Highland Boy Gold Min. Co. v. Strickley

• Decision Date: 14 July 1902
• Docket Number: 1,669.
• Citation: 116 F. 852
• Parties: HIGHLAND BOY GOLD MIN. CO. v. STRICKLEY.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

116 F. 852

HIGHLAND BOY GOLD MIN. CO. v. STRICKLEY.

No. 1,669.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

July 14, 1902

Syllabus by the Court.

In the national courts, an action at law cannot be maintained in equity, nor is an equitable cause of action or an equitable defense available at law.

In an action of ejectment, an equitable defense may not be successfully presented in the federal courts. The strict legal title prevails, and if there are equities, they can only be considered upon the equity side of the courts upon the presentation of a proper bill.

A judgment at law cannot be reviewed by an appeal, nor can a decree in equity be challenged by a writ of error in the federal courts. Judgments must be presented for review by writs, and decrees by appeals.

In a federal appellate court, the rules of law applicable to the method of trial and the method of review which the parties have chosen will measure their rights. The rules applicable to a trial at law will prevail if the action was tried at law and presented by writ of error, and the rules applicable to a hearing in equity if the suit was heard in equity and presented by appeal.

The necessity of using the particular property sought is an essential prerequisite to the exercise of the power of eminent domain over it by a corporation having that power.

The mere acquiescence of the owner of real estate in the entry construction, and use of a tramway upon his land by a mining company, without proof of the necessity of such use, will not estop him from maintaining ejectment for the possession of his premises at any time within the limit prescribed for the commencement of such actions by the statutes of his state.

George Sutherland, for plaintiff in error.

Frank Hoffman, for defendant in error.

John Strickley, the defendant in error, who will hereafter be called the plaintiff, brought an action in one of the district courts of the state of Utah against the Highland Boy Gold Mining Company, a corporation, the plaintiff in error which will hereafter be called the defendant. That action was removed to the United States circuit court for the district of Utah, and thereupon the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In this complaint he alleged that he was the owner of the Argonaut No. 1 placer mining claim in West Mountain mining district in the state of Utah; that the defendant had erected an aerial tramway across a portion of his claim which was supported by towers or stations resting thereon; that he had been injured thereby in the sum of $5,000; that he had notified the defendant to vacate the premises, but that corporation had refused to do so, and that it was continually trespassing upon his premises by operating the tramway to transport its ores across his land. He prayed for the possession of the premises, for $5,000 damages, and for an injunction forbidding the defendant from continuing its trespasses upon his property. The defendant by its amended answer, upon which the case was tried, denied the ownership of the mining claim by the plaintiff, denied that he had been damaged by the acts of the defendant in any sum exceeding $100, admitted that it had constructed and that it was operating a tramway over the mining claim described in the complaint, and that it had been requested to vacate the premises and cease its operations. 'And for a further answer, by way of equitable defense,' it alleged that it was the owner of, and was working, mining claims in the West Mountain district, and was smelting its ores about 18 miles away from its mines; that its mines were situated at a considerable height above Bingham gulch, and about two miles distant from it; that the only railroad in the mining camp was in this gulch; that it was necessary for the defendant to get its ores down to the railroad, in order to transport them to the smelter; that it had constructed the tramway a distance of 959.7 feet over the Argonaut No. 1 placer mining claim, and had sustained it by supporting towers resting thereon, and was operating it by gravity and steam power, for the purpose of transporting its ores from the mines to the railroad; that at the time it constructed the tramway the placer claim was unoccupied, and that the plaintiff knew that it was building the towers and constructing the tramway at the time that it built them, but made no objection until after it had expended the necessary funds to put them in operation. The defendant averred that it was willing and offered to pay whatever damages might be assessed for the appropriation of the right of way over the mining claim for its tramway, and prayed that no judgment for its ejectment from the portion of the premises occupied by its tramway be rendered, but that the plaintiff have judgment only for the damages for the permanent use and occupation of the strip of land across the claim occupied by the tramway. The case was tried by a jury. The plaintiff proved his title to the mining claim, waived any claim for damages, and rested. Thereupon the defendant called a witness, John Boitano, who testified that there was a pit on the Argonaut No. 1 placer mining claim that he had worked in for many years. He was asked how much he was able to make the full working day, and answered: 'It is pretty hard to tell what you can make; one day you might make ten, and-- .' When the plaintiff objected to the question, counsel for the defendant stated that the purpose of it was to show the value or lack of value of the land. The court sustained the objection, the defendant excepted, and offered to show by the witness on the stand and other witnesses that the value of the land from which the plaintiff sought to eject the defendant did not exceed $25. The court sustained the objection of the plaintiff to this offer, and the defendant excepted. There was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff knew that the defendant was constructing the tramway at the time it was built, and that he was present upon or near the premises, and took no action regarding the matter. The court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant excepted to this instruction. Judgment was rendered in accordance with the verdict, and the defendant sued out this writ of error to reverse it.

Before SANBORN and THAYER, Circuit Judges, and LOCHREN, District Judge.

SANBORN Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, .

The difference between causes of action at law and in equity is matter of substance, and not of form. In the national courts the ineradicable distinction between them is as sedulously preserved in the forms and practice available for their maintenance as it is in the natures of the causes themselves and in the principles upon which they rest. A legal cause of action may not be sustained in equity, because there is an adequate remedy for the wrong it presents at law, and it is only when there is no such remedy that a suit in equity can be maintained. Equitable causes and defenses are not available in actions at law, because they invoke the judgment and appeal to the conscience of the chancellor, and the free exercise of that judgment and conscience is forbidden in actions at law by the rule which entitles either party to a trial of all the issues of fact by a jury. In the federal courts an action at law cannot be maintained in equity, nor is an equitable cause of action or an equitable defense available at law. Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 436, 10 L.Ed. 235; Foster v. Mora, 98 U.S. 425, 428, 25 L.Ed. 191; Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499, 512, 13 Sup.Ct. 148, 36 L.Ed. 1059; Lindsay v. Bank, 156 U.S. 485, 493, 15 Sup.Ct. 472, 39 L.Ed. 505; Schoolfield v. Rhodes, 82 F. 153, 155, 27 C.C.A. 95, 97; Davis v. Davis, 72 F. 81, 83, 18 C.C.A. 438, 440.

The parties to this action framed their...