Hightower v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 94,011.,94,011.
• Citation: 2003 OK 45,70 P.3d 835
• Parties: Juanita HIGHTOWER, as Guardian of the Person And Estate of William Franklin Pearl, An Incompetent Person, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO., a Foreign Corporation, Defendant/Appellant. J.T. Locke, and Jerry Hinds, Defendants.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

70 P.3d 835

2003 OK 45

Juanita HIGHTOWER, as Guardian of the Person And Estate of William Franklin Pearl, An Incompetent Person, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO., a Foreign Corporation, Defendant/Appellant.

J.T. Locke, and Jerry Hinds, Defendants.

No. 94,011.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 6, 2003.

Jerry L. McCombs and Jon Ed Brown of LeForce & McCombs, P.C., Idabel, OK, for plaintiff/appellee.

Kirkman T. Dougherty and J. Rodney Mills of Hardin, Jesson & Terry, Fort Smith, AK, for defendant/appellant.

LAVENDER, J.

¶ 1 The issues in the present cause are as follows: (1) whether Pearl's state law negligence theories based upon adequacy of the warning devices, excessive train speed and "local hazard conditions" are preempted by federal law such that the trial court's instructions on these issues were improper and (2) if so, whether the scope of federal preemption extends to bar evidence of adequacy of warning devices, excessive train speed and "local hazard conditions," which is offered for purposes of comparative negligence and punitive damages; (3) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury to analyze the negligence of the parties on the basis of Oklahoma law of comparative negligence; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying Railroad's motion for a directed verdict on the issues of liability and punitive damages.

I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 William Franklin Pearl, a resident of LeFlore County, Oklahoma, was driving his 1997 pickup truck home subsequent to a shopping trip at 1 p.m. on December 16, 1997, whereupon his truck was struck by a train owned by Railroad and operated by its employees/Defendants Locke and Hinds, as Pearl was driving over the Pickering Street railway grade crossing in Mena, Arkansas. The crossing in question was a one-lane crossing and signs at the crossing included two reflectorized crossbucks warning signs¹ without gates and/or lights. The train at issue in this case was stationed out of Heavener, Oklahoma and was scheduled to return there on that date. The conductor Defendant and engineer Defendant were also residents of LeFlore County, Oklahoma.

¶ 3 This personal injury action was instituted on March 4, 1998 in the District Court of LeFlore County, in which Pearl sought compensatory damages for Defendants' negligence and punitive damages for "gross and especially egregious negligence." Pearl's negligence claims are as follows²: (1) the Railroad failed to keep its right-of-way free from vegetative sight obstructions (hereinafter "the vegetation claim"); (2) the train was exceeding the federally mandated speed limit at the crossing (hereinafter the "excessive speed claim"); (3) the Railroad was exceeding a safe speed in light of the specific, individualized hazard the Railroad had created at the crossing³; and (4) the Railroad failed to provide an adequate warning to motorists of the presence of an approaching train in light of the abnormally dangerous nature of the crossing (also referred to by the parties as "the inadequate warning claim" or "ultrahazardous crossing claim").

¶ 4 On March 22, 1999, The Railroad filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiff's negligence claims numbers 2 through 4, which were all negligence theories based upon issues of excessive train speed, the "ultra hazardous crossing" (adequacy of warning) claim, the audible warning signal claim and the "specific, individualized hazard" claim. The Railroad argued these theories of negligence were preempted by federal law. The trial court denied the Railroad's motion in part⁴, ruling that controversy existed regarding material facts as to whether the conditions of the applicable federal regulations had been met as to adequacy of warnings, whether the train was traveling within the speed limit approved by the federal government and whether the crossing constituted a specific, individualized hazard such that would be exempted from federal preemption.⁵

¶ 5 This case was tried to a jury in October, 1999, which returned a verdict in favor of Defendants Locke and Hinds, but found that the Railroad was negligent in causing Pearl's injuries and awarded Pearl $1 million in compensatory damages. The jury determined that Pearl was also negligent, and apportioned the loss as 40 per cent attributable to him and 60 per cent attributable to the Railroad. Subsequent to a second-stage proceeding, the jury found the Railroad acted wilfully, wantonly and in reckless disregard for the rights of others and awarded Pearl $100,000 in punitive damages. Judgment was entered on the jury verdict and the Railroad appealed.

