Highley v. Martin
| Decision Date | 28 November 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 16024,16024 |
| Citation | 784 S.W.2d 612 |
| Parties | Roger C. HIGHLEY, Respondent, v. Charles H. MARTIN and Joyce Martin, d/b/a Martin Logging and Lumber Company, Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
David G. Neal, Eminence, for appellants.
Winston V. Buford, Eminence, Milton B. Garber, Fulton, for respondent.
It must have seemed like a good idea at the time.
That perhaps succinctly characterizes the way Charles H. Martin and Joyce Martin ("the Martins"), doing business as Martin Logging and Lumber Company, undertook to protect themselves financially from a claim against them by Roger C. Highley ("claimant") under The Workers' Compensation Law, chapter 287, RSMo 1986. We are aware of no factually similar Missouri case.
In an amended claim for compensation filed July 29, 1987, claimant alleged his left hand was permanently injured by a saw in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by the Martins. In addition to seeking compensation from the Martins, claimant also asserted a claim against the Second Injury Fund "as provided by Section 287.220 RSMo," averring: "I have been advised there is no insurance by this employer."
On January 19, 1988, claimant appeared in person with his lawyer, Winston V. Buford, before an administrative law judge ("ALJ") of the Division of Workers' Compensation ("the Division") for hearing. Charles H. Martin was present, accompanied by David G. Neal, lawyer for the Martins.
A hearing ensued, the transcript of which shows that the Martins, through lawyer Neal, admitted they were an employer under The Workers' Compensation Law on the date of claimant's accident (August 11, 1986), that claimant was employed by them that date, that claimant's accident arose out of and in the course of his employment and that he sustained an injury as a result thereof.
After two discussions off the record the parties agreed on (1) the rate of compensation per week, (2) the number of weeks of temporary total disability, (3) the amount paid claimant by the Martins after the accident--$5,400--which was to be credited against the temporary total disability award, (4) the amount of permanent disability to claimant's left hand, and (5) the number of weeks of compensation to be awarded claimant for disfigurement. The parties further agreed that the medical treatment claimant had undergone was necessary to cure and relieve him from the effects of the injury, that the charges therefor were fair and reasonable, and that claimant had traveled 6,300 miles for medical attention.
Claimant then testified briefly as to how the accident occurred and as to a conversation he had with Charles H. Martin during which Martin said he had no workers' compensation insurance.
Charles H. Martin then testified briefly that he had no insurance to pay medical expenses for any injured employee, that he had no cash to pay claimant's medical bills, and that the value of the Martins' tangible assets probably did not exceed the amount of their encumbrances.
On March 15, 1988, the ALJ entered an award in favor of claimant as follows:
Medical aid (including travel) $46,149.01
Temporary total disability 4,500.00
Permanent partial disability 14,337.50
Disfigurement 2,500.00
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Total $67,486.51
In regard to the Second Injury Fund the ALJ found that claimant had received no money from any source to pay the medical expenses he had incurred, that claimant had no personal medical insurance and no prospects of obtaining any money, and that claimant continued to get demands for payment. The ALJ's award directed the Second Injury Fund to pay claimant's medical expenses ($46,149.01) "as provided by Section 287.220(5) RSMo." 1 The ALJ's award as the parties interpret it in their respective briefs, further provided that the amount payable to claimant by the Martins was only $15,937.50--the sum of the temporary total disability ($4,500), the permanent partial disability ($14,337.50) and the disfigurement allowance ($2,500), minus the $5,400 paid claimant by the Martins prior to the hearing.
The Martins filed a petition with The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission of Missouri ("the Commission") for review per § 287.480, RSMo 1986, alleging that immediately prior to the hearing of January 19, 1988, the parties "entered into settlement negotiations and did reach a settlement," the terms of which included the following:
"(a) The parties would proceed to a hearing on [the] claim but [the Martins] would waive all defenses and present no evidence ... and that the hearing would be conducted as a 'friendly suit' wherein [the Martins] would consent to the judgment entered by the [ALJ].
