Hicks v. State
| Citation | 983 S.W.2d 240 |
| Parties | Willie L. HICKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 02 April 1998 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee |
Gerald Stanley Green, Memphis, TN, for Appellant..
John Knox Walkup, Attorney General & Reporter, Sandy C. Patrick, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Justice Division, Nashville, TN, H. Greeley Wells, District Attorney General, Barry Staubus, Assistant District Attorney General, Blountville, TN, for Appellee.
The petitioner, Willie L. Hicks, appeals pursuant to Rule 3, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief. The petitioner pleaded guilty in 1994 of the first-degree murder of Yolanda Riley and the second-degree murder of her sister, Jennifer Riley. In accordance with the plea agreement, he received a life sentence with the possibility of parole in the first-degree murder conviction and a consecutive sentence of fifteen years for second-degree murder. On March 27, 1996, retained counsel filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the attorneys 1 who represented the petitioner during the plea bargaining and the submission of the plea were ineffective and that the guilty plea was entered involuntarily. After an evidentiary hearing, the post- conviction judge 2 entered a thorough and detailed memorandum order finding that Hicks had received effective assistance of counsel and that the guilty pleas were entered knowingly and voluntarily. Therefore, the lower court denied Hicks's petition for post-conviction relief.
In this appeal, Hicks contends (1) that his attorneys were ineffective in that they did not investigate and assert all apparently substantial defenses and that they failed to communicate properly with a defendant whose intelligence and understanding were well below average, and (2) that the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to trial and the privilege against self-incrimination.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
We begin with a brief summary of the facts as they appear in the transcripts of the post-conviction hearing, the submission hearing, and the preliminary hearing. The two victims and the petitioner were from Clarksdale, Mississippi. When Yolanda Riley decided to enter the Job Corps training program at Bristol, Tennessee, Hicks became upset. Three times he came to Tennessee to persuade her to return with him to Mississippi. The third time, Yolanda's sister, Jennifer, and Jennifer's two small children accompanied him. After spending the weekend with the petitioner and her sister, Yolanda agreed to return to Mississippi. However, after returning to the Job Corps site and meeting with her advisor and two other students, she changed her mind. She and the two students were sitting in a small inner office. The door was locked. Hicks, who was in the outer office, spoke to Yolanda on the telephone. When the conversation ended, Hicks kicked open the locked door, entered the office, and shot Yolanda several times, once execution-style in the back of the head. Then, he fired a single shot at Jennifer who had entered the office. Both women died.
The grand jury indicted the petitioner on two counts of premeditated and deliberate murder, and the state indicated that it would seek the death penalty. 3 When defense counsel traveled to Clarksdale, they discovered that, according to an intelligence test taken before he was eighteen, Hicks had an I.Q. of 59 and deficits in adaptive behavior. Although other test results yielded somewhat higher scores, the state apparently concluded that seeking the death penalty would be problematic under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203. 4 Hicks was allowed to plead guilty to first-degree murder in the shooting of Yolanda Riley and to second-degree murder in the shooting of Jennifer Riley.
At the guilty plea submission hearing, Hicks acknowledged that he fired the shots that killed the women but denied that he intended to kill them. He also disputed the number of shots that were fired and denied firing directly into Yolanda's head. When the trial judge questioned him more closely, he insisted that he shot the women accidentally. The trial judge then said, "Well, gentlemen, the Court's duty is pretty clear." The district attorney then suggested that the court accept the plea as an Alford plea. 5 The district attorney and defense counsel once again summarized the state's evidence for the court. The evidence would demonstrate that Hicks had brought the gun from Mississippi, that he carried it loaded into the Job Corps offices where he kicked open the locked door, and that one eye-witness heard him say, The trial judge then resumed his questioning of the petitioner who agreed that he wanted to waive his rights and plead guilty according to the plea agreement. Nothing more was said about an Alford plea. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced the petitioner.
The petitioner, his mother, and attorney, Mark Slagle, testified at the post-conviction hearing. Hicks said that his attorneys told him that if he went to trial he would receive the death penalty. Hicks testified that he thought the submission hearing was actually a trial, that the other people in the courtroom were the jury, and that when the trial judge said, "Well, gentlemen, my choice is clear," he thought he had lost his case. Later, he responded "guilty" to the trial judge's question because he thought he had lost. He also said that his attorneys had visited him more than five times and had told him about life sentences and the "lockdown" at Riverbend where he would never see his family. He complained that he had never seen the autopsy photographs proving that he had shot Yolanda in the back of the head. On cross-examination he admitted he had signed the guilty plea documents, two before the hearing and one in the court room.
