High Ridge Management Corp. v. State, 50827
Decision Date | 22 December 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 50827,50827 |
Citation | 354 So.2d 377 |
Parties | HIGH RIDGE MANAGEMENT CORP., etc., et al., Appellants, v. STATE of Florida et al., Appellees. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Elliot S. Shaw and Norman S. Segall of Shaw & Segall, Miami, for appellants.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Thomas M. Beason, Asst. Atty. Gen., and James G. Mahorner, Tallahassee, for appellees.
This cause is before us on direct appeal from an order of the Circuit Court, in and for Leon County, granting summary judgment for appellees and upholding the constitutional validity of Chapter 76-201, Laws of Florida, the Omnibus Nursing Home Reform Act of 1976, thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
Appellants, operators of twenty-one licensed South Florida nursing homes, sought a declaratory judgment as to their rights under the Omnibus Nursing Home Reform Act of 1976, Chapter 76-201, Laws of Florida, and requested the court to enjoin the appellees from implementing the act. In their complaint, appellants alleged that the act, by title and content, violates Article III, Section 6, Florida Constitution, and is nothing more than a conglomeration of unrelated and confusing provisions and unconnected subjects; that Sections 6 and 7 of the act (referred to by appellants as public flogging), which deal with inspection, posting of results, and penalties, violate appellants' procedural due process rights; that the portion of Section 7 of the act relating to the rating of nursing homes is an attempt by the State to seize control of the nursing home industry and to permit the State to endorse certain competitors and arbitrarily destroy others and, thereby, is a violation of appellants' right to equal protection; that the Omnibus Act, as a whole, is a serious violation of substantive due process and is a serious attempt to interfere with, and take over, Florida's nursing home business.
Summary judgment was granted in favor of appellees. The trial court found that Chapter 76-201, Laws of Florida does not violate due process or equal protection requirements of the Florida and United States Constitutions; that the provisions of Section 400.121, Florida Statutes (1975), have not been nullified; that the Administrative Procedures Act guarantees the right of hearing; that it is premature to challenge any proposed rules; that the rating system, in itself, is not, per se, unconstitutional since the act does not set out any arbitrary or capricious classification, that there has been no unlawful delegation of legislative authority, that the act is not vague, and that it relates to a single subject matter.
Appellants appealed, and this Court has granted a constitutional stay writ staying implementation of the rating system as provided for in Section 7 of Chapter 76-201, Section 400.23(3) and (4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1976).
The sole question presented for our review by appellants is the constitutionality vel non of Section 7, Chapter 76-201, Laws of Florida, Section 400.23, Florida Statutes (Supp.1976), insofar as it purports to establish a rating system for nursing homes in this state. Although conceding the state's right to regulate, inspect and license the nursing home industry pursuant to the state's police power, appellants argue that a governmental rating system whereby licensed businesses are rated "AA," "A," "B," "C" or "F," is an unnecessary, unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the state's police power and that the rating system as established by Chapter 76-201, Laws of Florida, constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority contrary to Article III, Section 1, Florida Constitution.
Section 7 of Chapter 76-201, Laws of Florida, provides in part:
We find that the statutory provision in question constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative authority since it does not contain objective guidelines and standards for its enforcement, and for this reason, it is unconstitutional.
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