Higgins v. Peltzer
| Citation | 49 Mo. 152 |
| Parties | JULIA HIGGINS, Respondent, v. CATHERINE M. PELTZER, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 31 October 1871 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.
H. A. Clover, for appellant.
I. The purchaser of land at a sheriff's sale under an execution is not bound to examine into the regularity of the proceedings by which the execution was obtained. (Henry v. Ferguson, 1 Bailey, 512; Barkley v. Screven, 1 N. & Mc. 408; Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157; Vance v. Reardon, 2 N. & Mc. 299; Giles v. Pratt, 1 Hill, S. C., 240.) In determining the jurisdiction of a court, the question whether or not the judgment be conformable to the law is wholly unnecessary for determination. If the court have no jurisdiction its judgment is equally void, whether in itself it be agreeable or repugnant to the law. If the law be misinterpreted or misapplied, the judgment is simply erroneous. It is hard to conceive how the question of jurisdiction can be made to depend on the question whether the judgment was right or wrong. (Wertheimer v. Boonville, 29 Mo. 258; Colton v. Beardsley, 38 Barb. 51.) The test of jurisdiction is whether the court has power to enter on the inquiry on any supposable state of facts, and not whether its decision be right or wrong. (Martin v. Barron, 37 Mo. 305, per Wagner, J.) Here the judgment was regular and the execution in conformity with it, and in the form prescribed by the statute. Further the purchaser was not compelled to look. Other matters were between the parties to the judgment and the marshal--matters for the interposition of the court.
II. The judgment against defendant was merely voidable (Roarbach v. Stebbins, 40 N. Y. 62, commenting on and explaining Watkins v. Abrahams et ux., 24 N. Y. 72; Miller v. Earle, 24 N. Y. 111; Read v. French, 28 N. Y. 294; Clark v. Douglass, 52 Penn. St. 408), and not impeachable collaterally except for fraud (Rex v. Vincent, 1 Strange, 481; Rex v. Rhodes, id. 703; Raine's case, 1 Lord Raym. 262; Noel v. Wells, 1 Lev. 235; Bush v. Sheldon, 1 Day's Cas. 170; Peck v. Woodbridge, 3 Day's Cas. 30; Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy et al., 5 Cranch, 173; Burke v. Elliott, 4 Ired. 355; Diehl v. Page, 2 Green, 143; Martin's Lessee v. Roach, 1 Harr., N. J., 477, 548; Obert v. Hammill, 3 Harr. 73; Doe, etc., v. Butcher, 3 Maule & S. 557), and is conclusive against her so long as the same remains as a judgment of the court. And it may be enforced by the ultimate process of such court to a sale of her property and a satisfaction of the judgment from the same, even although such judgment might have been avoided, as to her, by proper proceedings taken to that end.
It is impossible to perceive why a judgment against a married woman should be regarded as a void judgment, when the law is that a judgment in favor of or against a dead man is not a nullity. (Lewis v. Morgan, 11 Serg. & R. 234; Abbott v. Lyon, 4 W. & S. 38; Warder v. Tainter, 4 Watts, 270; Coleman v. McAnulty, 16 Mo. 177; Yaple v. Titus, 5 Wright, 195; Carr v. Townsend's Ex'rs, 63 Penn. 202.)
III. This was an attachment proceeding, and in effect a proceeding in rem.
IV. In general, wherever an officer can justify under a writ he can pass a title by sale under it, if all other prerequisites to a sale have been complied with. (Cox v. Nelson, 1 Monr. 95; McKinney v. Scott, 1 Bibb, 155; Reardon v. Searcy's Heirs, 2 Bibb, 202; Coleman v. Trabue, id. 518.)
Moss & Sherzer, for respondent.
I. At law the personal existence of the wife is merged in that of her husband.
II. Being so merged, she has no separate existence, and can not contract, her contracts being absolutely void ab initio; can not sue or be sued thereon, and no personal judgment against her can be rendered.
III. Judgments rendered against her for debt contracted during coverture, petition so disclosing, are void ), and may be attacked collaterally. (18 Md. 463; Fithian v. Monks, 43 Mo. 521.)
The only question presented by the record in this case is whether the judgment rendered in the St. Louis Law Commissioners' Court was merely voidable or absolutely void. If only voidable, it cannot be impeached collaterally, and it must stand and the rights acquired thereunder be protected till proper proceedings be had setting it aside, vacating it, or reversing it for error; for it is a familiar principle that the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be reversed or inquired into in a collateral proceeding, except for fraud. Nor, standing on the public records, can it be deemed a nullity, provided the magistrate had jurisdiction of the matter adjudicated. But where there is no authority in a court to act, and its proceedings are coram non judice, then they are null and void; and in the case of judgments rendered thereon, no title passes by virtue of the execution. And where a judgment is void, advantage may be taken of it collaterally. (Fithian v. Monks, 43 Mo. 502, and cases cited.)
The action was ejectment brought by the respondent against the appellant, and there was a common source of title. Appellant's title rested on a purchase made upon an execution sale by the marshal of St. Louis county, which execution was issued upon a judgment rendered in the Law Commissioners' Court against the respondent and her then husband. The property in controversy, at the time and before the judgment was rendered, belonged to the respondent by virtue of a conveyance executed to her while sole. At the time of the institution of the suit, respondent and her husband were non-residents. The property was attached, service was had by publication, judgment was obtained against her and her husband, a special execution was awarded, and the property was sold and bid in by the appellant. The petition upon which the judgment was so rendered set out that the respondent and her husband, as husband and wife, were indebted to the plaintiff therein in a certain sum for moneys paid out and expended at their instance and request, the same being for necessaries furnished certain children therein named.
The Circuit Court gave judgment for the respondent, holding that the judgment, as against her, was utterly void, and that the marshal's deed introduced in evidence was insufficient to support the title in the appellant. The promise and undertaking made by the respondent while she was a married woman was, as a contract, entirely void, and she could not be held personally liable therefor. This point was expressly adjudged by this court in Bauer et ux. v. Baue, 40 Mo. 61.
Whether the wife is capable of being sued at law, so that jurisdiction is acquired and the judgment is simply voidable or reversible for error, is another question. The best considered cases hold that she has no capacity to be proceeded against at law, and that a judgment rendered against her is void.
In Caldwell v. Walters, 18 Penn. St. 79, it is decided that a bond and warrant of attorney to confess judgment by a married woman and her husband is void as to her, and a sale of real estate upon such judgment, and the purchase of it during coverture by the plaintiff in the judgment and execution, did not divest the title. In the case just cited, the husband and wife joined in giving bond with a confession...
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