Hiatt v. Department of Labor and Industries

• Decision Date: 10 May 1956
• Docket Number: No. 33421,33421
• Citation: 48 Wn.2d 843,297 P.2d 244
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Aria A. HIATT, Widow of Ned L. Hiatt, Deceased, Respondent, v. The DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES of the State of Washington, Appellant,

Page 843

48 Wn.2d 843

297 P.2d 244

Aria A. HIATT, Widow of Ned L. Hiatt, Deceased, Respondent, v. The DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES of the State of Washington, Appellant,

No. 33421.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 1.

May 10, 1956.

Don Eastvold, Atty. Gen., William C. Hallin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Bassett, Geisness & Vance, Seattle, for respondent.

SCHWELLENBACH, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment reversing an order of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals and granting a widow's pension.

October 1, 1950, Ned Hiatt sustained injuries to his right shoulder and a compression fracture of his spine while in the course of extrahazardous employment. A claim was timely filed. He received treatment for his injuries at the Seattle General Hospital. After his discharge from the hospital on October 23, 1950, and while convalescing, he suffered a fatal heart attack at the home of a friend, on November 26, 1950.

March 6, 1951, the supervisor closed the claim with an award of twenty-five per cent of the maximum allowed for unspecified disability; ten per cent of the amputation value of the arm at the shoulder, and time loss as previously paid. Two weeks later, his surviving spouse, respondent herein, filed a claim for a widow's pension. The claim was subsequently rejected by the department, and that order was upheld by the Board of Appeals.

On appeal to the superior court it was stipulated that the workman was totally disabled at the time of his death and that his death was not caused by the industrial injury. The trial court found:

'* * * Said workman died November 26, 1950, as a result of a coronary thrombosis. Said thrombosis consisted of a blood clot in the coronary artery which began to form within a few days, at most, prior to his death. Said coronary thrombosis was not caused by said industrial injury. As a direct and proximate result of said industrial injury said decedent was totally disabled at all times after said injury until his death and, if he had not died, he would have been totally disabled for at least four to six months after November 26, 1950, as a direct and proximate result of said industrial injury. If decedent had lived out an average life expectancy for a man of his years, it would have been reasonable to expect that he would eventually have recovered from the effects of his industrial injury to the extent that he could return to a gainful occupation. At the time of said injury and at all times thereafter until his death said decedent suffered from a far advanced generalized condition of arteriosclerosis and by reason of said condition had no life expectancy.'

The court concluded that, at the time of his death, the workman was totally and permanently disabled as a direct and proximate result of the industrial injury. Judgment was entered reversing the order rejecting the claim and remanding the cause to the department with instructions to allow the widow's pension.

RCW 51.32.060 (in effect at the time of decedent's injury) provides in part:

'When permanent total disability results from the injury, the workman shall receive monthly during the period of such disability'. (Then follows schedule of payments.) RCW 51.32.050(7) provides:

'If the injured workman dies during the period of permanent total disability, whatever the cause of death, leaving a widow, invalid widower, or child, the surviving widow or invalid widower shall receive one hundred dollars per month until death or remarriage, * * *.'

Our problem is this: Was the total disability of the deceased workman permanent at the time of his death, within the meaning of the workmen's compensation act? Respondent contends that it was permanent because it was reasonably calculated to be continued until his death, since he had no life expectancy.

RCW 51.08.160 defines "permanent total disability" within the meaning of the workmen's compensation act:

"Permanent total disability' means loss of both legs, or arms, or one leg and one arm, total loss of eyesight, paralysis or other condition permanently incapacitating the workman from performing any work at any gainful occupation.'

In Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Sullivan, 33 Wyo. 223, 237 P. 253, 254, the Supreme Court of Wyoming, in discussing a statute identical in language with the above, stated:

'Except in the cases of permanent total disability that are specifically...