¶ 6 The Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV (COCA) affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the adequacy of the warning devices, excessive train speed and on "local hazard conditions," as these claims were preempted by federal law. However, the COCA concluded that preemption does not extend to bar evidentiary proof of these theories for purposes of comparative negligence and punitive damages. Additionally, the COCA determined that upon remand, the jury should be instructed on Arkansas comparative negligence law rather than Oklahoma law. Further, the COCA affirmed the trial court's denial of Railroad's Motion for Directed Verdict on the issues of liability and punitive damages.

II THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

¶ 7 Review of trial court instructions is governed by 20 O.S.2001 § 3001.1, which provides as follows:

[n]o judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted by any appellate court of this state in any case ... on the ground of misdirection of the jury or for error in any matter of pleading or procedure, unless it is the opinion of the reviewing court that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.

Id. We have held that in cases tried to a jury, where a jury is instructed on more than one issue and error affects one of the issues, "the error affecting one issue or theory in a case will be regarded as prejudicial where it is impossible to determine upon which of the two issues or theories the jury based its decision." Bredouw v. Jones, 1966 OK 93, 431 P.2d 413, 420⁶.

¶ 8 In this case, the jury was instructed on the abnormally dangerous nature of the crossing/adequacy of warning devices⁷, excessive train speed/specific individual hazard (also referred to as "local hazard condition" claim, "specific individualized hazard claim" and/or "local safety hazard claim")⁸ and track classification⁹ of the crossing in question. The COCA determined that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on these claims, as these claims were preempted by federal law. As will be discussed in more detail in this opinion, we agree with the COCA that federal law preempts these claims and the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to them. However, the COCA concluded that the jury was properly instructed on the vegetation claim, and we do not disturb that determination.¹⁰ The jury's verdict in this case fails to specify whether the jury based its decision upon the properly submitted vegetation theory or upon one of the several improperly submitted theories of negligence. Thus, it is impossible to discern upon which theory or theories the jury based its decision to find Railroad negligent and thus, the error affecting those several theories of negligence is deemed prejudicial pursuant to the rule in Bredouw, and probable that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of 20 O.S. § 3001.1. Therefore, the Railroad is entitled to a new trial in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice in this matter.

¶ 9 The Railroad additionally argued, and the COCA agreed, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the issue of comparative negligence according to Oklahoma law instead of Arkansas law.¹¹ We disagree and hold that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on Oklahoma negligence and comparative negligence law.

¶ 10 This Court has held "that the rights and liabilities of parties with respect to a particular issue in tort should be determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties." Brickner v. Gooden, 1974 OK 91, 525 P.2d 632, 637. In this case, while the COCA determined that upon remand, the jury should be instructed pursuant to the law of Arkansas regarding comparative negligence, the COCA refrained from disturbing the trial court's determination that the jury be instructed pursuant to Oklahoma negligence law. To the extent the COCA treated negligence and comparative negligence as separate and distinct issues, this was in err. For purposes of choice of law analysis under Brickner v. Gooden, where the affirmative defense of comparative negligence is raised in a negligence action, they are to be treated as the same "particular issue in tort." The same state's laws with the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties regarding negligence should also be the same state with the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties with respect to defenses thereto.

¶ 11 In Brickner, this Court expressly abandoned the lex loci delicti rule (the law of the place of the wrong), which previously determined the applicable substantive law for tort actions brought in Oklahoma. Id. To determine the state with the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, the Brickner case identified four factors to be considered "according to their relative importance with respect to a particular issue" as follows: "(1) the place where the injury occurred, (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of...