Higginbotham v. Junction City School Dist.
Decision Date | 16 April 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 97-749,97-749 |
Citation | 332 Ark. 556,966 S.W.2d 877 |
Parties | , 126 Ed. Law Rep. 521 Glenn HIGGINBOTHAM, Appellant, v. JUNCTION CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Alvin Kelly, Leon Hines, Randall J. Lyons, Stan Owens, John Sims, And Kevin Hux, Appellees. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Pat Hall, El Dorado, for Appellant.
William C. Brazil, Conway, for Appellee.
Appellant Glenn Higginbotham raises two issues against Appellee Junction City School District (the District), for whom Appellant was formerly employed as a high school principal, and the individual Appellees, the District's superintendent and school board members. The Union County Circuit Court upheld the District's decision to refuse Appellant's attempted withdrawal of his resignation. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(a)(17), as this appeal involves a significant public interest and interpretation of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act (the Act), codified at Ark.Code Ann. §§ 6-17-1501 to -1510 (Repl.1993). We affirm.
In July 1994, the District hired Appellant as the high school principal for the 1994-95 school year. Appellant served as principal for the District until December 19, 1994, when Superintendent Alvin Kelly asked him to resign.
Kelly had conferenced with Appellant on both September 30, 1994, and October 24, 1994, about Appellant's performance of his duties. A memo dated September 30, 1994, from Kelly directed Appellant to allow Dale Hux, another teacher and dean of students, to handle discipline matters in order for Appellant to "supervise the instructional program, interact with the students and teachers in order to get to know them and their needs." The memo further set forth procedures for written announcements, intercom usage, lunch detention, and organizing "items of importance." After discussing these issues with Appellant, Kelly placed the memo in Appellant's personnel file.
Another memo from Kelly, dated October 25, 1994, followed the October 24, 1994 conference between Kelly and Appellant. In that memo, Kelly cited six concerns regarding discipline and gave suggestions for improvement. The issues in the October 25, 1994 memo were similar to those in the September 30, 1994 memo.
On December 19, 1994, Kelly presented a letter to Appellant, detailing ten serious concerns about Appellant's "effective and efficient operation" of the school. The concerns included Appellant's calling students "yard apes" over the intercom; failing to remember names of students and teachers; failing to maintain necessary materials for operating the school; paddling students without witnesses; "[e]xcessive cross-examination of teachers on routine referrals of students to the office"; poor written and oral communications skills; his monitoring activities, which were viewed as a "joke" by students; poor leadership; teachers' resentment of Appellant's evaluations of them; using profanity in the classroom; and failing to maintain professional rapport with teachers. The letter further stated:
I am hereby requesting that you resign immediately. If you feel a resignation is not in order, I will begin termination procedures immediately.
Appellant wrote, "As of today, I resign," and signed his name across the letter. He then cleaned out his office and turned in his keys the same day. Kelly notified the board members of Appellant's resignation that night by telephone. Appellant later alleged that he wrote those words of resignation because he did not want a termination on his resume. Appellant also alleged that Kelly promised to pay him his salary for January if he resigned immediately.
On December 20, 1994, Appellant attempted to retract his resignation through letters written by his attorney to Kelly and the school's attorney, Bill Prewett. Appellant reported back to work on December 22, 1994, although no one else was there because of the holidays. The District responded that Appellant's resignation had already been accepted. The District further advised Appellant to request a hearing no later than January 5, 1995. Additionally, Prewett wrote:
[T]he Superintendent of Schools will recommend to the Board at its meeting on January 10 that Mr. Higginbotham be terminated as of December 19, the day of his resignation. The recommendation for termination is based upon the reasons set forth in Mr. Kelly's letter of December 19 which was delivered to Mr. Higginbotham on that date. A copy of the letter is enclosed for your information.
Appellant requested a hearing, a transcript of the hearing, names of witnesses expected to testify at the hearing, and exhibits expected to be presented. Although the District made the exhibits and other discovery available for Appellant to copy, Appellant did not go to Prewett's office to copy them before the hearing.
The hearing occurred on February 1, 1995. Prewett presided as the hearing officer at the board's request. The board did not provide a court reporter, but tape recorded the hearing and had it transcribed. Prewett read statements against Higginbotham by parties who were not present at the hearing. Superintendent Kelly testified about the facts leading up to the resignation. Appellant and his attorney voluntarily left the hearing before it was over without making a statement or introducing evidence. After finding that Appellant had reported his resignation to the Missouri Unemployment Commission in writing, the board, upon motion, voted to formally accept Appellant's resignation.
