Hickman v. Schnell
| Decision Date | 06 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | A22-0319 |
| Parties | In Re: Henry Hickman, Appellant, v. Paul Schnell, Commissioner of MN Dept. of Corrections, et al., Defendants, Sgt. D. Franklin, Corrections Officer at Rush City MN, State Prison, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Chisago County District Court File No. 13-CV-20-807
Henry Hickman, Rush City, Minnesota (pro se appellant).
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Anna Veit-Carter, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent).
Considered and decided by Gaitas, Presiding Judge; Bratvold Judge; and Larson, Judge.
Appellant, an inmate, injured his wrist when a security door closed as he exited the residential wing of a state prison. He seeks review from a judgment dismissing his claims against respondent, the corrections officer who operated the security door. Appellant argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment dismissing his negligence and battery claims and by dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) claim for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We conclude that, in response to evidence submitted by respondent, appellant produced no evidence from which a jury could find that respondent breached his duty of care to appellant or that respondent intentionally closed the door on appellant as alleged in the complaint, defeating his negligence and battery claims. We also conclude that any error was harmless in the district court's decision to dismiss the section 1983 claim. Thus, we affirm.
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to Hickman reflects the following facts. In May 2020, pro se appellant Henry Hickman was 63 years old and an inmate at Minnesota Correctional Facility-Rush City (MCF-Rush City). Hickman resided in North B-Wing of Complex 4. Respondent Sergeant D. Franklin was a corrections officer at MCF-Rush City and was stationed in Complex 4 as the North Complex bubble officer.
Bubble officers follow MCF-Rush City's Offender Movement Control Operating Guidelines (operating guidelines). Under the operating guidelines, bubble officers oversee "switch outs," which are large movements of inmates between a residential wing and the rest of the facility. During a switch out, inmates pass through a security door. The operating guidelines direct bubble officers to announce three stages of the switch out: (1) five minutes before the switch out begins, (2) when the switch out begins and a security door opens, and (3) one minute before a security door closes at the end of a switch out.
Bubble officers use a touch screen to open and close a security door during a switch out. The security door for North B-Wing, where Hickman resided, is a large steel sliding door that takes about seven seconds to fully open or to fully close. A bubble officer can stop a security door's movement by pressing "stop" on the touch screen. When a bubble officer presses "stop," about one second elapses before the security door stops. Franklin averred that bubble officers "are not supposed to close a security door while an offender is in the doorway."
Inmates receive MCF-Rush City's Offender Information and Informal Sanctions Handbook (offender handbook), which provides that an inmate must switch out "at designated times" and is allowed "two minutes to exit" the area "after the switch out is called."
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Franklin submitted an affidavit about the day that Hickman was injured during a noontime switch out when inmates left North B-Wing to go the lunchroom. Franklin averred that on May 4, 2020, he announced (1) five minutes before the switch out began, (2) when the switch out began, and (3) when there was one minute remaining in the switch out.
Two surveillance cameras recorded events during the switch out, and the summary-judgment record includes two video exhibits. Exhibit C is a video recording of the security door between North B-Wing and the rest of the facility from about 12:35 p.m. to 12:39 p.m. Exhibit D is a video recording of the interior of North B-Wing from about 12:35 p.m. to 12:39 p.m. Both exhibits C and D include time stamps but do not include audio.
The following summarizes the two video recordings. At 12:35 p.m. and 31 seconds, Franklin begins opening the security door, which is fully open at about 12:35 p.m. and 38 seconds. Exhibit D shows Hickman exiting a cell on the upper level of North B-Wing at about 12:36 p.m. and 53 seconds. He is wearing glasses, a gray sweatshirt with a white shirt underneath it, gray sweatpants, and white tennis shoes. From 12:36 p.m. and 53 seconds to 12:37 p.m. and 33 seconds, Hickman stands outside the cell on the upper level. At 12:37 p.m. and 33 seconds, Hickman reenters the cell for about four seconds before exiting the cell again at 12:37 p.m. and 37 seconds. At 12:37 p.m. and 45 seconds, Hickman starts descending the stairs from the upper level of B-Wing.
At 12:37 p.m. and 53 seconds, the doorway with the security door is clear and Franklin begins closing the door. Exhibit C shows Hickman about ten feet from the security door when it starts closing. Four seconds after Franklin begins closing the door, Hickman squeezes through the security door. Hickman takes about one second to clear the doorway. Exhibit C shows the security door jerk before it finishes closing at 12:38 p.m.
In December 2020, Hickman sued Franklin along with other parties not involved in this appeal. 1[] Hickman's complaint alleged that Franklin negligently or intentionally closed the security door "on [Hickman's] left wrist," causing injury, and "Franklin had the opportunity to stop the metal door" but failed to do so. Based on these alleged facts, Hickman asserted three claims: negligence, battery, and a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In July 2021, Franklin moved to dismiss the complaint under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court granted Franklin's motion in part, dismissing Hickman's section 1983 claim, and denied it in part, determining that Hickman pleaded sufficient facts to support his negligence and battery claims.
In December 2021, Franklin moved for summary judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 56, affidavits and various exhibits, including the video recordings. Hickman opposed the motion and, in his affidavit, asserted that Franklin's "inattention or sloppiness caused the injury." Hickman also argued in his memorandum that the video recordings supported his claim that Franklin "closed a heavy metal door on" Hickman.
At the end of a hearing during which Franklin's attorney and Hickman argued their positions, the district court granted Franklin's motion for summary judgment dismissing Hickman's negligence and battery claims. The district court explained that no evidence showed that Franklin breached a duty of care because the security door was open for "more than two minutes," the period provided in the offender handbook for exiting during a switch out. The district court also determined that no evidence showed that Franklin intentionally closed the door "in an effort to harm" Hickman. Following the hearing, the district court issued an order directing entry of judgment for Franklin.
Hickman appeals.
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 753 (Minn. 2005); accord Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. We review a district court's summary-judgment decision de novo to "determine whether the district court properly applied the law and whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment." Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010).
Franklin contends that the district court erred by granting summary judgment dismissing his negligence claim. "Negligence is the failure to exercise the level of care that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the same or similar circumstances." Doe 169 v. Brandon, 845 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Minn. 2014). Negligence consists of "four elements necessary for recovery: (1) the existence of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) an injury, and (4) the breach of that duty being the proximate cause of the injury." Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Minn. 2001).
Franklin does not dispute that he owed Hickman a duty to exercise reasonable care while operating the security door. An individual owes a duty of care if an injury is foreseeable. Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 888 (Minn. 2010). Thus, the issue here is whether Hickman offered evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Franklin breached his duty of care when he operated the security door while Hickman exited during a switch out.
An individual acts with reasonable care if they "exercise the degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances." Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 28 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). Breach of the duty of reasonable care is generally a question of fact for the jury to decide. Sauter v. Sauter, 70 N.W.2d 351, 354 (Minn. 1955); Stelling v. Hanson Silo Co., 563 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Minn.App. 1997). Still, summary judgment is proper "when the record contains a complete lack of proof on any of the four...
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