Hicks v. Albertson
Citation | 284 N.C. 236,200 S.E.2d 40 |
Decision Date | 14 November 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 52,52 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Parties | Roland HICKS v. James Michael ALBERTSON. |
Henson, Donahue & Elrod by Joseph E. Elrod, III, Greensboro, for defendant appellant.
Clontz, Gardner & Tate by J. W. Clontz and Rossie G. Gardner, High Point, for plaintiff appellee.
'The general rule in this State is that, in the absence of statutory authority therefor, a court may not include an allowance of attorneys' fees as part of the costs recoverable by the successful party to an action or proceeding.' In re King, 281 N.C. 533, 540, 189 S.E.2d 158, 162. 'Except as so provided by statute, attorneys' fees are not allowable.' Baxter v. Jones, 283 N.C. 327, 330, 196 S.E.2d 193, 196. See also, Bowman v. Chair Co., 271 N.C. 702, 157 S.E.2d 378. An exception, recognized in the case of a party who, by his own effort and at his own expense, has preserved or increased a common fund or common property in which others may share with him, has no application to the present case. See: Hoskins v. Hoskins, 259 N.C. 704, 131 S.E.2d 326; Rider v. Lenoir County, 238 N.C. 632, 78 S.E.2d 745; Horner v. Chamber of Commerce, 236 N.C. 96, 72 S.E.2d 21; Trust Co. v. Schneider, 235 N.C. 446, 70 S.E.2d 578.
G.S. § 6--21.1 provides:
'In any personal injury or property damage suit * * * instituted in a court of record, where the judgment for recovery of damages is two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) or less, the Presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney representing the litigant obtaining a judgment for damages in said suit, said attorney's fee to be taxed as a part of the court costs.' (Emphasis added.)
The obvious purpose of this statute is to provide relief for a person who has sustained injury or property damage in an amount so small that, if he must pay his attorney out of his recovery, he may well conclude that it is not economically feasible to bring suit on his claim. In such a situation the Legislature apparently concluded that the defendant, though at fault, would have an unjustly superior bargaining power in settlement negotiations. It is, of course, a matter of common knowledge that a great majority of such claims arise out of automobile accidents in which the alleged wrongdoer is insured and his insurance carrier controls the litigation. This statute, being remedial, should be construed liberally to accomplish the purpose of the Legislature and to bring within it all cases fairly falling within its intended scope. Weston v. Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 263, 75 S.E. 800; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, §§ 303--305; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 388.
In the present case, a suit was instituted in a court of record for property damage and the judgment for recovery of damages was less than $2,000. Thus, the case falls squarely within the language of G.S. § 6--21.1, unless the provision in the statute that the Presiding judge may allow the fee as part of the costs excludes this case from the beneficient purpose of the statute.
Where the suit is actually brought to trial, it is clear that the Legislature contemplated that the judge who presided at the trial would determine whether a fee for the attorney of the party recovering damages should be allowed and, if so, the amount. Such judge would be in a better position than any other to make this determination. To hold, as the defendant here contends, that this use of the adjective 'presiding' shows the Legislature intended that no fee be allowed in any case settled without actual trial is, in our opinion, to give this word an unreasonably strict construction.
So to construe the statute would defeat its purpose in large part, for such construction would require the claimant to insist that the case be carried to trial, thereby enlarging the reasonable attorney's fee, in order that his net recovery equal his actual loss. In this statute, we construe the term 'presiding judge' to mean the judge presiding over the court in which the action is instituted. Such judge can, without danger of injustice, fix a reasonable fee for the attorney of the party recovering damages by settlement prior to trial. Here, the fee allowed was fixed by such judge. The defendant does not contend that the amount of it was unreasonable.
Rule 68(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
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