High v. Braniff Airways, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 April 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-4498,76-4498 |
| Citation | 592 F.2d 1330 |
| Parties | 19 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 702, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9130 Frederick H. HIGH et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Plaintiff-Intervenor, Appellee, v. BRANIFF AIRWAYS, INC., Defendant-Appellee, and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers et al., Defendants, and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Hal K. Gillespie, G. William Baab, Dallas, Tex., for defendants-appellants.
Les Mendelsohn, San Antonio, Tex., for High, et al.
John F. Sherlock, III, EEOC, Washington, D.C., for EEOC.
Terry S. Bickerton, William H. Lemons, III, San Antonio, Tex., for Braniff.
Chris Dixie, Houston, Tex., for Unions.
Joseph T. Eddins, Jr., Asst. Gen. Counsel, EEOC, Washington, D.C., Richard E. Tinsman, San Antonio, Tex., Gerald D. Letwin, Abner W. Sibal, Beatrice Rosenberg, Attys., EEOC, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Edward W. Penshorn, San Antonio, Tex., for Int'l Assn. Machinists, Etc., et al.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before INGRAHAM, GEE and FAY, Circuit Judges.
This appeal concerns a small portion only of a massive consent decree entered in settlement of an employment discrimination case. Most of this decree was agreed to on all hands and is not now in dispute. Before us, the parties have advanced numerous contentions, most of which, because of the disposition we make, we need not and perhaps should not consider at this time, since ambiguities that we find ourselves unable to resolve satisfactorily on the present record dictate a remand for further proceedings. Our opinion, being of a tentative and interim nature, is therefore not to be taken as establishing any law of the case whatever, and we shall avoid burdening the reports with a more extensive statement of the case or exposition of our reasoning than is strictly necessary to our present purposes.
The decree in question settled a class action originally brought by minority employees against Braniff Airways, Inc. and the International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers and its local (Machinists), the union representing one of Braniff's bargaining units, under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The EEOC subsequently was allowed to intervene, and an amended complaint added as defendants the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, its airline division and its local (Teamsters), representing another bargaining unit. Basically, the Machinists' unit comprised mechanics and related crafts. Some of these employees, such as aircraft mechanics, were required to be licensed; some were not. The Teamsters' unit consisted essentially of office workers, including as its highest classification Customer Service (or ticket) Agents, who deal directly with the travelling public. No licenses or special technical skills were required for any member of this unit, except typing capability and the like.
Among the provisions of the lengthy decree is its Paragraph 15, entitled "Training," which (with its Appendix H) is the subject of the present dispute and the focus of our inquiry:
(a) The Company shall make available to twenty-five (25) members of the Affected Class training for the position of Aircraft Mechanic, selection of such members and respective area of training to be in the Government's sole discretion, in the following manner:
(i) each such member of the Affected Class so selected shall be offered an opportunity to participate in specified training offered by the Company, or, at its option, Braniff Educational Systems, Inc. which would qualify a person for employment as an Aircraft Mechanic. In order for such member to be eligible to attend Braniff Educational Systems, Inc., he must be employed by the Company in Dallas, or qualify for transfer to a vacancy in Dallas prior thereto;
(ii) upon successful completion of training each such member of the Affected Class shall be eligible for a future vacant Aircraft Mechanic position of the type and/or in the shop for which he has been trained, in accordance with the terms of Paragraph 14 of this Decree;
(iii) in the event an Affected Class member does not successfully complete his training, his rights under Paragraph 14 of this Decree are to remain unaffected;
(iv) the degree of training necessary to qualify any such person may be flexible and the Company at its discretion may adjust such training as required to take into effect the qualifications any such member may already possess when compared to those of incumbent Aircraft Mechanics presently successfully performing the jobs required.
(b) The Company may make available as feasible and encourage such vocational and home study training as may be necessary for minority employees who have not previously had opportunities to acquire experience that would qualify them for transfer or advancement to higher non-licensed positions, or who because of basic educational or verbal deficiencies, may require additional training.
(c) The Company shall, after necessary training or familiarization, if any, make available to those individuals listed in Appendix H hereto the jobs at locations specified therein, to commence on the dates indicated in said Appendix. Such jobs may be filled by such individuals notwithstanding the bidding procedures set forth in this Decree or in the applicable collective bargaining agreement.
(d) All training provided for in this Paragraph shall be during the employee's off-duty hours, and the Company shall incur no training pay expense or overtime liability to any employee as a result of said training.
All parties before the court agreed to the above provisions and to the original Appendix H, reading as follows:
This Appendix, as referenced by subparagraph (c) of Paragraph 15 on page 22 of the Decree, will be subsequently provided by the parties and will set forth the names of individuals who are to receive different jobs under said subparagraph and the location, classification and starting date for said jobs.
Later in the proceedings a proposed revised Appendix H was filed with the court, which set out seven employees from the Machinists' unit and twenty from the Teamsters' unit who had been selected to receive the training and overriding seniority benefits provided in Paragraph 15 quoted above. It is not seriously disputed that both the number and identities of the twenty Teamsters selected were determined in the course of consultations between the plaintiffs and Braniff, consultations that did not include representatives of the Teamsters Union. Although the Teamsters objected to this revision, it was included in the final decree entered, counsel for the Teamsters specifically noting on its face the union's refusal to consent to this portion of the decree. They now appeal to us this action of the trial court. 1
Their threshold contention, asserted perfunctorily in their brief but more vigorously at oral argument, is that Paragraph 15 refers exclusively to jobs covered by the collective bargaining agreement between Braniff and the Machinists Union. We find the contention not entirely without merit, as the intended coverage of Paragraph 15 is not clear; and though we reach here a provisional conclusion that jobs in the Teamsters' unit are covered, we expressly leave the question open for reconsideration by the district court on remand.
As we noted in Eaton v. Courtaulds of North America, Inc., 578 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1978), our task in interpreting a consent decree is akin to that posed by construction of a contract. If possible, we are to arrive at its meaning by reference to the language of the decree alone and without resort to extrinsic aids. Nor is much by way of the latter available to us on the present record. Subparagraph (c) itself, the only one explicitly referring to Appendix H, contains a single...
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...a consent decree necessarily implies that the litigants have assented "to all of its significant provisions." High v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 592 F.2d 1330, 1334 (5th Cir. 1979). In this respect a consent decree is akin to a contract, to be interpreted in the same manner. United States v. IT......
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