Hicks v. Giles, 17963

Decision Date06 September 1962
Docket NumberNo. 17963,17963
Citation127 S.E.2d 196,241 S.C. 129
PartiesR. L. HICKS, Respondent, v. Glenn H. GILES, Appellant.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Hayes & Hayes, Rock Hill, W. M. Brice, Jr., York, for appellant.

Simrill & Simrill, Rock Hill, for respondent.

BUSSEY, Justice.

The plaintiff-respondent in this action seeks to recover certain moneys from the defendant-appellant based upon a sharecropping agreement between the parties, the plaintiff being the owner of the land and the defendant the sharecropper, and plaintiff's farm being adjacent to a farm owned by the defendant. The complaint alleges three causes of action; the first for the recovery of half of the expenses of the farming operation; in the second, the plaintiff seeks to recover for half of the expenditures made by him in connection with the feeding and caring for an intermingled herd of cattle belonging to plaintiff and defendant; and in the third cause of action plaintiff seeks an accounting from the defendant for the profits.

Defendant interposed a general denial and the case was referred generally to Hon. Cleve E. Lytle, as special referee, who held a reference on the 19th day of October 1959, and filed a report which was confirmed in its entirety by an order of the Honorable James Hugh McFaddin, dated January 7, 1960, from which order there was no appeal.

As certain issues were concluded by the order of Judge McFaddin, we quote the following pertinent portions from the first report of the special referee, confirmed by said order:

'After a careful review of the material evidence presented I find and conclude that the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a modified sharecropping agreement for the years 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954 and 1955. I further find and conclude that the specific terms and conditions of the sharecropping agreement were as follows:

'(a) The plaintiff and defendant agreed that the plaintiff would furnish to the defendant all fertilizers and other commodities needed in the farm operations of plaintiff's farm; and that the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant would care for the plaintiff's cows, maintain fences, grow oats and other grain crops which could be eaten by cattle, clear farm land, cultivate and maintain permanent pasturage, and plant limited acreage of cotton and corn, all such farm operations related to plaintiff's farm.

'(b) The plaintiff and the defendant agreed that each would share equally all expenses attributed to farm operations of plaintiff's farm.

'(c) The plaintiff and the defendant agreed that each would share equally in the profits derived from farm operations of the plaintiff's farm.'

In addition to the foregoing, the referee found that during certain years of the agreement an undertermined amount of oats, hay and grain crops was produced on the plaintiff's farm, and that the total crop produced for these years was fed to intermingled cattle owned by the plaintiff and the defendant. The number of cattle owned by each was approximately the same. The referee further found that during the years 1954-1955 certain cotton was produced on plaintiff's farm and that during each of said years the plaintiff had received one bale less cotton than the defendant.

Thereafter, pursuant to another order of reference, a further reference was held on July 6, 1960 at which evidence was taken in connection with the expenses of operating the farm, feeding the intermingled cattle, and profits from the farming operation, following which the special referee filed a report recommending a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the total amount of $4,670.95, which report was confirmed by the order of Honorable Julius B. Ness, dated January 7, 1961, the appeal here being from the order of Judge Ness.

The defendant by his exceptions raised numerous questions but several of his exceptions are not properly before this court, the questions raised thereby having been concluded by the order of Judge McFaddin from which order there was no appeal, and we shall now consider only the questions which are properly before us.

The appellant contends that he should have been allowed to orally amend his answer in the middle of the second and final reference so as to plead the statute of limitations with reference to expenditures during the years 1951 and 1952. In this connection the defendant contends that the complaint was insufficient to put him on notice that the plaintiff would attempt to prove expenditures during the years 1951 and 1952. In our view not only was the complaint entirely sufficient in this respect, but, in addition thereto, Judge McFaddin's order had long since adjudicated the fact that the agreement extended from 1951 through 1955, and the defendant's liability for his share of expenses during the years in question.

The court's exercise of discretion with reference to allowance of am...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Kirven v. Lawrence
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • August 13, 1964
    ...however, this power is not unlimited. Alamance Industries v. Chesterfield Hosiery Mill, 239 S.C. 287, 122 S.E.2d 648; Hicks v. Giles, 241 S.C. 129, 127 S.E.2d 196. In Pickett v. Southern Rwy.-Carolina Division, 74 S.C. 236, 54 S.E. 375, this Court '* * * The fact that there had been two tri......
  • Sea Pines Plantation Co. v. Wells
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 5, 1987
    ...and Schools, 265 S.C. 459, 219 S.E.2d 837 (1975). See also, Odom v. Odom, 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E.2d 353 (1966); Hicks v. Giles, 241 S.C. 129, 127 S.E.2d 196 (1962). A. Appellant alleges that the trial court erroneously concluded that the flagpole, satellite dish and jacuzzi were "structures"......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT