Hilands Golf Club v. Ashmore

• Decision Date: 18 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-050.,01-050.
• Citation: 2002 MT 8,308 Mont. 111,39 P.3d 697
• Parties: HILANDS GOLF CLUB, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Joan ASHMORE, a/k/a Joan Zirko, Charging Party/Respondent and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

39 P.3d 697

2002 MT 8

308 Mont. 111

HILANDS GOLF CLUB, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Joan ASHMORE, a/k/a Joan Zirko, Charging Party/Respondent and Appellant.

No. 01-050.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs August 16, 2001.

Decided January 18, 2002.

Donald C. Robinson, Poore, Roth & Robinson, P.C., Butte, MT, For Appellant.

James H. Goetz, Goetz, Gallik Baldwin & Dolan, P.C., Bozeman, MT, For Respondent.

Elizabeth Brenneman, Attorney at Law, Helena, MT, For Amicus Brief (ACLU).

Justice TERRY N. TRIEWEILER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The Petitioner, Hilands Golf Club, filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the District Court for the Thirteenth Judicial District Court in Yellowstone County to set aside a Montana Human Rights Commission order which found Hilands had committed gender discrimination to the detriment of the Respondent, Joan Ashmore. The District Court vacated the Human Rights Commission order based on its conclusion that Ashmore lacked standing and her claim was moot. Ashmore appeals the District Court's dismissal. We reverse the order of the District Court.

¶ 2 The following issue is dispositive on appeal:

¶ 3 Did the District Court err when it considered claims that Ashmore lacked standing and her claim was moot, even though those arguments were made for the first time in the District Court?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The Hilands Golf Club is a member-owned, private country club in Billings, Montana. Prior to 1989, Hilands limited its full membership, which included voting privileges, to men only. Wives of male members were considered "associate" members. That status included no voting privilege or proprietary interest in the Club.

¶ 5 In 1989, the Montana Legislature amended the Montana Human Rights Act to prohibit gender discrimination in places of public accommodation. See § 49-2-304, MCA. As a liquor license holder, the Hilands Golf Club qualified as a place of public accommodation.

¶ 6 On April 20, 1989, in response to the Legislature's action, Hilands amended its bylaws and adopted a gender neutral membership policy. Hilands also modified its "blackballing" procedure (by which any three members could deny an applicant membership) and set up a grievance procedure to handle discrimination complaints. Women were allowed to join the Club for the $5,000 membership fee, and assume full membership status.

¶ 7 Steve Zirko joined Hilands on August 22, 1988, and his wife, Joan Ashmore, became an "associate" member. Zirko and Ashmore knew of Hilands' men-only membership policy at the time. However, no other membership choices were available. Following the 1989 amendments, women were allowed to become voting members, and spouses of members, whichever gender, were made "associate" members. Despite the bylaw change, Ashmore alleged that de facto discrimination continued, and that Hilands continued to publish, distribute and enforce gender-specific rules and regulations which either limited or denied services, facilities, and privileges to women.

¶ 8 On August 20, 1990, Ashmore filed a preliminary complaint with the Montana Human Rights Commission pursuant to § 49-2-501(1), MCA, alleging gender discrimination. Ashmore filed a second preliminary complaint on October 2, 1990. On March 28, 1991, Ashmore filed a formal complaint with the Commission in which she alleged:

A. My husband is a member of the respondent's golf club and I am an associate member of the club.

B. The majority of respondent's voting membership are [sic] male. Females were not permitted voting memberships until a year ago. Respondent has only two female members.

C. The majority of the associate members are [sic] wives of voting members.

D. Respondent has a rule regarding playing time that gives members exclusive use of golf course on Thursdays, and on Saturday, Sunday and holiday mornings.

¶ 9 Steve Zirko resigned his voting membership on September 25, 1992. As a result, Ashmore's status as an "associate" member ended. Ashmore applied for "non-resident" member status and was accepted. In that status, she was entitled to play golf at "any time reserved for regular members." On September 26, 1994, Ashmore voluntarily resigned her membership with Hilands.

¶ 10 Ashmore's complaint of gender discrimination before the Human Rights Commission referred to incidents which occurred prior to her change in membership status in September of 1992 and her ultimate resignation from Hilands in 1994. Hearings before the Human Rights Commission Hearing Examiner occurred between June and August of 1993. On January 4, 1994, the Hearing Examiner issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in favor of Ashmore. On June 13, 1994, the Human Rights Commission affirmed the findings of the Hearing Examiner and ordered Hilands to pay Joan $750 in damages for emotional distress. Furthermore, the Commission enjoined Hilands from engaging in future discriminatory practices and ordered Hilands to create a three-person committee to review its policies and practices, promote greater numbers of female members, and monitor its progress.

