Hidden Val. Municipal Water Dist. v. Calleguas Municipal Water Dist.

• Decision Date: 28 November 1961
• Citation: 197 Cal.App.2d 411,17 Cal.Rptr. 416
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: HIDDEN VALLEY MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALLEGUAS MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 25627.

Page 416

17 Cal.Rptr. 416

197 Cal.App.2d 411

HIDDEN VALLEY MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALLEGUAS MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 25627.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Nov. 28, 1961.

Robert J. North, Camarillo, Loeb & Loeb, Howard I. Friedman, Los Angeles, for appellant.

O'Melveny & Myers, Pierce Works, William D. Moore, Los Angeles, for respondents.

SHINN, Presiding Justice.

Hidden Valley and Calleguas are separate and independent water districts organized and existing under the Municipal Water District Act of 1911 (Stats.1911, c. 671, p. 1290, as amended; Water Code App. sections 20-1 et seq.). At the time the present action was commenced there were proceedings initiated by defendant for annexation to defendant of the territory comprising plaintiff district and two other separate areas and, concurrently, annexation of the entire territory to the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. Not having consented to the annexation of its territory plaintiff instituted the present action to terminate the annexation proceedings, insofar as they are designed to include plaintiff's territory. Injunction was sought against further proceedings. Unless they are enjoined they will be proceeded with to conclusion. Defendant demurred generally to plaintiff's complaint. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. The injunction sought was denied and the action was dismissed, but the judgment as entered restrains further annexation proceedings on condition that an appeal from the judgment be promptly taken and prosecuted by plaintiff, with a reservation of the power to modify the injunction upon five days' notice.

There is but a single question on the appeal, namely, can the territory of plaintiff be annexed as contemplated without its consent? The question calls for an interpretation of Section 33 reading as follows: 'Sec. 33. The inclusion in, or annexation or addition to, a municipal water district, of the corporate area of any public corporation or public agency, shall not destroy the identity or legal existence or impair the powers of any such public corporation or public agency, notwithstanding the identity of purpose, or substantial identity of purpose, of such municipal water district. Except for formation proceedings commenced before the effective date of the amendments to this act made by the 1955 Regular Session of the Legislature, no public corporation or public agency having identity of purpose or substantial identity of purpose shall be formed partly or entirely within a municipal water district existing under this act without the consent of such municipal water district.'

The first sentence of the section was enacted in 1941 (Stats.1941, c. 26, p. 463, section 12). The second sentence was added in 1955 (Stats.1955, c. 1318, p. 2401, section 9). For resolution of the controversy it is necessary to determine the sense in which the words, in the second sentence, 'formation proceedings' and 'formed' were used, that is to say, whether they relate to annexation proceedings, as plaintiff contends, or only to original proceedings for the creation of a district, as they were interpreted by the trial court.

Since the trial court agreed with the interpretation of Section 33 contended for by defendant, we shall refer to that contention as it is found in defendant's brief, which we quote as follows: 'In and of itself, the clear and concise language of Section 33 fully supports the trial court's judgment, and refutes the arguments of Hidden Valley. The language leaves no room for any construction or interpretation which has as its object and result a material departure from the unambiguous words used by the legislature. The material language of the second sentence of Section 33 is: '* * * no public corporation or public agency having identity of purpose or substantial identity of purpose shall be formed partly or entirely within a municipal water district * * * without the consent of such municipal water district.' This sentence does not state that no public corporation shall annex any territory partly or entirely within a municipal water district. It does not state that the corporate area of a municipal water district shall not be added to another public corporation. The operative language is that '* * * no public corporation * * * shall be formed. * * *' no more--no less. If the legislature had intended the second sentence to be operative with respect to the annexation or addition of territory to an existing public corporation, it is not unreasonable to assume that it would have explicitly mentioned 'annexation' or 'addition,' just as it did in the first sentence. Indeed, the use of the words 'annexation' and 'addition' in the first sentence and the absence of the quoted words in the second sentence, compels the conclusion that the second sentence is not concerned with, and was not intended to apply to, annexations or additions.'

In support of its argument defendant makes numerous references to the manner in which the words 'form,' 'formed' and 'formation' have been used, namely, in the Municipal Water District Act of 1911 (Water Code App. section 20-1 et seq.), the County Water District legislation (Water Code sections 30000-31187), California Water Districts legislation (Water Code Section 34000 et seq.), County Waterworks District (Water Code Sections 55000 et seq.), in legislation relating to Metropolitan Water Districts (Water Code App. Section 35-1 et seq.) and Municipal Utility Districts (Public Utilities Code Section 11501 et seq.). Specifying numerous instances in which the words appear in the acts, it is contended that they have always been used in connection with the creation of districts. Defendant says: 'Thus, it is clear that in the enabling acts which provide for the formation of public corporations similar in purpose to a municipal water district, the legislature has consistently used the word 'formed' and has consistently confined the use of that word to proceedings for the initial creation or incorporation of these special districts. Likewise, it has consistently refrained from the use of that word with respect to annexation proceedings. In those instances where words such as 'created,' 'organized' or 'incorporated' have been used, the legislature has intended them to be synonymous with 'formed." This is the thesis upon which defendant's arguments are founded.

The substance of plaintiff's argument is illustrated by the following excerpts from its opening brief: 'The thrust of the first sentence [Section 33] is to preserve the separate identity and powers of the district whose territory has been added to another district. The effect of the second sentence is to qualify the first sentence so as to prevent the taking of such territory without the consent of the district whose territory is taken.' Reference is made to other legislation in which the continuing existence and vitality of a district whose territory has been annexed by another district is preserved (Water Code section 31181 (County Water Districts); Health and Safety Code section 4880 (Sewer Maintenance District); Health and Safety Code section 6525 (Sanitation Districts); Metropolitan Water District Act, section 9.4 (Water Code App. section 35-9.4)), and of this policy plaintiff says: 'This has been particularly the case in legislation dealing with water districts where increasing demands upon limited local water supplies in California have necessitated the proliferation of new and broader based agencies providing distribution of water supplies from more distant sources. The impetus for such legislation has come from the local districts themselves. As their local water supplies have become fully utilized, the districts have sought affiliation with such other districts providing water from other sources to service expanding populations and needs. In so doing, they have insisted upon preserving their continued existence and vitality for the distribution of their own traditional local water supplies. * * *

'The second sentence of Section 33 is designed to protect districts against abuses made possible by the fact that the territory of a district can be taken by another district if, at the election required for such taking, a majority of the voters in the entire area affected so desire. The abuse contemplated is the situation in which a district does not desire affiliation with another district, does not require additional and supplemental water supplies, and objects to the burdens of dual taxation and administration. In the absence of the second sentence, such objections would not prevail against the majority of votes cast from other areas also proposed to be taken by the acquiring district. Thus, the second sentence, in effect, qualifies the consequences of the first sentence by imposing the requirement of consent of the affected district before its territory can be so taken. This consensual requirement, explicit in Section 33, conforms to the pattern of similar ...