Hill v. Algor

• Decision Date: 18 January 2000
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 97-205 (SSB).
• Citation: 85 F.Supp.2d 391
• Parties: Ernest HILL, (AKA) Antoine Hill, Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey ALGOR, individually and as a New Jersey State Police Officer, David Henry Meyer, individually and as a New Jersey State Police Officer, Robert Kwap, individually and as a New Jersey State Police Officer, Stephen Makuka, individually and as a New Jersey State Police Officer, and John Does (1 through 6 individually and as New Jersey State Police Officers), Defendants.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

85 F.Supp.2d 391

Ernest HILL, (AKA) Antoine Hill, Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey ALGOR, individually and as a New Jersey State Police Officer, David Henry Meyer, individually and as a New Jersey State Police Officer, Robert Kwap, individually and as a New Jersey State Police Officer, Stephen Makuka, individually and as a New Jersey State Police Officer, and John Does (1 through 6 individually and as New Jersey State Police Officers), Defendants.

Civil Action No. 97-205 (SSB).

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

January 18, 2000.

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I. Dominic Simeone, Law Offices of I. Dominic Simeone, Cherry Hill, NJ, for Plaintiff.

John C. Connell, Archer & Greiner, Haddonfield, NJ, for Defendants.

OPINION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BROTMAN, District Judge.

Presently before this Court is the motion of defendants Trooper David Henry Meyer ("Meyer"), Trooper Robert Kwap ("Kwap") and Trooper Stephen Makuka ("Makuka") for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.¹

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arises out of events occurring in the aftermath of a January 19, 1996 shootout between New Jersey state troopers and drug suspects inside the Happy Dragon Chinese Restaurant located at Twenty-Eighth and Mickle Streets in Camden, New Jersey. On this night, troopers Algor, Meyer ("Meyer"), Roy Baker ("Baker"), and Sgt. Stewart Whiteman ("Whitman"), pursuant to the Camden Initiative,² were on patrol in the Camden area. They responded to a report of drug activity at the restaurant. As a result of the gunfire which ensued, Baker was severely wounded, and a drug suspect was killed.

While these events were unfolding, plaintiff Ernest Hill ("Hill") was walking along Twenty-Eighth Street to the bus stop to catch a bus to Pennsauken. As he walked, Hill heard gunfire. Hill continued toward the bus stop but paused directly across the street from the restaurant, noting the presence of state troopers. Hill also noticed an African-American male lying in the entrance to the restaurant. While Hill could not positively identify the male, he believed the man to be his friend Moses Clary. Hill yelled to the troopers to call an ambulance. The parties dispute the events which followed Hill's arrival on the scene, including both Hill's and the troopers' actions. Ultimately, Hill was arrested for obstruction of justice. Algor and Meyer were the officers who arrested Hill.

After his arrest, Hill was transported to the Camden Police Administration Building. Shortly thereafter, Hill was transported to the State Police Barracks in Bellmawr, New Jersey ("the Barracks"). On this night, Kwap was the acting shift supervisor of the Barracks. At the Barracks, Hill was placed in a holding cell, where, handcuffed to a bench, he remained from 11:45 p.m. until approximately 2:30 a.m. During this time, Hill claims that he was beaten by a group of state troopers. Hill does not know the identities of these troopers.

At around 2:45 a.m., Investigator Charles Bentham ("Bentham") entered Hill's holding cell to move him to another room where his official statement would be taken. Upon entering the cell, Bentham noticed some blood on Hill's clothing, hands, and head near the hairline. Bentham took Hill to a restroom to wash the blood from his face and hands.

In the interrogation room Bentham and Makuka asked Hill questions and took his statement, which process did not end until approximately 4:30 a.m. Makuka, who was off-duty on this night, was summoned to the Barracks to question Hill concerning the circumstances surrounding the shooting of Trooper Baker.

Ultimately, Hill was charged with obstruction of justice in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 and released from the Barracks between 4:30 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. on January 20, 1996. After his release, Hill sought treatment at Cooper Medical Center. At the hospital, Hill received stitches in his head. In addition, Hill complains of spinal and knee injuries as a result of his assault.

On January 17, 1997, Hill filed a complaint against the State of New Jersey, the New Jersey State Police Department, and John Does 1-6 individually and as state police officers. On October 10, 1997, the Court granted Hill's motion to amend his complaint, and on October 2, 1997, Hill filed an amended complaint naming Algor as a defendant. On October 14, 1997, the Court dismissed with prejudice all federal and state claims against the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey State Police Department. On February 23, 1999, Algor filed a motion seeking summary judgment on all claims. In an Opinion and Order dated June 1, 1999 ("the June Opinion"), the Court granted Algor's motion for summary judgment as to the following claims:

(1) First Cause of Action (42 U.S.C. § 1983): that part which alleges a violation of Hill's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection; and

(2) Second Cause of Action: Conspiracy based upon discriminatory animus under 42. U.S.C. § 1985(3).

(Order dated June 1, 1999.) In addition, pursuant to Hill's decision not to pursue against Algor the following claims, the Court dismissed these claims with prejudice:

(1) First Cause of Action (42 U.S.C. § 1983): those parts which allege a violation of Hill's:

i. Eighth Amendment right to protection from cruel and unusual punishment;

ii. Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him;

iii. Fourth Amendment right to be protected against punishment disproportionate to any crime;

(2) Third Cause of Action (42 U.S.C. § 1983);

(3) Fourth Cause of Action (42 U.S.C. § 1983);

(4) Sixth Cause of Action (Negligence). Order dated June 1, 1999.

Thus, the remaining claims against Algor which survived summary judgment and may proceed to trial include:

(1) First Cause of Action (42 U.S.C. § 1983): that part alleging violation of Hill's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to protection from false arrest and excessive force;

(2) Fifth Cause of Action alleging common law assault; and

(3) Ninth Cause of Action alleging common law false arrest.

On March 22, 1999, the Court granted Hill's motion to amend his complaint for a second time, and the following day Hill filed a second amended complaint. The second amended complaint adds Meyer, Kwap, Makuka, and John Does 1-6 as defendants. It alleges that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). It also contains state law causes of action for assault, negligence, respondeat superior, malicious prosecution, and false arrest. On October 8, 1999 defendants Meyer, Kwap, and Makuka filed the summary judgment motion that is presently before the Court.³

II. DISCUSSION

A. JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.

B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is a stringent one, but it is not insurmountable. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 provides that summary judgment may be granted only when materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Serbin v. Bora Corp., 96 F.3d 66, 69 n. 2 (3d Cir.1996). In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the court must grant all reasonable inferences from the evidence to the non-moving party. The threshold inquiry is whether there are "any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Supreme Court decisions mandate that a summary judgment motion must be granted unless the party opposing the motion "provides evidence `such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Once the moving party has carried its burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The non-moving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Serbin, 96 F.3d at 69 n. 2 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); see also Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir.1991) (declaring that non-movant may not "rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or ... vague statements"). Thus, if the non-movant's evidence is merely "colorable" or is "not significantly probative," the court may grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

FEDERAL CLAIMS

C. COUNT ONE: VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In count one of his second amended complaint, Hill alleges that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by infringing on his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to protection from false arrest and excessive force. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 20.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

This statute "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes...