Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Committee, Etc.

• Decision Date: 03 May 1944
• Docket Number: No. 8207.,8207.
• Citation: 179 S.W.2d 946
• Parties: HEXTER TITLE & ABSTRACT CO., Inc., v. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE, FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL DIST., STATE BAR OF TEXAS, et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 946

179 S.W.2d 946

HEXTER TITLE & ABSTRACT CO., Inc., v. GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE, FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL DIST., STATE BAR OF TEXAS, et al.

No. 8207.

Supreme Court of Texas.

May 3, 1944.

Error from Court of Civil Appeals of Second Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by Grievance Committee, Fifth Congressional District, State Bar of Texas, and another against Hexter Title & Abstract Company, Incorporated, to enjoin the defendant from practice of law. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed in part the judgment of the trial court and granted plaintiffs the full relief prayed for, 175 S.W.2d 108, and the defendant brings error.

Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.

Touchstone, Wight, Gormley & Touchstone, of Dallas, for petitioner.

R. Guy Carter, William P. Goar, C. K. Bullard, and C. C. Renfro, all of Dallas, for respondents.

Hamilton, Lipscomb, Wood & Swift and Dexter Hamilton, all of Dallas, and W. Boyd Smith, of San Antonio, amici curiae, for petitioner.

Burges, Burges, Scott, Rasberry & Hulse and J. F. Hulse, all of El Paso, amici curiae, for State Bar.

W. B. Moss, of Sinton, Alton J. Luckett, of New Braunfels, Elbert Jandt, of Seguin, Frank B. Lloyd, of Alice, and Howell Ward, of Corpus Christi, amici curiae, for Grievance Committee, 14th Cong. Dist.

J. R. Sorrell, Henri Warren, and Howell Ward, all of Corpus Christi, amici curiae, for Grievance Committee, Nueces County Bar.

Homa S. Hill and Melvin F. Adler, both of Ft. Worth, amici curiae, for Ft. Worth Bar Ass'n.

C. E. Coolidge and Irl F. Kennerly, both of Houston, amici curiae, for Grievance Committee, State Bar for 8th Cong. Dist.

Grady Barrett, of San Antonio, amicus curiae, for Grievance Committee, 20th Dist.

A. V. Knight, of San Antonio, amicus curiae, for Board of Directors, San Antonio Bar Ass'n.

Black, Graves & Stayton and C. L. Black, all of Austin, Thompson, Knight, Harris, Wright & Weisberg and Wm. H. Neary, all of Dallas, S. A. Crowley, of Ft. Worth, Adkins, Pipkin, Madden & Keffer, Gibson, Ochsner, Little & Sutton, and Simpson, Dorenfield & Fullingim, all of Amarillo, Walter F. Clark, Clark, White & Rogers, Chas. C. Hampton, W. Clyde Odeneal, and Russell V. Rogers, Jr., all of Dallas, E. W. Earl, Jones, Hardie, Grambling & Howell, and M. Scarborough, all of El Paso, B. B. Brown, V. C. McNamee, Geo. Kemble, Zeno C. Ross, E. C. Pannell, Jack Rattikin, Hampden Spiller, and H. K. Welch, all of Ft. Worth, Ira B. Simmons, of Houston, C. C. Crocker, of San Angelo, A. M. Heck, Louis D. Hill, and R. P. Ingrum, all of San Antonio, and Hamlett Harrison, Horace Wells, James J. Sheerin, and Otis Bowyer, Jr., all of Dallas, amici curiae.

ALEXANDER, Chief Justice.

The Grievance Committee of the State Bar of Texas for the Fifth Congressional District brought this suit against Hexter Title and Abstract Company, Inc., to enjoin said defendant from doing certain acts which were alleged to be the practice of law in violation of the statutes of this State. The trial court granted part, but not all, of the relief prayed for by plaintiff. Upon appeal the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court in part, and granted the full relief prayed for by plaintiff. 175 S.W.2d 108. Hexter Title and Abstract Company, Inc., applied for and obtained a writ of error to this court.

The Bar Association of Dallas was at one time a party plaintiff in the suit, but the trial court sustained a plea in abatement as to said plaintiff, and that part of the judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. The Bar Association of Dallas has not attempted to prosecute any further appeal from the judgment in that respect, and hence we need not consider whether said Association had the right to maintain the suit.

Before considering the specific points raised by the appeal it would be well to review the statutes heretofore enacted by the Legislature of this State for the purpose of regulating the practice of law and the purposes sought to be accomplished thereby. In 1933 the Legislature enacted Penal Code, Article 430a, Vernon's Ann.P. C., Acts 1933, p. 835, which carefully defined what constituted the practice of law and designated who were prohibited from so practicing. In 1939 the Legislature went one step further and enacted the State Bar Act, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stat. Art. 320a—1, Act 1939, 46th Leg., p. 64, which had for its purpose the further regulation of the practice of law. That act created the organization known as the State Bar, composed of the registered licensed attorneys of the State, and constituted it an administrative agency of the judicial department. The same act empowered the Supreme Court, with the approval of a majority of the registered licensed lawyers, to prescribe rules and regulations "for disciplining, suspending, and disbarring attorneys at law; for the conduct of the State Bar; and prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of attorneys at law." The act prohibited those not members of the State Bar from practicing law, and empowered the agency there created to carry out the purposes of the act. The primary purpose of the Legislature in the enactment of the above legislation was to protect the public by eliminating from the law profession those morally unfit to enjoy the privileges and those lacking in proper training and other qualifications necessary to perform the services required of an attorney. The practice of law is a matter of vital interest to the public. The lawyer is primarily engaged in the protection and preservation of the liberties and property rights of the people and the administration of justice among them, which is one of the primary purposes of good government. As society has become more compact the law has necessarily become more complex, requiring increased skill in its application. The Legislature in recognition of this fact has from time to time increased the prelegal and legal attainments required for admission to the Bar. These safeguards have been deemed necessary by the Legislature to protect the public against the loss of their liberty and property rights through ill advice from incompetent practitioners. It is readily apparent that it would serve no useful purpose to require high standards of efficiency for members of the legal profession if those who have not attained these standards of efficiency are to be permitted to practice the arts of the profession. Also, the relation between attorney and client is a most intimate one, involving the highest degree of confidence and trust, and in which, as a consequence, there is almost unlimited opportunity for fraud on the part of the attorney. It is apparent, therefore, that those who are to be entrusted with the opportunities of such a position should be possessed of a high degree of integrity. In recognition of this the Legislature has set up machinery for the establishment of canons of ethics for the profession, and the disbarment of those guilty of fraudulent or dishonorable practice or malpractice. Again, it would be useless to establish high standards of morality for members of the profession if those who are not members, and therefore not bound by such canons, could practice the arts of the profession. The State has a vital interest in the regulation of the practice of law for the benefit and protection of the people as a whole, and the legislation above referred to was adopted in furtherance of a wholesome public policy.

The first contention here presented is that the Grievance Committee of the State Bar had no authority to maintain the suit to enjoin the defendant from practicing law.

It is a very well established rule in this State that a plaintiff cannot maintain a suit to enjoin the violation of a criminal law unless such violation results in damage to such plaintiff or otherwise affects him in a manner peculiar to him, and not common to the public in general. Woods v. Kiersky, Tex.Com.App., 14 S.W. 2d 825, 828. We believe, however, that the plaintiff in this case has an interest in the subject matter of the suit that is peculiar to it, and not common to the public in general.

The State Bar Act, Art. 320a—1, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats., Acts 1939, 46th Leg. p. 64, reads in part as follows:

"Sec. 2. There is hereby created the State Bar, which is hereby constituted an administrative agency of the Judicial Department of the State, with power to contract with relation to its own affairs and which may sue and be sued and have such other powers as are reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

"Section 3. All persons who are now or who shall hereafter be licensed to practice law in this State shall constitute and be members of the State Bar, and shall be subject to the provisions hereof and the rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas; and all persons not members of the State Bar are hereby prohibited from practicing law in this State. * * *" (Italics ours.)

It will be noted that one of the purposes of the above act was to subject all members of the Bar to the provisions of the act, and another purpose was to prohibit those not members of the State Bar from practicing law. The State Bar was created as an administrative agency of the judicial department to carry out these purposes, and was given the right to sue and "such other powers as are reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." In other words, the State Bar Act prohibited persons not members of the State Bar from practicing law, and conferred upon the State Bar all the powers reasonably necessary to effectuate that purpose. The act at least impliedly made it the duty of the State Bar to enforce the provisions thereof which prohibited non-members from practicing law. It therefore had an interest in the subject of the suit peculiar to itself, such as would authorize it to maintain a suit for the enforcement of the provisions of the act.

The act clearly conferred upon the State Bar all powers reasonably...