Higgins v. Guerin

• Decision Date: 23 June 1952
• Docket Number: No. 5553,5553
• Parties: , 33 A.L.R.2d 769 HIGGINS v. GUERIN et al.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 956

245 P.2d 956

74 Ariz. 187, 33 A.L.R.2d 769

HIGGINS v. GUERIN et al.

No. 5553.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

June 23, 1952.

Jennings, Strouss, Salmon & Trask, of Phoenix, Attorneys for appellant.

Harold E. Whitney, of Phoenix, and Alexander B. Baker, Phoenix, of counsel, for appellees.

UDALL, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by J. C. Higgins (defendant-appellant), from a judgment of the lower court determining the value of a certain caterpillar tractor owned by Guerin Bros. (plaintiffs-appellees) and awarding damages for its detention. The parties will hereafter be referred to as they were in the trial court.

The matter is before us for the second time. On the first appeal, Guerin v. Higgins, 70 Ariz. 219, 218 P.2d 870, 875 we reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of defendant Higgins and held that plaintiffs, Guerin Bros., were the rightful owners of the tractor and equipment in dispute. The case was remanded for a new trial with directions to ascertain 'the value of the tractors at the date of trial and of establishing what damages, if any, the plaintiffs have sustained as a result of the detention of said tractors by the defendants.' The basic facts are set forth in the original opinion.

Defendant Harold Freeland made no appearance at the second hearing, judgment went against him, and he is not a party to the present appeal.

Upon the retrial, the lower court, sitting without a jury, found the value of the tractor--as of the date of the first trial--to be $8500, and fixed damages for its detention at $10,000. Judgment for the plaintiffs and against the defendant for these amounts, with costs, was regularly entered on March 30, 1951, and upon denial of defendant's motion for a new trial this appeal was taken. The plaintiffs, prior to the entry of judgment, filed a formal election to take the value of the property in lieu of the property itself.

In reality but two problems are presented under defendant's four assignments of error and supporting propositions of law, viz: (1) the legal effect of a formal stipulation by counsel in the original trial as to the value of the tractor in question, i.e., whether such stipulation is conclusive and binding upon the parties throughout the litigation, and (2) whether the trial court erred in its method of computing damages which allegedly resulted in the awarding to plaintiff of grossly excessive damages that are disproportionate to the value of the property.

As to the first point: the original complaint in replevin alleged the Higgins tractor and accessories to be of the value of $8500, and the prayer was for recovery of said property or this sum, plus damages of $10,000 for its detention and costs. At the first trial it appears that due to the absence of plaintiff H. T. Guerin counsel were 'hard put' to prove value, whereupon the following stipulation was entered into:

'Mr. Baker: If the court please, it was stipulated between counsel that the value of the equipment named in the case against J. C. Higgins was the sum of $6000.00 at the date of the trial. Is that correct?

'Mr. Trask: It may be so stipulated.'

In keeping with this stipulation counsel for plaintiff submitted to the court a proposed jury instruction reading in part:

'* * * and in addition you shall assess and find the reasonable value of said equipment at the time of trial, not to exceed the sum of $6000.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding this state of the record, and despite the formal stipulation, the lower court at the second hearing, over the defendant's strenuous objection, permitted H. T. Guerin to testify that the fair market value of the equipment in question was $8500 on the date of the first trial, and this testimony was accepted by the court in its judgment as being the true value thereof. In this jurisdiction we are committed to the rule that in assessing the value of the property the value should be that which the property has at the time of the trial. 77 C.J.S., Replevin, § 270, note 72; Coffey v. Williams, 69 Ariz. 126, 210 P.2d 959 and cases therein cited.

The admission of this testimony is assigned as error. It is the contention of the defendant that the plaintiffs were bound by their formal stipulation to this ultimate question of fact as to value which was then an issue. The plaintiffs, however, seek to avoid the apparent conclusive effect of this stipulation by arguing that the same did not extend beyond the original replevin action where the value was 'solely insignificant' or 'incidental', and that under the mandate directing the lower court to find the value of the equipment on retrial they were at liberty to disregard the previous stipulation and offer such proof as was then available.

It is to be noted that the stipulation in question was not limited in time nor circumstances. The great weight of authority is to the effect that a stipulation such as was entered into in this case is conclusive throughout the litigation unless the parties, for good cause shown, are relieved by the court of its binding effect. In LeBarron v. City of Harvard, 129 Neb. 460, 262 N.W. 26, 32, 100 A.L.R. 767, a similar question was involved on the retrial of a case. The trial court ignored the stipulation and upon appeal the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, stating:

'A stipulation by the parties as to the facts, so long as it stands, is conclusive between them, and cannot be contradicted by evidence tending to show the facts otherwise. (Citing cases.)

'Parties will not be relieved from stipulations in the absence of a clear showing that the matter stipulated is untrue, and then only if the application for such relief is seasonably made, and good cause is shown for granting it.' (Citing cases.)

Similarly in Lappinen v. Union Ore Co., 224 Minn. 395, 29 N.W.2d 8, 17, a stipulation as to certain facts had been entered into at a hearing in an industrial commission matter; upon a second hearing before the full commission the stipulation was disregarded. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the decision and held that the stipulation was conclusive, stating:

'* * * Unless stipulations are enforced, they are apt to prove a trap for even the most wary and circumspect, and that is precisely what would be the effect of the stipulation here if the commission could disregard it in deciding the question of the nature and extent of employee's disability.

'As long as a stipulation remains in effect it is binding not only on the parties, but on both the trial and appellate court.' (Citing cases.)

For text statement and other cases in point, see: 50 Am.Jur., Stipulations, sections 9 and 13; Annotation 100 A.L.R. 775; Gonzales v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 34 Cal.2d 749, 214 P.2d 809; Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 407 Ill. 186, 94 N.E.2d 888; Pines v. Beck, 300 N.Y. 181, 90 N.E.2d 28.

In the instant case no effort was made by the plaintiff to be relieved of the effect of the stipulation. For the proper procedure a party should follow to accomplish this, see: 50 Am.Jur., Stipulations, section 14; Crunden-Martin Mfg. v. Christy, 22 Ariz. 254, 196 P. 454; LeBarron v. City of Harvard, supra; Webster v. Goolsby, 130 Ark. 141, 197 S.W. 286.

We hold that the original stipulation of the parties was binding and the value of the tractor was thereby fixed for the second hearing. Therefore the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of plaintiff H. T. Guerin as to the value of the tractor and in entering judgment for $8,500, instead of $6,000 in accordance with...