Hicks v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co, 25165.

• Decision Date: 13 February 1936
• Docket Number: No. 25165.,25165.
• Citation: 52 Ga.App. 828,184 S.E. 808
• Parties: HICKS et al. v. STANDARD ACC. INS. CO. et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

52 Ga.App. 828

184 S.E. 808

HICKS et al.

v.STANDARD ACC. INS. CO. et al.

No. 25165.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Feb. 13, 1936.

Rehearing Denied March 24, 1935.

Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Error from Superior Court, Hart County; Berry T. Moseley, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by V. B. Hicks and others, opposed by the Standard Accident & Insurance Company, insurer, and another. To review a judgment of the superior court affirming an order of the Department of Industrial Relations dismissing the claim, claimants bring error.

Affirmed.

Hugh & Carey, of Skelton, and A. S. Skelton and J. H. & Emmett Skelton, all of Hartwell, for plaintiffs in error.

Neely, Marshall & Greene, of Atlanta, for defendants in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

SUTTON, Judge.

This is a writ of error to review the judgment of the superior court affirming, on appeal, an award of the Department of Industrial Relations denying compensation and dismissing the claim. It appears from the judgment excepted to that on August 5, 1926, one Hicks received an injury while working for a named company subject to the provisions of the workmen's compensation statute, and as a result of that injury he died on December 28, 1932; that no claim for compensation because of such injury was ever filed by Hicks; that on May 3, 1933, and within one year from the date of Hicks' death, a claim was filed by his dependents seeking compensation for the death of such employee, on which claim a hearing was had on June 28, 1933, and on September 18, 1933, the commissioner held as a matter of law that the claim was barred, and dismissed it for the reason that any claim of the deceased employee had become barred, and because the full period of 300 weeks after the date of the accident had passed before the dependents filed their claim; that from this order an appeal was taken to the superior court, where, on December 4, 1933, the award was affirmed, to which judgment of affirmance no exception was taken; that, within six months from December 4, 1933, being more than one year after the death of the employee, the claimants filed a second claim, contending that they had a right so to do under the Civil Code of 1910, § 4381 (Code 1933, § 3-808); and that on January 19, 1935, the commission again denied compensation on the ground that the claimants were barred by reason of the order denying them compensation and dismissing their first claim, which was conclusive, having been affirmed by judgment of the superior court on appeal, and no exception to that judgment taken; and that the department had no jurisdiction to grant a new hearing, or a rehearing and change, or to correct the order or award made on the first claim.

The power of the Department of Industrial Relations to reopen and rehear cases or grant a new hearing, in a matter in which an award has been made, is limited by the compensation act; and after seven days from its rendition, where there has been no change in condition, the department cannot reopen a final and conclusive award, denying compensation and dismissing the claim therefor, which was appealed to the superior court and there affirmed, and no exception taken. The doctrine of res judicata applies to such an unreversed order or judgment. Therefore the Department of Industrial Relations has not the power and authority, under ...