Higgins v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 July 1967
• Docket Number: No. 21808,21808
• Parties: Leo J. HIGGINS and Joyce Lee Higgins, Plaintiffs in Error, v. The CONNECTICUT FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 479

430 P.2d 479

163 Colo. 292

Leo J. HIGGINS and Joyce Lee Higgins, Plaintiffs in Error, v. The CONNECTICUT FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation Defendant in Error.

No. 21808.

Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department.

July 24, 1967.

Emory L. O'Connell, Denver, Helman, Younge, Hockensmith & Stacey, Grand Junction, for plaintiffs in error.

Smith, Holmes, Williams & Turner, Grand Junction, for defendants in error.

JOHN N. MABRY, ^* Justice.

The parties occupy the same relative positions they had in the district court, where the plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought damages for the alleged 'collapse' of their dwelling. Reference to the litigants will be made as plaintiffs and defendant, or by name. The case was tried to the court.

Plaintiffs, a few weeks after moving into their new home, observed hairline cracks in a lower wall. After a few months, cracks by separation appeared around one or more doors and windows, and a slight upheaval appeared in the basement floor. The cracks increased in number and size and reached their peak about eighteen months after the family first moved into the house. There was no worsening of the condition of the house between the peak and the time of trial, which was more than three years later. The plaintiffs at all times lived in the dwelling which was impervious to the elements. There was no other material damage to the structure. The building was neither distorted nor changed from its original form and character from the time it was insured.

During the trial, at the invitation of the plaintiffs, the court visited and inspected the structure and observed cracks in the building. In its subsequent findings, however, the court greatly minimized the number, variety and size of the cracks and amount of damage, as claimed by the plaintiffs.

The defendant, by its Home Owners insurance policy, insured the plaintiffs against direct loss to the property covered by the following peril:

'Section 14. Collapse of building(s) or any part thereof, but excluding loss to outdoor equipment, fences, retaining walls not constituting a part of a building, driveways and walks, except as the direct result of the collapse of a building.'

Based on the foregoing evidence and the provisions of the insurance policy, the trial court, in its carefully prepared and detailed findings, concluded: that the word 'collapse' as used in the insurance policy is not ambiguous; that the word connotes a complete change in a structure, where the building loses its distinctive character as a building and when the substantial integrity of the building has been damaged to such an extent that it has been materially impaired and rendered uninhabitable; that within the meaning of the policy there had been no collapse. It found the issues generally for the defendant and dismissed the complaint.

Whether the word 'collapse,' as used in a contract of insurance, is ambiguous is relatively new to American jurisprudence; it has not been previously before this court for determination. It appears that only twelve states in the Union have passed upon this precise proposition and two lines of authority have emerged from these jurisdictions. One such group holds that the word 'collapse,' in the context of the peril insured against in Higgins' policy, is not ambiguous and, consequently, courts may not interpret such word, but must bottom their decision on accepted definitions and common usage. This is the defendant's theory in the case.

The other authority--the numerical minority, and we believe the less well-reasoned cases--has taken the position that the term, in such cases, is ambiguous and courts are free to determine the intent of the parties regarding the use of the word; and furthermore, the intent should be resolved against the insurance companies that prepared the contract. Such holdings support plaintiffs' thesis.

Words are not fungible, but have a definite and precise meaning; they express whatever meaning accepted standards of custom and usage have attached to them. The word 'collapse' used in this insurance policy has a generally accepted and well-understood meaning. As used here it is without ambiguity....