Hidden Cove Marina, Inc. v. Mondello

• Decision Date: 03 August 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-886,82-886
• Citation: 117 Ill.App.3d 21,72 Ill.Dec. 512,452 N.E.2d 765
• Parties: , 72 Ill.Dec. 512 HIDDEN COVE MARINA, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Anna MONDELLO, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VILLAGE OF FOX LAKE, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 765

452 N.E.2d 765

117 Ill.App.3d 21, 72 Ill.Dec. 512

HIDDEN COVE MARINA, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Anna MONDELLO, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VILLAGE OF FOX LAKE, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.

No. 82-886.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

Aug. 3, 1983.

Charles M. May, Ltd., Markham M. Jeep, Waukegan, for plaintiff-appellant.

Querrey, Harrow, Gulanick & Kennedy, Glen E. Amundsen, Waukegan, Soffietti, Johnson, Teegen & Phillips, Howard Teegan, Fox Lake, for defendant and third-party plaintiff-appellee.

UNVERZAGT, Justice:

Hidden Cove Marina, Inc. (Hidden Cove), plaintiff, appeals from that part of a Lake County circuit court summary judgment denying that portion of its small claims complaint requesting payment from Anna Mondello, defendant, for the storage of her car pursuant to article II of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 4-201, et seq.) The trial court granted Hidden Cove its request for payment for the towing of Ms. Mondello's car. On appeal, Hidden Cove argues that the Illinois Vehicle Code permits it to recover for its storage charges as well as its towing charges. We affirm.

Section 4-203(e) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) provides that, "[w]hen a vehicle removal from either public or private property is authorized by a law enforcement agency, the owner of the vehicle will be responsible for all towing costs." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-203(e).) No question is raised concerning the police department's authority to remove defendant's car; the only issue concerns whether towing costs include storage fees, a question of statutory construction.

The first canon of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent as expressed in the statute. (City of East Peoria v. Group Five Development Co. (1981), 87 Ill.2d 42, 46, 57 Ill.Dec. 594, 429 N.E.2d 492.) Provisions of a statute should be read in light of the statute as a whole. (Winks v. Board of Education of Normal Community Unit School District No. 5 (1979), 78 Ill.2d 128, 135, 34 Ill.Dec. 832, 398 N.E.2d 823.) The legislative intent usually appears from a consideration of the statute's language which affords the best means of its exposition. (Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin (1978), 72 Ill.2d 189, 194, 21 Ill.Dec. 144, 381 N.E.2d 222.) The words used in the statute are assumed to have been intended to retain their ordinary and popularly understood meaning. (Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund (1983), 95 Ill.2d 211, 215, 69 Ill.Dec. 177, 447 N.E.2d 394.) If the legislative intent can be ascertained from the language of the statute, the language prevails and will be given effect; the court may not declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports. Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill.2d 342, 350, 167 N.E.2d 169.

The legislature's sole use of the word "towing" limits a car owner's financial obligation to the cost in removing the car, not the cost incurred in its storage. The legislature's differentiation between towing and storage charges in section 4-207 of the Code, where it provides that, "[n]o vehicle shall be released to the owner * * * until all...