Hill Cnty. High Sch. Dist. No. A v. Dick Anderson Constr., Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | DA 16-0186 |
| Citation | 390 P.3d 602,386 Mont. 223 |
| Parties | HILL COUNTY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. A, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DICK ANDERSON CONSTRUCTION, INC., and Springer Group Architects, P.C., Defendants and Appellees. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Thomas D. "Todd" Shea, Jr., Shea Law Firm, PLLC, Bozeman, Montana
For Appellees: Steve W. Reida, Alexander L. Roots, Landoe, Brown, Planalp & Reida, P.C., Bozeman, Montana, Jon A. Wilson, Brett C. Jensen, Brown Law Firm, P.C., Billings, Montana
¶1 Hill County High School District No. A filed suit after Havre High School's roof—which Dick Anderson Construction, Inc., built and Springer Group Architects, P.C., designed—partially collapsed in 2010. The Twelfth Judicial District Court granted Anderson and Springer summary judgment after concluding that the statute of repose time-barred the School District's claims. We address the following issues on appeal:
¶2 We affirm.
¶3 The School District entered into a contract with Springer in 1996 to design a new roof for Havre High School. The School District then entered into a contract with Anderson in 1997 to construct the roof. Anderson began construction in June 1997. The expected completion date for the project was October 1997. It is undisputed that the project was not completed by that point, but the parties dispute whether the project ever was "completed." Nevertheless, a final walkthrough occurred in January 1998 in which the parties discussed various punch list items that needed to be addressed. The school was in full use by April 1998 and the School District issued final payment around that same time.
¶4 Problems emerged with the new roof almost immediately. For example, the roof leaked, shingles and ridge caps fell off, interior vertical and horizontal beams were twisted, several vertical beams were not properly attached to the flooring, and a portion of the roof began to pull away from a wall. Springer and Anderson worked with the School District to address the various problems beginning in 1998. In October 2003, Springer informed the School District that repairs were finished and that no further work was necessary. After a heavy snowstorm in December 2010, 6,000 square feet of the roof collapsed.
¶5 The School District filed suit in December 2011. Its amended complaint alleged negligence, breach of express and implied warranty, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, deceit, and fraud. Springer and Anderson filed motions to dismiss—which the District Court converted to motions for summary judgment—asserting that the action was barred by the passage of time. The court granted Springer and Anderson summary judgment. It concluded that § 27–2–208, MCA, barred the School District's claims because the roof was "completed," within the meaning of the statute, in 1998. The court concluded also that alleged fraudulent concealment would not toll the statute of repose under § 27–2–208, MCA. Finally, the court awarded Springer attorney fees pursuant to the contract between Springer and the School District. The School District claims error in each ruling.
¶6 We review summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the standards set forth in M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Bird v. Cascade Cnty. , 2016 MT 345, ¶ 9, 386 Mont. 69, 386 P.3d 602. Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates both the absence of any genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) ; Bird , ¶ 9. Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must present material and substantial evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Bird , ¶ 9. We will draw all reasonable inferences from the offered evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment; but conclusory statements, speculative assertions, and mere denials are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Bird , ¶ 9.
¶7 We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct. Bird , ¶ 9. A decision on a request for an award of attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion unless a contract requires an award of fees, in which case a district court lacks discretion to deny the request.
Wittich Law Firm, P.C. v. O'Connell , 2013 MT 122, ¶ 15, 370 Mont. 103, 304 P.3d 375.
¶8 1. Whether the District Court correctly held that the statute of repose barred the School District's claims.
¶9 The District Court concluded that the roof was completed in 1998 and thus the School District's claims were barred under the ten-year statute of repose found at § 27–2–208, MCA. The court first determined that the statute's definition of "completion" "indicates [that] perfect performance is not required but instead that the construction of real property be usable for the purpose for which it is intended." The court concluded that the "purpose of the roofing project in this case is to shelter the building's occupants and its contents from the elements." Acknowledging that "Springer and Anderson may have performed their obligation poorly," the court found undisputed evidence that the School District began using the roof for its intended purpose in April of 1998. As such, the District Court concluded that § 27–2–208, MCA, barred the School District's claims and granted Springer and Anderson summary judgment.
¶10 On appeal, the School District argues that questions of fact exist regarding when, or even if, the roof was completed; the District Court therefore erred in granting Springer and Anderson summary judgment. The School District asserts that it submitted substantial evidence that the project was never completed because the roof had significant defects that were never resolved by Springer and Anderson. And, the School District contends, the roof did not meet its intended purpose because it did not shelter the building from the elements. The School District emphasizes that Springer and Anderson never issued a certificate of completion. Finally, the School District claims that because Springer and Anderson continued to work on the roof until 2003, it cannot be said that the collapse of the roof arose out of their work on the project in 1998.
¶11 In construing a statute, we look first "to the plain meaning" of its language. Eldorado Coop Canal Co. v. Hoge , 2016 MT 145, ¶ 18, 383 Mont. 523, 373 P.3d 836 (citation and internal quotations omitted). We also interpret a statute "as part of a whole statutory scheme and construe it so as to forward the purpose of that scheme." Eldorado Coop Canal Co. , ¶ 18 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
¶12 Statutes of repose create "a substantive right in those protected to be free from liability after a legislatively-determined period of time." Joyce v. Garnaas , 1999 MT 170, ¶ 14, 295 Mont. 198, 983 P.2d 369(citation omitted). Such statutes "are based on considerations of the economic best interests of the public as a whole and are substantive grants of immunity based on a legislative balance of the respective rights of potential plaintiffs and defendants struck by determining a time limit beyond which liability no longer exists." Joyce , ¶ 14 (citation omitted).
¶13 The statute of repose applicable to improvements to real property provides, in pertinent part, that "an action to recover damages ... resulting from or arising out of the design ... [or] construction ... of any improvement to real property ... may not be commenced more than 10 years after completion of the improvement." Section 27–2–208(1), MCA. The statute expressly defines "completion" as "that degree of completion at which the owner can utilize the improvement for the purpose for which it was intended or when a completion certificate is executed, whichever is earlier." Section 27–2–208(4)(a), MCA. Section 27–2–208, MCA, thus poses "an absolute bar to bringing a claim for construction-related damages more than ten years after construction is completed." Hein v. Sott , 2015 MT 196, ¶ 11, 380 Mont. 85, 353 P.3d 494 ; accord Ass'n of Unit Owners of Deer Lodge Condominium v. Big Sky , 245 Mont. 64, 80, 798 P.2d 1018, 1028 (1990) ().
¶14 It is undisputed that neither Anderson nor Springer ever executed a completion certificate for the project. In determining whether the roof was completed pursuant to the statute, the District Court hence focused its inquiry on whether the School District could utilize the roof for its intended purpose.
¶15 The School District's argument that the roof was not complete pursuant to § 27–2–208(4)(a), MCA, because the roof needed repairs conflicts with the statute's plain language. Section 27–2–208(4)(a) requires a "degree of completion at which the owner can utilize the improvement for the purpose for which it was intended." (Emphasis added.) The statute does not require that an improvement be finished to the owner's final satisfaction. It requires instead that the improvement can be used for its intended purpose. As the District Court noted, "the School District's interpretation of the statute would require any unsatisfactorily completed construction project to extend the statute of repose ad infinitum based upon any subsequent repair work done by the original contractor or engineer." Such an interpretation runs counter to both the statute's plain language and the purpose of the statute of repose.
¶16 Although the School District relies...
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