¶ 11 On July 12, 1994, pursuant to § 2-4-702, MCA, Hilands filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the Commission's order. A challenge to the validity of Hilands' appeal was denied by this Court in Hilands Golf Club v. Ashmore (1996), 277 Mont. 324, 922 P.2d 469. On remand, Hilands filed a Motion to Dismiss based on its contention that Ashmore lacked standing and her claim was moot.

¶ 12 On October 23, 2000, the District Court granted Hilands' Motion to Dismiss. On December 14, 2000, Ashmore filed a Notice of Appeal of the District Court's decision. To date, Hilands has neither paid Ashmore her monetary damages in the amount of $750 nor formed the three-person committee ordered by the Commission to undertake certain activities to eliminate and discourage further discrimination.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 13 We first note that Hilands' Motion to Dismiss was filed and granted in the District Court before the Court reached the underlying issues decided by the Human Rights Commission. The basis for Hilands motion was that "the present case is moot, that Respondent Ashmore lacks standing, and that, therefore, vacatur should be entered, vacating the Order of the Montana Human Rights Commission, and that this case should then be dismissed." Therefore, we are reviewing Hilands' Motion to Dismiss. A district court's ruling on whether a justiciable controversy exists is a conclusion of law. Northfield Ins. Co. v. Montana Ass'n of Counties, 2000 MT 256, ¶ 8, 301 Mont. 472, ¶ 8, 10 P.3d 813, ¶ 8. We review the district court's conclusions on which its decision is based to determine whether they have been correctly decided. Ridley v. Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. (1997), 286 Mont. 325, 329, 951 P.2d 987, 989.

DISCUSSION

¶ 14 Did the District Court err when it considered claims that Ashmore lacked standing and her claim was moot, even though those arguments were made for the first time in the District Court?

¶ 15 Ashmore contends that the District Court improperly dismissed the order of the Human Rights Commission based on standing and mootness. Ashmore argues that because Hilands knew the facts which gave rise to its standing and mootness claims prior to the contested hearing before the Human Rights Commission, Hilands in effect waived such arguments by not raising them during the administrative process. Ashmore relies on § 2-4-702(1)(b), MCA, of the Montana Administrative Procedure Act and this Court's decision in Lincoln County v. Sanders County (1993), 261 Mont. 344, 862 P.2d 1133.

¶ 16 Hilands maintains that because both standing and mootness are jurisdictional issues, they can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. It relies on Shamrock Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 1999 MT 21, ¶ 19, 293 Mont. 188, ¶ 19, 974 P.2d 1150, ¶ 19 ("Shamrock I"), and Shamrock Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 1999 MT 39, ¶ 9, 293 Mont. 317, ¶ 9, 974 P.2d 1154, ¶ 9 ("Shamrock II"). It further contends that not only can standing and mootness be raised, but a court has an obligation to examine its own jurisdiction sua sponte at each stage of the proceedings, even if the parties previously waived such issues.

¶ 17 The District Court concluded that Lincoln County's application to the present case was doubtful in light of our decisions in Shamrock I and Shamrock II. Based on that conclusion, the District Court dismissed the Human Rights Commission order.

¶ 18 In order to best serve justice and allow parties to have their day in court, we encourage, as a general rule, a liberal interpretation of procedural rules governing judicial review of administrative decisions. Hilands Golf Club v. Ashmore (1996), 277 Mont. 324, 330, 922 P.2d 469, 473. That being said, a district court's authority to review administrative rulings is constrained by statutes duly enacted by the Montana Legislature. In re McGurran, 1999 MT 192, ¶ 12, 295 Mont. 357, ¶ 12, 983 P.2d 968, ¶ 12. While it is true that a court has an obligation to consider its own jurisdiction sua sponte, a court's jurisdiction to review administrative decisions is statutorily created and limited.

¶ 19 The Montana Administrative Procedure Act sets forth the procedure for judicial review of contested administrative decisions, like the one in this case. § 2-4-701 to -711, MCA. Section 2-4-702(1)(b), MCA, provides:

A party who proceeds before an agency under the terms of a particular statute may not be precluded from questioning the validity of that statute on judicial review, but the parties may not raise any other question not raised before the agency unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that there was good cause for failure to raise the question before the agency. [Emphasis added.]

¶ 20 When we interpret a statute, we first look to the plain meaning of the words it contains. Clarke v. Massey (1995), 271 Mont. 412, 416, 897 P.2d 1085, 1088. Where the language of the...