Hicks v. Jones

• Decision Date: 11 July 1946
• Docket Number: 147/155.
• Citation: 47 A.2d 894
• Parties: HICKS et al. v. JONES et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

47 A.2d 894

HICKS et al.

v.JONES et al.

147/155.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

July 11, 1946.

Suit by Douglas M. Hicks and Sue E. Hassell, surviving executors of Frank R. Jones, deceased, against Emma H. Jones and others for construction of decedent's will.

Will construed.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A court of equity will normally decline to interpret and construe testamentary passages alleged to be nebulous unless there is some present or imminent need for enlightenment.

2. However, this court has the power to construe a will irrespective of other equitable relief, and to determine and declare the rights of beneficiaries therein involved.

3. Held, that by the words ‘in case the income directed to be paid her (widow) at any time shall be insufficient, in the opinion of my executors or trustees, to provide her with all the necessary comforts, conveniences and enjoyments of life, suited to one in her station, then, and in such case, I give unto her so much of the principal of my estate as in the opinion of said executors or trustees may be necessary for such purposes,’ the testator intended that his widow, the life tenant of his trust, should currently receive during her life from his estate sums sufficient to enable her to continue to have the same or comparable ‘comforts, conveniences and enjoyment’ to which she had been accustomed and which would be in keeping with her usual and prevailing mode of living.

4. Held, further, that there is nothing in the testator's will to indicate an intention that his widow in the event of an insufficiency of trust income should first resort to her own independent and personal income. Hence, evidence of it should be ignored by the trustees in determining the adequacy of the income from the trust.

Hicks, Kuhlthau, Thompson & Deshler and John B. Molineux, all of New Brunswick, for complainants.

Fred W. DeVoe, of New Brunswick, for defendants Rector, etc., Christ Church.

Hopkins, Vorburger & Dickson and Herman Vorburger, all of Hoboken, for defendant Presbyterian Hospital.

George R. Morrison, of New Brunswick, for defendant New Brunswick Community Chest.

Frederic M. P. Pearse and George S. Pearse, both of Newark, for defendant Evergreens.

R. E. & A. D. Watson, of New Brunswick, for defendants Grace J. Holland and others.

McCarter, English & Studer and Woodruff English, all of Newark, for defendant Emma H. Jones.

Philip Blacher, of New Brunswick, for defendant Saint Peters General Hospital.

JAYNE, Vice Chancellor.

It is perhaps precautious to note initially that this court as a matter of policy will normally decline to interpret and construe testamentary passages alleged to be nebulous unless there is some present or imminent need for enlightenment. Stewart v. Stewart, 61 N.J.Eq. 25, 47 A. 633; Ogden v. McLane, 73 N.J.Eq. 159, 67 A. 695; Kellogg v. Burnett, 74 N.J.Eq. 304, 69 A. 196; Matlock v. Matlock, 98 N.J.Eq. 572, 131 A. 212; Potter v. Watkins, 90 N.J.Eq. 538, 134 A. 84; Caldwell Nat. Bank v. Rickard, 103 N.J.Eq. 516, 143 A. 745; Titsworth v. Titsworth, 107 N.J.Eq. 436, 152 A. 869; Joselson v. Joselson, 116 N.J.Eq. 180, 172 A. 812; March v. Norristown Penn Trust Co., 123 N.J.Eq. 282, 197 A. 276; Schumacher v. Howard Savings Institution, 128 N.J.Eq. 56, 63, 15 A.2d 107, affirmed 131 N.J.Eq. 211, 23 A.2d 581; 1 Barbour's Ch. Pr., 2d Rev. Ed., 332, c. 12.

Yet the power of this court to construe a will irrespective of other equitable relief, and to determine and declare the rights of beneficiaries therein involved is not exposed, I think, to any substantial doubt. In re Ungaro's Will, 88 N.J.Eq. 25, 102 A. 244; R.S. 2:26-68, N.J.S.A. 2:26-68.

