Hickman v. City of Detroit, Dept. of St. Rys.

• Decision Date: 09 January 1950
• Docket Number: No. 88,88
• Citation: 326 Mich. 547,40 N.W.2d 722
• Parties: HICKMAN v. CITY OF DETROIT, DEPARTMENT OF STREET RAILWAYS.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 722

40 N.W.2d 722

326 Mich. 547

HICKMAN v. CITY OF DETROIT, DEPARTMENT OF STREET RAILWAYS.

No. 88.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Jan. 9, 1950.

John T. Meier, Ralph L. Hayes, Detroit, attorneys for defendant and appellant.

Leon Dreifuss, Detroit, attorney for plaintiff and appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

CARR, Justice.

On the 8th of June, 1948, and for some time prior thereto, plaintiff was employed by the City of Detroit in its department of street railways as an extra coact operator. He worked out of the Highland Park garage terminal located on Second Avenue. On the date mentioned he quit work at 12:48 a. m. Under the terms of his employment he was required to report to the terminal for a 5:30 a. m. 'show up', for the purpose of being assigned to a run, if available for him.

After checking out of the terminal plaintiff drove his automobile downtown, returning to the terminal shortly after 3 a. m. It is his claim that he did this for the purpose of being assigned to a run before 5:30 in the event that a regular driver failed to appear in time for his scheduled run. Plaintiff parked his automobile on Second Avenue between the sidewalk and the curb, entered the terminal, and advised the station master of his return, stating in substance that he would be sleeping upstairs in the 'recreation room' Instead of going to the recreation room, plaintiff left the terminal for the purpose of returning to his automobile and shutting off the motor which he had left running in order to charge the battery. While walking along a driveway a few feet from the door he slipped and fell. It is his claim that while lying prone on the driveway he was run over by a coach driven by an employee who failed to see him. As a result, he sustained a broken leg.

Application for hearing and adjustment of claim under the workmen's compensation law of the State* was filed by plaintiff on August 24, 1948. Defendant denied liability, claiming in its answer that plaintiff had not suffered a compensable injury 'arising out of and in the course of' his employment by defendant. The deputy commissioner by whom the matter was heard awarded plaintiff compensation of $21 per week for total disability from June 9, 1948, until the further order of the commission, together with medical and hospital expense in the sum of $1,445.50. The workmen's compensation commission affirmed the award. On leave granted, defendant has appealed.

Based on the facts as found from the testimony taken before the deputy commissioner, the compensation commission came to the conclusion that plaintiff had sustained a personal injury 'arising out of and in the course of his employment' by defendant, within the meaning of section 1 of part 2 of the workmen's compensation law, C.L.1948, § 412.1, Stat.Ann.1947 Cum.Supp. § 17.151. Defendant insists that such conclusion was erroneous on the ground that at the time he was injured plaintiff was engaged in a purely personal mission not connected with his employment or arising out of it. He was, as above noted, on his way from the terminal to his parked automobile, for the purpose of shutting off the motor, at the time he sustained the injury. On behalf of plaintiff it is contended that the award should be upheld, some stress being placed on the fact that the accident happened on defendant's premises. In substance it is plaintiff's position that at the time of the accident he was within the ambit of his employment and that his injury may fairly be said to have been suffered in the course of such employment and to have arisen therefrom.

The compensation commission, in its opinion filed in the proceeding, after stating the facts and the issue involved in the case, said in part:

'It is fairly well established that an accident which occurs on the employer's premises after the employee has finished his day's work arises out of and in the course of his employment. We think the same principle should apply in this case. The accident occurred on the employer's premises.'

In making the statement quoted the commission doubtless had in mind prior decisions of this court in cases where the injuries involved were sustained on the employers' premises and in which such fact was, to some extent at least, emphasized. Hills v. Blair, 182 Mich. 20, 148 N.W. 243; Haller v. City of Lansing, 195 Mich. 753, 162 N.W. 335, L.R.A.1917E, 324; Brink v. J. W. Wells Lumber Co., 229 Mich. 35, 201...