Higgins v. Matlock, Miller & Dycus

• Decision Date: 18 April 1906
• Citation: 95 S.W. 571
• Parties: HIGGINS v. MATLOCK, MILLER & DYCUS.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

95 S.W. 571

HIGGINS v. MATLOCK, MILLER & DYCUS.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

April 18, 1906.

On the Merits.

May 23, 1906.

Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County; W. H. Pope, Judge.

Action by Matlock, Miller & Dycus against Patillo Higgins. From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Crook & Harris, for appellant.

Motion to Reverse and Remand.

FLY, J.

Briefs have been filed by the appellants, but the cause has not yet been set down for submission, and is before this court on an agreement made by the attorneys for both parties that the judgment may be reversed and cause remanded, and all costs be taxed against appellees, "without the necessity of the court investigating the record in said cause or rendering a written opinion." No reason is given for the agreement, and no error pointed out upon which the judgment should be reversed. This court will not entertain any such motion. If the agreement is made because counsel for appellees have become convinced that there is error, the error should be pointed out to this court in order that it may pass upon the matter in such a manner that the trial court will avoid the error on another trial. As said by this court in Texas Loan Agency v. Hunter, 35 S. W. 399: "If there are errors in the proceedings requiring a reversal, we must indicate them, and endeavor, by an expression of opinion as to the law governing the case, to save the trial court from the commission of like errors upon another trial, and not leave it in greater perplexity than at first, by holding its judgment erroneous without indicating why or wherefore." If the parties to this suit desire a reversal of the judgment and a remanding of the cause, they should agree as to the errors that were committed by the trial judge and give their authorities in support of the same, or they should brief the case in the usual way, so that the court can pass upon the assignments of error. To sustain the agreement of counsel, without a reason being given for such agreement, would be such an injustice to the trial judge as cannot meet with the sanction of an appellate court. If appellant desires to dismiss his appeal, his request will be granted, or if the parties should agree that the judgment be affirmed, that will be permitted without any reasons being given for such judgment, but not so where the judgment of a court is to be reversed, and a cause remanded for a new trial.

The statute enjoins upon the Courts of Civil Appeals the duty of filing reasons for the reversal of all causes; the ground for this requirement being that the lower court should have something to guide it on another trial. Were the judgment reversed in this cause on the agreement of counsel, reasons would be required for such reversal, and none could be given, except that parties had agreed that it be done which would be no reason at all. A reversal under such circumstances would be violative of the...