Hilburn v. Enerpipe, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 11 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 112,765.,112,765. |
| Citation | 370 P.3d 428,52 Kan.App.2d 546 |
| Parties | Diana K. HILBURN, Appellant, v. ENERPIPE, LTD., Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Thomas M. Warner, of Warner Law Offices, P.A., of Wichita, for appellant.
Kelly A. Ricke and Andrew D. Holder, of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, L.L.P., of Overland Park, for appellee.
Before ARNOLD–BURGER, P.J., GREEN and STANDRIDGE, JJ.
ARNOLD–BURGER
, J.
While Diana K. Hilburn rode home with her husband, a truck owned and operated by Enerpipe, Ltd. (Enerpipe) rear-ended their car. The collision negatively impacted Hilburn's recovery from a recent back surgery, resulting in a second surgery and chronic pain. After a trial, a jury returned a verdict in the amount of $335,000 in total damages for Hilburn, most of which compensated for her noneconomic losses. Over Hilburn's objection, the district court reduced her damages pursuant to the Kansas noneconomic loss damages statute, K.S.A. 60–19a02
.
On appeal, Hilburn challenges the constitutionality of the statutory cap as applied to a negligence claim that does not involve medical malpractice. But first, she asks this court to conclude that the Supreme Court erred in its finding in Miller v. Johnson, 295 Kan. 636, 289 P.3d 1098 (2012)
, that a quid pro quo test applies to claims under Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution. Because this court is duty bound to follow Supreme Court precedent absent some indication that the court is abandoning its prior position, Hilburn's claim fails. Second, she asks us to limit the Miller ruling to medical malpractice claims because the Supreme Court relied on the insurance scheme established in the Health Care Provider Insurance Availability Act, an act that does not apply to other torts. Because the State has established a similar insurance scheme for injuries caused by the negligence of motor carriers and automobile drivers, we find the rationale of the Miller court controls our decision in this case. Accordingly, the decision of the district court is affirmed.
In November 2010, Hilburn underwent a lumbar fusion surgery to address degenerated disks in her back. This surgery required removing abnormal disks and inserting hardware to help fuse bone together. Nine days later, as she and her husband drove home from picking up a prescription in Wichita, Hilburn's husband slowed their car in heavy traffic to accommodate a law enforcement vehicle that had pulled onto the median. The semi-truck behind them, driven by Jimmy Harris, attempted to stop but ended up rear-ending their car. Neither party disputes that Enerpipe owned the truck, employed Harris, and was operating as a motor carrier at the time of the accident.
After the collision, Hilburn suffered a large amount of pain and involuntary muscle contractions
in her back. The impact loosened the hardware from her surgery and caused the bone fusion process to fail, which ultimately resulted in a second surgery. Even after this surgery, Hilburn suffered chronic back pain that required daily medication to manage.
Hilburn sued Enerpipe for negligence. Enerpipe admitted to many of her allegations, including that the accident "was caused by the negligent actions of [the] driver in operating [Enerpipe's] vehicle," and the case proceeded to jury trial on the issue of damages. After hearing all the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of $335,000 in total damages for Hilburn; $301,509. 14 constituted noneconomic loss damages.
Pursuant to our Kansas damages cap statute, K.S.A. 60–19a02
, the district court reduced the amount of noneconomic loss damages to $250,000. Hilburn objected to the journal entry that memorialized application of the statute. At a hearing, she acknowledged that a recent Kansas Supreme Court case, Miller, 295 Kan. 636, 289 P.3d 1098, had decided the issue, but she argued that because Miller concerned a medical malpractice plaintiff, her case differed dramatically. The district court disagreed, explaining:
The district court therefore denied Hilburn's request and reduced the award. Hilburn timely appealed.
The sole issue in this case is whether the noneconomic damages cap contained at
is constitutional in the context of a negligence claim against an out-of-state commercial trucking company for injuries sustained in an automobile collision in Kansas. We begin with the statute being challenged. In pertinent part, the statute provides:
.
