendant-appellant.
W. Anthony Park, Atty. Gen., Martin R. Ward, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, Lary C. Walker, Pros. Atty., Washington County, Weiser, for plaintiff-respondent.
On March 16, 1971, two petitions were filed in the magistrate's division of the Third Judicial District in the interest of Gary D. Gibbs, a child under eighteen years of age. The petitions alleged that Gary, then seventeen years old and residing in Oregon near Weiser, Idaho, committed two separate acts of first degree burglary with the intent to commit larceny on the night of March 10, 1971, in Idaho. On March 18 the prosecuting attorney filed motions for the magistrate's division to waive jurisdiction 1 under the Youth Rehabilitation Act (Y.R.A.). On March 19, Gary's parents were mailed two summonses notifying them that petitions had been filed alleging that their son was within the purview of I.C. § 16-1803(1)(b) of the Y.R.A. 2 The summonses ordered the parents and child to appear in magistrate's court on March 29, and notified them of their right to be represented by counsel. However, the summonses did not indicate the purpose of the appearance beyond reciting allegations in the petitions; neither did they disclose the pending motions for the magistrate to waive jurisdiction.
On March 29, the magistrate conducted what were termed as 'interviews' on the two petitions. Neither the boy nor his parents were represented by counsel. However, upon being fully advised of their rights, the parents and child indicated that they were willing to proceed. They were further advised that they could terminate the proceedings at any time by refusing to answer questions. In that event, 'hearings' would be scheduled, at which time the State would be required to produce evidence showing Gary to come within the purview of the Y.R.A.
After initial questioning regarding the boy's age and residence, the magistrate informed Gary and his parents that the court could waive jurisdiction under the Y.R.A. and bind Gary over to the district court for trial as an adult on each charge of first degree burglary. If found guilty at such a trial Gary could be sentenced to not less than one nor more than fifteen years in the state penitentiary for each felony. 3 It appears from the record that this disclosure in each 'interview' represented the first notice to Gary and his parents that a purpose of the proceedings was to determine whether to bind the boy over to district court.
Gary and his parents were then informed that the magistrate could not, at such proceedings, accept a plea of guilty or find Gary guilty. The magistrate requested Gary to tell him 'whatever he wanted to' about the allegations in order to determine their sufficiency to bind Gary over for trial. Gary indicated, at both 'interviews' that the allegations in the petitions were true. At the first 'interview' the magistrate asked Gary and his parents if they had consulted a doctor concerning psychiatric examination and treatment. They indicated they had and that the doctor had recommended 'family-wise' counseling since there were difficulties at home, but 'there was no mental illness.' The magistrate was further informed that Gary had been in that court before and at that time was on probation for previous offenses not specified in the record. At the conclusion of each 'interview' the magistrate found Gary within the purview of the Y.R.A., but then waived jurisdiction and bound him over to the district court for trial as an adult on the felony charges. The court subsequently entered written 'decrees' to this effect, and supplemented these with 'orders' also waiving jurisdiction.
Following these proceedings, Gary retained counsel and appealed to the district court from the waivers of jurisdiction in the magistrate's division. Further criminal proceedings in the district court against Gary were stayed pending the appeal. Gary contended that when he admitted the truth of the allegations in the petitions, he entered the functional equivalent of a guilty plea and on that basis was found to be within the purview of the Y.R.A. He argued that constitutional protections from double jeopardy 4 should have precluded the magistrate from binding him over for trial to the district court on the same charges. The district court found that the child and his parents were specifically admonished by the magistrate that a plea of guilty could not be entered or accepted at the 'interviews' and that the proceedings were preliminary in nature. The district court held that there could have been no plea or adjudication of guilt to create former jeopardy, and the 'orders' waiving jurisdiction were affirmed.
In his appeal to this Court, Gary has assigned error generally, on 'due process' grounds, to the waiver of jurisdiction. Under that rubric he couples his double jeopardy contention with the argument that he was denied his right to a proper hearing before the magistrate. For the reasons articulated below, we hold that the waiver was invalid because (1) it was unauthorized by statute; (2) it subjected Gary to possible double jeopardy; (3) the waiver proceedings were not prefaced by timely notice advising Gary and his parents that motions to waive jurisdiction were pending before the magistrate; and (4) the waiver decision did not conform to the criteria set forth infra.