Bertha Hicks, the petitioner's mother, described her son as having a hard time understanding things. He was in special education classes at school. She and other members of her family came up to see him a few days prior to the submission hearing to talk to him about accepting the plea. She said that she told him that it was his decision and that he would have to make up his own mind.
Mark Slagle testified to his experience in handling capital cases as well as other first-degree murder cases. He described the trip that he, Stephen Wallace, and the investigator made to Clarksdale where they interviewed the petitioner's family and friends and obtained his school, medical, and psychological records. 6 The defense moved for and the trial court granted funds so that a psychologist or psychiatrist could examine the petitioner. 7 Defense counsel had complete access to the prosecutor's files. They met with the medical examiner, interviewed available witnesses, and reviewed the investigative reports. Slagle agreed that he sometimes had a difficult time communicating with Hicks. However, he said that when he took his time and explained things carefully, Hicks seemed to understand. He and Wallace explained the terms of the plea agreement very carefully, including maximum and minimum sentences, consecutive sentencing, lesser included offenses, and the rights the petitioner would be waiving. According to Slagle, the defense team took extra pains because of the petitioner's limited intelligence. Slagle believed that the petitioner understood that he was not having a trial and that he was aware of the significance of the guilty plea proceeding. On cross-examination, Slagle agreed that the hearing was unusual, and that he had his doubts as to Hicks's ability to follow the proceedings. He couldn't recall another time when a prosecutor suggested that the court accept an Alford plea. He conceded that the petitioner seemed to be confused at times. 8 However, Slagle believed that Hicks knew he was entering a guilty plea and that he wanted to do it.
The post-conviction judge took the case under advisement, and on February 24, 1997, he filed his "Finding of Fact, Memorandum of Law, Judgment Order" denying petitioner's request for post-conviction relief. In the memorandum, the court recognized that the petitioner's intelligence was a factor that must be considered. The post-conviction judge concluded that the trial judge had satisfied the requirements of Rule 11, Mackey, and Boykin and that the guilty plea had not been coerced. He also found that the trial court had adequately explained the Alford plea and that it was not improper for a district attorney to suggest that the court accept a "best interests plea" as long as there was a strong factual basis for the conviction and the defendant was represented by competent counsel. With respect to the effectiveness of trial counsel, the court specifically accredited Slagle's testimony. He found that both defense attorneys were experienced in criminal law and in capital cases, that they had traveled to Mississippi in an attempt to find useful information, that they met with the petitioner on many occasions, and that they were cognizant of the petitioner's intelligence level and had advised him accordingly. The court concluded that trial counsel had generally represented their client effectively according to the standards established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn.1975). Based on the facts before the court, the trial court concluded that, notwithstanding the petitioner's lack of mental development, the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas and received effective assistance of counsel.
Because this petition was filed on ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Dellinger v. State, No. E2005-01485-CCA-R3-PD (Tenn. Crim. App. 8/28/2007)
...when there is no serious or substantial doubt about the accuracy of the conclusions drawn from the evidence. Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Findings of fact made by the trial court are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against them. State v......
-
U.S. v. Mcmurray
...2008 WL 5330459, at *7 (Tenn.Crim.App. Dec. 22, 2008) (unpublished decision) (citing Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160; Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn.Crim.App.1998)). We have not considered whether the prosecutor's proffer of the factual basis for [653 F.3d 379] a plea, when the defe......
-
Cauthern v. State
...when there is no serious or substantial doubt about the accuracy of the conclusions drawn from the evidence. Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn.Crim. App.1998). Once the court assigned to hear and adjudicate the post-conviction petition has ruled, its factual findings are subject to ......
-
Keen v. State, No. W2004-02159-CCA-R3-PD (Tenn. Crim. App. 6/5/2006), W2004-02159-CCA-R3-PD.
...when there is no serious or substantial doubt about the accuracy of the conclusions drawn from the evidence. Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Once the post-conviction court has ruled upon a petition, its findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless the eviden......