" ‘Noneconomic losses' " includes " ‘claims for pain and suffering, mental anguish, injury and disfigurement not affecting earning capacity, and losses which cannot be easily expressed in dollars and cents.’ " Miller, 295 Kan. at 644, 289 P.3d 1098
. In this case, the jury returned a verdict as to noneconomic damages of $301,509.14, and the district court reduced it to $250,000 per the statute and our Supreme Court's ruling in Miller. Because a review of the Miller case, which held that K.S.A. 60–19a02 is constitutional in the case of a medical malpractice claim, will help to better understand Hilburn's arguments on appeal and guide the ultimate outcome of this case, we will next review the Supreme Court analysis in Miller.
We review Miller and the quid pro quo test it established.
In order to address some medical issues, Amy Miller consented to the removal of her right ovary. Although the documentation from her surgery indicated that her doctor had removed the correct ovary, she continued to suffer severe pain. An examination by another doctor revealed that Miller's doctor had actually removed her left ovary instead of her right. Nonsurgical options to manage Miller's pain failed, requiring a second surgery and removal of her remaining ovary.
Miller sued the original doctor for medical malpractice, and the jury "found the doctor completely at fault." 295 Kan. at 642, 289 P.3d 1098
. The jury awarded Miller over $750,000 in damages, including $575,000 for her noneconomic loss. But in accordance with K.S.A. 60–19a02, the district court reduced the noneconomic loss damages to $250,000. Miller objected to this reduction.
Miller argued that K.S.A. 60–19a02
violated two of her rights under the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights: her right to trial by jury (Section 5 ) and her right to remedy by due course of law (Section 18 ). Starting with Miller's right under Section 5, the Supreme Court first observed that although the constitution preserves the " ‘inviolate’ " right of trial by jury, that preservation is limited to the right "as it historically existed at common law when our state's constitution came into existence." 295 Kan. at 647, 289 P.3d 1098
. But because the jury's role at common law included the calculation of damages, the Supreme Court recognized that the statute indeed encroached on the right guaranteed by Section 5. 295 Kan. at 648, 289 P.3d 1098.
But this encroachment alone did "not necessarily render K.S.A. 60–19a02
unconstitutional." 295 Kan. at 648, 289 P.3d 1098. Instead, the court needed to decide whether the legislature, which "may modify the common law in limited circumstances without violating Section 5," had exceeded its authority. 295 Kan. at 648, 289 P.3d 1098. After a lengthy analysis, the court determined that the correct test to determine whether the legislature overstepped its bounds was the same test used to address Section 18 challenges, commonly called the quid pro quo test. 295 Kan. at 648–53, 289 P.3d 1098.
As explained by our Supreme Court, the quid pro quo test involves two steps. First, the court must decide "whether modification to the common-law remedy or the right to jury trial is reasonably necessary in the public interest to promote the public welfare." 295 Kan. at 657, 289 P.3d 1098
.
This analysis resembles the one "used to decide equal protection questions under the rational basis standard." 295 Kan. at 657, 289 P.3d 1098
. Second, the court must "determine whether the legislature substituted an adequate statutory remedy for the modification to the individual right." 295 Kan. at 657, 289 P.3d 1098. This "more stringent" step requires there be "an adequate substitute remedy conferred on those individuals whose rights are adversely impacted." 295 Kan. at 657, 289 P.3d 1098.
While recognizing that it had previously upheld the damages cap in Samsel v. Wheeler Transport Services, Inc., 246 Kan. 336, 789 P.2d 541 (1990)
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...the jury itemized the damages. See, e.g., Natalini v. Little , 278 Kan. 140, 142, 92 P.3d 567 (2004) ; Hilburn v. Enerpipe, Ltd. , 52 Kan.App. 2d 546, 548-49, 370 P.3d 428 (2016) ("After hearing all the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of $335,000 in total damages for Hilburn; $301,509......
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Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 112,765
...of her constitutional rights.The Court of Appeals panel rejected Hilburn's arguments and affirmed. See Hilburn v. Enerpipe, Ltd. , 52 Kan. App. 2d 546, 560, 370 P.3d 428 (2016). Believing itself bound by the precedent of Miller , the panel summarily declined Hilburn's invitation to reexamin......
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