It is useful to establish at the outset a framework for analysis, by examining more closely the conflicting 'orders' and 'decrees' entered by the magistrate. Each 'order' simply waived jurisdiction and bound Gary over for trial in the district court under I.C. § 16-1809, supra. However, the 'decrees' entered prior to the 'orders' also contained findings that Gary was within purview of the Y.R.A. under I.C. § 16-1803, supra, because he violated state law. I.C. § 16-1814 provides that if the magistrate finds jurisdiction under I.C. § 16-1803 he shall so 'decree' and then may select among six listed final dispository possibilities. Waiver of jurisdiction is not one of those possibilities. A magistrate cannot find jurisdiction under I.C. § 16-1803 and then purport to waive jurisdiction under I.C. § 16-1806.
Ordinarily, as a matter of logic, the magistrate might surmise that he must find jurisdiction under the Y.R.A. before such jurisdiction could be waived. However, I.C. § 16-1803 imparts a narrow meaning to the term 'jurisdiction' when it provides that the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over a juvenile 'who has violated * * * any * * * state * * * law * * *.' Taken literally, I.C. § 16-1803 creates a dilemma; for if the magistrate finds the accused to be a violator who is therefore subject to the court's exclusive jurisdiction under the Y.R.A., I.C. § 16-1814 is activated and precludes waiver of the jurisdiction thus found. Such an interpretation effectively would nullify I.C. § 16-1806. This Court adheres to the cardinal principle that a statutory provision will not be deprived of its potency if a reasonable, alternative construction is possible. 5
The statutes may be reconciled when we recognize that the express grant of jurisdiction over a juvenile 'who has violated * * * any * * * state * * * law' necessarily includes the incidental power to review the facts and circumstances, and to determine whether the accused is in fact a violator who is amenable to rehabilitative treatment under the Y.R.A. Prior to finding the defendant a violator, I.C. § 16-1814 does not require the court to choose among the six final dispositions. Therefore, at this point the court may elect on the basis of its review of the facts and circumstances, to waive jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 16-1806, rather than assuming it under I.C. § 16-1803. However, the court cannot do both.
By undertaking to do both in this case, the magistrate not only entangled the applicable statutes, but also thereby created the closely related double jeopardy issue to which appellant directs our attention. Double jeopardy has been termed '(t)he least litigated issue in the area of procedural protections and constitutional rights in the juvenile courts.' 6 Those courts which have addressed the question are in conflict. Until recently, the greater weight of authority appeared to rest on the proposition that jeopardy does not attach in juvenile proceedings because they are noncriminal in nature. 7 The premise that such proceedings are not criminal was rooted in the assumption that the objectives of reform and rehabilitation required a 'socialized,' informal court procedure inducing the child 'to feel that he is the object of (the court's) care and solicitude.' 8 That assumption, merged with the doctrine of parens patriae borrowed from courts of chancery, led this Court six decades ago to exempt juvenile courts from the rigors of due process because their purpose was not to try crimes but 'to confer a benefit on the child and the community in the way of surrounding the child with better and more elevating influences and of educating and training him * * *.'
Nevertheless, this 'optimism of a more hopeful day' could not forever obscure the fact that, '(t)o the child and his family the imposition of authority or commitment to a training school seemed little different from the consequence of a criminal conviction.' 10 Moreover, studies of juvenile treatment programs throughout the country began to reveal that rehabilitation was not always achieved, but occasionally had been so overshadowed by emphasis on discipline that the programs resembled the penal systems they were intended to replace. 11 In Kent v. United States, 12 the Supreme Court observed:
'There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds:...
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...to the Court's opinion suggest their appropriateness as guidelines for juvenile court waiver proceedings.' In State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 916, 500 P.2d 209, 217 (1972), the Idaho Supreme Court, confronted with a challenge similar to the one advanced here, molded the criteria on the basis ......
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