Hickman v. Hickman
Decision Date | 25 January 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 1091,1091 |
Citation | 366 S.E.2d 21,294 S.C. 486 |
Parties | Donna M. HICKMAN, Respondent, v. Kenneth W. HICKMAN, Appellant. . Heard |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Hans F. Paul, North Charleston, for appellant.
Henry T. Gaud, Charleston, for respondent.
In this domestic case, Kenneth W. Hickman appeals from the order of the family court granting his wife Donna M. Hickman separate support and maintenance and certain other relief in the nature of support. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Mr. Hickman complains of the award to Mrs. Hickman of permanent, periodic alimony in the amount of $333.33 a month. He claims the trial court should have awarded Mrs. Hickman only rehabilitative alimony.
Although a court may award rehabilitative alimony, our Supreme Court has cautioned that "the record must demonstrate the self-sufficiency of the recipient at the expiration date of the ordered payments." Herring v. Herring, 286 S.C. 447, 451, 335 S.E.2d 366, 368 (1985). Here, the record does not show any likelihood that Mrs. Hickman after a given time during which rehabilitative alimony is paid would become any more self sufficient than she already is. See Eagerton v. Eagerton, 285 S.C. 279, 328 S.E.2d 912 (Ct.App.1985) ( ).
The trial court committed no error, therefore, in awarding Mrs. Hickman permanent, periodic alimony instead of rehabilitative alimony.
Mr. Hickman next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring him to secure the payment of permanent, periodic alimony with life insurance.
The trial court's order directed Mr. Hickman "[to] continue ... in force the life insurance on his life with [Mrs. Hickman] named as beneficiary so long as he is obligated for support." Under the order, Mr. Hickman is obligated for both alimony and child support.
In South Carolina, a family court cannot require, absent special circumstances, a supporting spouse to obtain or maintain, solely as an incident of periodic support, a life insurance policy naming the dependent spouse as beneficiary. Hardin v. Hardin, 365 S.E.2d 34 (S.Ct.App.1987). There are no special circumstances here that warrant security for the payment of alimony to Mrs. Hickman.
The trial court's order, therefore, is reversed to the extent that it requires Mr. Hickman to secure with life insurance the payment of permanent, periodic alimony to Mrs. Hickman.
Mr. Hickman further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring him to pay an excessive amount as child support each month and in failing to allocate the support payments among the parties' three children.
The trial court required Mr. Hickman to pay $666.67 a month in unallocated child support and required him to pay additional payments in the nature of child support for high school tuition for the two older children, for medical and hospitalization insurance for all three children, and for the children's medical, dental, orthodontic, and periodontal expenses not covered by insurance. The oldest child, a son, was expected to graduate from high school in the spring of 1987 and would reach his eighteenth birthday in October, 1987.
The amount to be awarded as child support is within the sound discretion of the trial court whose award thereof will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Spires v Higgins, 271 S.C. 530, 248 S.E.2d 488 (1978). An abuse of discretion is never presumed and the burden of showing an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court is on the complaining party. 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 88 at 438 (1978). In ascertaining the proper amount of child support, the court should consider the totality of the pertinent circumstances surrounding the case. See Lee v. Lee, 237 S.C. 532, 118 S.E.2d 171 (1961) ( ).
Mr. Hickman argues that the trial court failed to consider his "necessities and living expenses," one of several factors a court should weigh in determining the amount of child support. Peebles v. Disher, 279 S.C. 611, 310 S.E.2d 823 (Ct.App.1983). Our reading of the trial court's order, however, does not leave us with this impression. The trial court expressly referred in its order to the financial declaration on which Mr. Hickman listed his various expenses and to the fact that Mr. Hickman was then living with his mother.
We note, moreover, that Mr. Hickman's financial declaration discloses that he enjoys a net monthly income of $2,870.56, that he contributes the sum of $315.22 each month to a pension plan, and that he has, aside from his one-half interest in the marital home, which the trial court valued at $69,316, assets worth $63,755. Cf. 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 51 at 329 (1978) ( ).
The trial court, therefore, committed no abuse of discretion in determining the amount Mr. Hickman must pay each month in child support.
Regarding the failure of the trial court to allocate the child support among the parties' three children, we discern no abuse of discretion. To our knowledge, no rule exists requiring a court to allocate child support among dependent children not in the parent's custody. Cf. Stroman v. Williams, 291 S.C. 376, 353 S.E.2d 704 (Ct.App.1987) ( ).
Mr. Hickman also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring him to pay for a portion of the college education expenses of his two sons.
As we noted above, the older son was to finish high school in the spring of 1987. The younger son was to finish three years later. The trial court ordered Mr. Hickman "[to] provide the necessary additional funds for [the older child] to complete his college education" and it ordered "that the same provisions ... apply to the younger son...."
We reverse the requirement that Mr. Hickman pay a portion of his two sons' college education expenses.
Concerning the older son, there are no findings by the trial court regarding his financial ability to attend college without Mr. Hickman's assistance, there are no findings regarding the availability of grants and loans, there are no findings regarding his ability to earn income during the school year and during vacation periods, and there are no findings regarding what the reasonable costs of his education will be. Wagner v. Wagner, 285 S.C. 430, 329 S.E.2d 788 (Ct.App.1985); McKinney v. McKinney, 282 S.C. 96, 316 S.E.2d 728 (Ct.App.1984); Hughes v. Hughes, 280 S.C. 388, 313 S.E.2d 32 (Ct.App.1984).
Concerning the younger son, the requirement that Mr. Hickman pay a portion of his college expenses is premature at best, the boy being only a ninth grader at the time of the hearing. Cf. Risinger v. Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 (1979) ( ).
We therefore remand for additional findings of fact the issue of whether Mr. Hickman should help pay for the college education expenses of his older son and, if so, how much. Risinger v. Risinger, supra; Wagner v. Wagner, supra; McKinney v McKinney, supra; Hughes v. Hughes, supra.
The question of whether Mr. Hickman should assist the younger son with his college education expenses can be raised later when and if the younger son is ready for college.
Mr. Hickman's remaining contentions center on the award of exclusive possession of the marital home to Mrs. Hickman and on the requirement that he pay certain expenses associated with the costs of maintaining the home while it is in Mrs. Hickman's exclusive possession.
The trial court granted Mrs. Hickman exclusive use of the marital home "at least until July, 1991 at which time [the older son's] four-year college term should have ended ...". Mr. Hickman argues that this amounts to an award of the marital home to Mrs. Hickman for an indefinite period of time and that such an award is impermissible.
The question of whether to award one spouse exclusive possession of the marital home is one addressed to the sound discretion of the trial...
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