The testator, Frank R. Jones, executed his last will and testament on April 19, 1936. He died on April 9, 1939. He left for testamentary distribution an estate of an estimated value in excess of $800,000. The present inquiry is concentrated upon the fifth article of the will which may be here literally exemplified:

‘Fifth: Excepting and reserving the sum of One Thousand, Two Hundred Dollars ($1,200.00) annually, hereinafter given my mother, and also the provisions hereinafter for my two sisters, Grace J. Holland and Martha W. Jones, I also give and bequeath unto my said wife the entire income from my estate and property from the day of my death so long as she, my said wife, shall survive, to be paid to her at different periods through each year as the same shall be available, and in case the income so directed to be paid her at any time shall be insufficient, in the opinion of my executors or trustees, to provide her with all the necessary comforts, conveniences and enjoyments of life, suited to one in her station, then, and in such case, I give unto her so much of the principal of my estate as in the opinion of said executors or trustees may be necessary for such purposes.

‘Should it be demonstrated, however, that she will not use all of said income, then, at the end of each year, after making provision for payment of taxes and expenses and for the payments to my said mother and sisters, such unused and unreserved income shall be added to the corpus of my estate and be disposed of as herein directed.’

The point concerning which the complainants experience doubt is presented by them in their brief in the following fashion: ‘The sole issue is as to whether or not ‘station in life’ refers to that mode of living in fact followed by the testator (and his wife) during the last years of his life, or whether it refers to a mode of living to be determined by the life tenant or by the executors in view of the size of the testator's estate or which the life tenant, in the exercise of her own discretion, might prevail upon the executors to approve. In exercising their discretion, what test or limitation has the testator placed upon the executors?'

The occasion for the present proceeding is said to arise from the diversity of the opinions of the life tenant and those having interests in remainder respecting the circumstances in which the testator intended the corpus to be invaded for the beneficial advantages of his widow, the life tenant.

The complainants and the remaindermen incline to the view that the testamentary phrase ‘necessary comforts, conveniences and enjoyments of life suited to one in her station’ restricts the authority of the fiduciaries to invade the corpus to amounts, if any, reasonably required to afford the life tenant the same comforts, conveniences, and enjoyments theretofore customarily supplied to her by the testator. The life tenant proposes that she is entitled under the provisions of the will to such payments from princiapl as she in her estimation and judgment may require for her comforts, conveniences, and enjoyments, and that the duty of the fiduciaries to honor her requests is in pursuance of the intention of the testator and imperative, without regard to their ‘opinion’ concerning the necessity or need of such allowances.

The cardinal rules in aid of the construction of wills have been recently recapitulated in Barrett v. Barrett, 134 N.J.Eq. 138, 34 A.2d 579, and in Bottomley v. Bottomley, 134 N.J.Eq. 279, 35 A.2d 475. The rules of construction, generated over a span of years by judgment and experience, afford guidance, but in this class of cases an investigation of the reported decisions so often seems to confirm the aphorism that ‘no will has a twin brother,’ and the duty ad instar remains to detect the intention of the particular testator from a studious consideration of the language of his will pursued in the light of the pertinent circumstances which in his individual case actually surrounded the composition of the will. Duane v. Stevens, 137 N.J.Eq. 329, 44 A.2d 716.

In quest of precedents having some helpful relevancy to the issue here in question, my attention has fallen upon the following cases among others: Lippincott v. Ridgway, 11 N.J.Eq. 526; Jacobus' Ex'r v. Jacobus, 20 N.J.Eq. 49; McKnight's Ex'rs v. Walsh, 24 N.J.Eq. 498; Stephens v. Howard's Ex'r, 32 N.J.Eq. 244; Corlies v. Allen, 36 N.J.Eq. 100; Reeve v. Beekman, 42 N.J.Eq. 613, 9 A. 27, affirmed 44 N.J.Eq. 295, 18 A. 80; Coffin v. Watson, 78 N.J.Eq. 307, 79 A. 275, affirmed 79 N.J.Eq. 643, 83 A. 1118; Gluckman v. Roberson, 116 N.J.Eq. 531, 174 A. 488; New Jersey Title Guarantee, etc., Co. v. Dailey, 123 N.J.Eq. 205, 196 A. 703; Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Read, 124 N.J.Eq. 599, 4 A.2d 10; Commonwealth-Merchants Trust Co. v. Seglie, 127 N.J.Eq. 160, 12 A.2d 153.

The federal courts have had reason to construe testamentary bequests somewhat similar. Notably, Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151, 49 S.Ct. 291, 73 L.Ed. 647; Merchants Nat. Bank of Boston v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256, 64 S.Ct. 108, 88 L.Ed. 35; Hartford Connecticut Trust...