(b) When the [ALJ] would enter his findings and award and forward copies to the parties, [the Martins] would prepare and forward to [claimant] a Stipulation and Compromise for Settlement providing that, regardless of the amount of the award, [claimant] would receive and accept the sum of ... $4,500 ... in full and complete satisfaction of all of his claims against [the Martins].
(c) Upon receipt of the Stipulation, [claimant] would immediately sign it and return it to [the Martins'] counsel in sufficient time to be submitted to the [ALJ] for his approval, and the parties would request and recommend that the [ALJ] approve the settlement.
(d) ... upon the [ALJ's] approval of the Compromise Settlement, [the Martins] would immediately pay over to [claimant] ... $4,500 ... and [claimant] would enter satisfaction of the award and make no further claim against [the Martins] for any additional amount."
The petition for review went on to allege that lawyer Neal, upon receiving the ALJ's award, prepared and forwarded the agreed stipulation to lawyer Buford for claimant's signature, that Buford returned the stipulation to Neal unsigned, along with a letter explaining that although an agreement had been reached claimant no longer intended to abide by it, and that a copy of the stipulation together with a copy of Buford's letter was attached to the petition for review. The petition prayed that the Commission, among other things, acknowledge the settlement agreement and enforce it against claimant by compelling him to accept $4,500 "as full and complete satisfaction" of the Martins' obligation to claimant, or remand the cause to the Division of Workers' Compensation "with instructions to vacate the findings and award and conduct a full and fair hearing on all the issues."
The copy of the unsigned "Stipulation and Agreement for Compromise Settlement" attached to the petition for review provided:
"The purpose of this Stipulation and Agreement is to compromise and discharge all of the liability of the [Martins] under an award ... entered on March 15th, 1988 ... and in furtherance thereof the parties hereto covenant and agree as follows:
1. The [Martins dispute] the findings and award of the [ALJ] entered on March 15th, 1988, and [intend] to request a review by the ... Commission in accordance with Section 287.480 RSMo. (1986), and if that review is unfavorable, to perfect an appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 287.495 RSMo. (1986). Moreover, alleged employer is not insured and has not funds or resources with which to satisfy the stated award, and if steps are taken to enforce the award through levy or garnishment, the alleged employer will be compelled to discharge the obligation in bankruptcy which will render the award uncollectable.
2. As a result of the above, the parties stipulate and agree to settle and compromise the amount of the award due under the findings of the [ALJ] ... and that upon payment and acknowledgement of the receipt of the settlement amount, claimant shall acknowledge satisfaction of the award in full as if he had received the total amount of the award entered March 15th, 1988.
3. Claimant hereby agrees to accept ... $4,500 ... as full and complete satisfaction of the amount of the award against the alleged employer ... in the amount of ... $15,937.50 ... and upon receipt thereof shall acknowledge payment in full upon the award and shall thereafter fully release and discharge the alleged employer from any and all claims and demands arising from the award of March 15th, 1988.
4. In consideration for the reduction of the amount of the award, the alleged employer hereby waives and surrenders its right to request review of the award by the ... Commission, and further waives and surrenders its right to appeal the award to the Missouri Court of Appeals, and states that the settlement amount will be paid in full upon approval by the [ALJ] of this compromise settlement.
5. The parties further agree to jointly submit this compromise settlement to the [ALJ] within twenty ... days of March 15, 1988, and jointly requests [sic] that he approve the same and incorporate it into the record in this case."
The copy of the letter from Buford to Neal attached to the petition for review was dated March 28, 1988, and read:
"I had [claimant] in Saturday morning and presented him with your proposed Stipulation.
Your Stipulation represent [sic] our understanding as of the time of our appearance before [the ALJ] in Ironton. Since Ironton, Charles Martin apparently has lost all control of his tongue. He says he has enough money to buy you, me and the Judge, and that this whole thing has been a laugh so far as he is concerned.
For all of the foregoing, [claimant] now is willing to see Mr. Martin go into bankruptcy if he thinks this is the way to avoid claims for injuries to his employees."
On October 4, 1988, the Commission entered a final award wherein the Commission found that the ALJ's award was supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with The Workers'...
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