On April 21, 1995, Appellant appealed the board's decision to the Union County Circuit Court. Appellant's complaint alleged claims for violation of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, breach of contract, misrepresentation, outrage, mental distress, and duress. In the alternative, Appellant alleged that he was constructively discharged. The trial court conducted the hearings on November 1 and November 19, 1996. Appellant testified that he thought Kelly was just helping him by issuing the September 30, 1994 and October 25, 1994 directives because he had walked into a bad situation in the school, which had employed four principals within four years. Appellant further testified that he was not formally evaluated during his employment with the Junction City Public Schools; he admitted, however, that he was aware of the concerns notated in the two prior memos and was also aware of his options when he wrote and signed his resignation on the December 19, 1994 letter. During cross-examination, Appellant admitted that he intended for his resignation to be effective immediately. Appellant further admitted that in his application for Missouri unemployment benefits that he completed on December 20, 1994, he wrote "because I didn't fulfill job as told and then asked to resign, resigned." When questioned about why he left the February 1, 1995 school board hearing before it was over, Appellant testified that he left because he had heard enough accusations and realized he was not going to get anything accomplished and was not allowed to present his side at what he had referred to as the "kangaroo court."
Superintendent Kelly testified about the problems he discussed with Appellant in their two 1994 conferences. Kelly stated that he did not ask Appellant to sign either the September 30, 1994 memo or the October 25, 1994 memo, nor was Appellant told he could disagree or that the memos would be put into his file. Kelly also stated that Appellant told him that "if you don't want me here, I don't want to be here[.]" Kelly testified that he informed the board members of Appellant's resignation by telephone the night of December 19, 1994. Kelly further testified he would have suspended Appellant on December 19, 1994, if Appellant had not resigned. Kelly admitted that he promised to pay Appellant his January salary, but stated that he did not do so because Appellant later tried to withdraw his resignation.
Margaret McGaha, assistant elementary principal at Junction City, testified that Appellant told her over the telephone "that he thought it was best that he resigned because he knew that Mr. Kelly, or we were unhappy with his work."
High school secretary Diana Dove testified that she often had to rewrite Appellant's announcements because they did not make any sense. Dove further testified that Appellant also kept shorter hours than the other administrators and had frequent memory problems.
Board members testified that they accepted Appellant's resignation over the telephone on December 19, 1994, when Kelly communicated it to them. Board member Randall Lyons testified that the board first accepted Appellant's resignation before terminating him.
In a letter opinion dated February 13, 1997, and judgment filed on March 12, 1997 the trial court concluded that Appellant properly resigned, that the board accepted the resignation when delivered to Kelly as the board's agent, and that the board denied Appellant's attempt to withdraw his resignation at the February 1, 1995 hearing. The trial court found that there was sufficient cause for the denial of Appellant's attempted withdrawal of his resignation and that the board did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory manner. The trial court also found that Appellant was not under duress when he resigned. The trial court dismissed all of the claims but the Act violations on the basis that an appeal under the Act cannot be expanded to include tort and contract actions. The trial court did not rule on the issue of whether the District conducted a proper termination proceeding due to its finding that Appellant had resigned.
Additionally, the trial court found that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate Appellant's alternative claim for constructive discharge. Given that two board members worked at the school on a part-time basis, the trial court had concerns that the board was not completely impartial. The trial court concluded, however, that there was sufficient evidence to...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Rainer
...is not a ruling for purposes of appeal); see also Jackson v. State, 334 Ark. 406, 976 S.W.2d 370 (1998) ; Higginbotham v. Junction City Sch. Dist., 332 Ark. 556, 966 S.W.2d 877 (1998). It is the obligation of an appellant to obtain a ruling from the trial court in order to preserve an issue......
-
Craft v. City of Fort Smith
...we cannot do so for the first time on appeal. See Collins v. Keller, 333 Ark. 238, 969 S.W.2d 621 (1998); Higginbotham v. Junction City Sch. Dist., 332 Ark. 556, 966 S.W.2d 877 (1998). As to his specific procedural arguments, Mr. Craft first contends that Ordinance 50-97 violates Ark.Code A......
-
Ford v. Arkansas Game & Fish Com'n
...bars review of the issue on appeal. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 334 Ark. 406, 976 S.W.2d 370 (1998); Higginbotham v. Junction City Sch. Dist., 332 Ark. 556, 966 S.W.2d 877 (1998). Accordingly, we refuse to address the venue issue at this Affirmed. ...
-
Suzanne Proctor v. Cabot Sch. Dist.
...347 Ark. 132, 60 S.W.3d 436 (2001); Barker v. Clark, 343 Ark. 8, 33 S.W.3d 476 (2000)). 17. Id. (citing Higginbotham v. Junction City Sch. Dist., 332 Ark. 556, 966 S.W.2d 877 (1998)). 18. Deering v. Supermarket Investors, Inc., 2013 Ark. App. 56, at 9, --- S.W.3d ---- (citing Brown v. SEECO......