Higgins v. Pratt
Decision Date | 12 September 1944 |
Parties | JOSEPH H. HIGGINS v. ERNEST W. PRATT. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
April 5, 1944.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., LUMMUS, QUA DOLAN, & WILKINS, JJ.
Malicious Prosecution. Probable Cause. Practice, Civil, Exceptions what questions open; Requests, rulings, and instructions. Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof, Relevancy and materiality. Witness, Cross-examination.
The mere fact that a defendant, who, following the charge to the jury, alleged exceptions to refusals to give certain rulings, requested by him before the charge was given, did not also except to portions of the charge inconsistent with such requested rulings, did not preclude him from relying in this court on the exceptions so saved.
The burden is upon the plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution for an alleged crime to prove by affirmative evidence that irrespective of the actual state of facts, there was absent from the mind of the defendant when he charged the crime such an honest and reasonable belief as to the facts as would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or to entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the plaintiff was guilty as charged.
At the trial of an action for malicious prosecution of the plaintiff for conduct alleged to be in violation of Sections 34 and 34A of G. L (Ter.
Ed.) c. 55, in connection with an election in a town, requests by the defendant for rulings, in effect that the defendant had probable cause to believe that the crime had been committed unless at the time he made the charge he "knew in fact that" such section "did not apply to towns of less than ten thousand population," properly were refused and a motion that a verdict be ordered for the defendant properly was denied where the defendant relied on a defence that in making the charge he followed advice of counsel and it appeared that he knew that the town in question had a population of less than ten thousand and there was evidence raising an issue for the jury whether he made a full and honest disclosure of facts to his counsel and honestly followed the advice given.
A request, by the defendant at the trial of an action for malicious prosecution, for a ruling respecting the issue whether the defendant had probable cause to believe the plaintiff guilty as charged, in substance that, if the defendant in consulting counsel as to his course of conduct did not withhold information with intent to procure an opinion that might operate to protect him against a suit, but, on the contrary, being doubtful of his legal rights, consulted counsel and afterwards pursued a course pointed out by counsel, he was not liable notwithstanding the fact that counsel might have been mistaken in the advice given, called to the attention of the judge the substantive issue of the effect of advice of counsel on the question of probable cause, and an instruction should have been given that the defendant should not be found liable if the jury found, in addition to the facts predicated in the request, that the defendant acted in good faith and made a full and honest disclosure to counsel of all the material facts within his knowledge and belief.
Failure of one, consulting counsel with respect to the propriety of his charging another with criminal violation of certain provisions of the election laws in connection with an election in a town, to state to counsel that the population of the town was less than ten thousand, which the client knew to be the fact, did not require a finding of lack of probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution against the client where, following counsel's advice, he made the charge and, because the statutory provisions did not apply to a town with a population of less than ten thousand, there was a finding of not guilty thereon, unless it was also shown that as a reasonable man he ought to have known that such fact was material to the advice he sought and that counsel did not already know the fact.
At the trial of an action for malicious prosecution on the charge of making false statements in violation of election laws, the defendant was entitled to make inquiry of the plaintiff in cross-examination respecting the truth or falsity of the statements.
The defendant at the trial of an action for malicious prosecution on a criminal charge was not entitled to examine a judge, who had found the plaintiff not guilty, as to "the basis" for his finding.
TORT. Writ in the Superior Court dated April 26, 1940. The case was tried before Swift, J. Requests by the defendant for rulings refused by the trial judge, referred to in the opinion, were as follows: "3. The defendant, having been advised by competent counsel to sign the complaints against the plaintiff is not answerable to the plaintiff for the prosecution thereunder unless the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant in bad faith concealed material facts within his knowledge from his counsel. This rule of law applies even though counsel was mistaken in law in the advice he gave the plaintiff. 4. The following facts have been stipulated by the parties in this case and must be considered as such by the jury: . . .
[here followed the statement of facts stipulated as set out in the second paragraph of the opinion]."
Portions of the charge to the jury were as follows:
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