Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank New Jersey

Decision Date15 October 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-5603,95-5603
Citation98 F.3d 61
Parties72 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 234, 5 A.D. Cases 1796, 8 NDLR P 378 Albert L. LAWRENCE v. NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK NEW JERSEY, Albert Lawrence, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Gregory S. Schaer (argued), Law Offices of Linda B. Kenney, Red Bank, NJ, for Appellant.

Thomas D. Ruane (argued), St. John & Wayne, Newark, NJ, Steven B. Harz, John & Wayne, New York City, for Appellee.

Before: SCIRICA and ROTH, Circuit Judges and O'NEILL, District Judge. *

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.

Albert Lawrence appeals the grant of summary judgment to National Westminster Bank in his suit alleging age and handicap discrimination and denial of severance benefits. We will affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court.

I.

Albert Lawrence was hired by Citizens First National Bank of New Jersey, now National Westminster Bank, New Jersey, 1 in October 1979 as Vice President/Chief Investment Officer of the Trust Department. In 1985 he was promoted to the position of Senior Vice President/Chief Investment Officer.

On June 30, 1987, Lawrence was injured in a car accident and sustained severe back injuries. As a result he wears a back brace. Lawrence alleges he suffers from chronic pain and discomfort because of the injury. Nevertheless, after the accident, Lawrence returned to work and resumed his position with the bank.

In early 1992, Allan Nichols became bank Chairman. Nichols developed new goals and business objectives for the bank, and specifically for the Trust Department. Although the parties' accounts of what ensued over the next one and one half years differ, the bank contends Lawrence's level of performance substantially deteriorated. On September 3, 1993, at the age of sixty, Lawrence was terminated for sub-standard performance and "behavior not befitting a manager."

Lawrence disputes he was fired for "cause." He contends this explanation was pretextual, and that he was fired because of his age and/or his physical condition. Lawrence filed suit in the United States District Court for New Jersey alleging age and handicap discrimination under New Jersey and federal laws. 2

As we have noted, the district court granted National Westminster Bank's motion for summary judgment. Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank, New Jersey, No. 94-1368, 1995 WL 506043 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 1995). Lawrence now appeals.

II.

We have jurisdiction over the final order of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. "When we review a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same test as the district court should have applied initially." Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2611, 132 L.Ed.2d 854 (1995). A court may grant summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "When the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may meet its burden on summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to carry its burden of persuasion at trial." See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 329 (3d Cir.1995); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A nonmoving party creates a genuine issue of material fact when it provides evidence "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "In reviewing the record, the court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences." Brewer, 72 F.3d at 330.

III.
A.

Lawrence alleges National Westminster Bank violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq., by dismissing him because of his age.

Age discrimination claims under the ADEA and LAD are governed by the same standards and allocation of burdens of proof. See Retter v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 755 F.Supp. 637, 638 (D.N.J.1991), aff'd, 975 F.2d 1551 (3d Cir.1992); see also Waldron v. SL Industries, Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 503-04 (3d Cir.1995). Lawrence's age discrimination claims are grounded not on direct evidence but on pretext. We have adopted the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis for age discrimination cases brought under a pretext theory. See Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728; Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 897 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052, 108 S.Ct. 26, 97 L.Ed.2d 815 (1987). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first present a prima facie case by establishing that (1) he is over 40 years old, (2) he is qualified for the position in question, (3) he suffered from an adverse employment decision, and (4) his replacement was sufficiently younger to permit a reasonable inference of age discrimination. Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728; Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 897. 3 Once a plaintiff has satisfied the prima facie standard, the burden shifts to defendant to articulate a "legitimate nondiscriminatory" reason for the adverse employment decision. Should the defendant successfully carry its burden, the plaintiff then "has the opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's stated reasons were not its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination." Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728. At this stage, the plaintiff may defeat a summary judgment motion either: (1) by discrediting the proffered reasons for termination, directly or circumstantially, or (2) by adducing evidence that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse action. Sempier, 45 F.3d at 731; see also Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir.1994) ("We hold that, to ... [defeat a motion for summary judgment], the plaintiff generally must submit evidence which: l) casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication; or 2) allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action"). 4

Here, the parties' disagreement revolves around the "pretext" prong of the discrimination claim. The district court found Lawrence established a prima facie case of age discrimination, but determined "plaintiff failed to offer any evidence that suggests defendant's nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment is unworthy of belief." The court then granted summary judgment in favor of National Westminster Bank.

B.

After reviewing the record, we believe Lawrence cast sufficient doubt on National Westminster Bank's proffered reasons for his termination to create a material issue of fact. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762. National Westminster Bank asserts it dismissed Lawrence because of poor job performance. According to the bank, Lawrence's managerial and customer-relations skills declined dramatically in the year before his termination. He lost customer accounts and the confidence of customers, supervisors and other bank employees.

In particular, National Westminster Bank argues Lawrence's last evaluation is demonstrative of his inadequate performance. The evaluation rated his performance in several areas, falling into three categories: behavior; performance/financial standards; and specific objectives. Overall, he was described as meeting standards in the latter category, but falling below standards in the other two categories. Lawrence challenges the credibility of the evaluation contending that the report was unsigned, undated, incomplete, and never provided to him during his employment. 5

National Westminster Bank also relies on a March 1993 memorandum, prepared by Richard Moore, for National Westminster Bank's Senior Vice President, Peter Beisler, detailing several reasons why Lawrence was not "the right person to lead [National Westminster Bank's] investment effort in the future and should be replaced in that position." National Westminster Bank contends Moore's memorandum substantiates its assertion Lawrence was fired "for cause."

A jury might well view Moore's memorandum as evidence that National Westminster Bank's proffered reasons for Lawrence's termination were not pretextual. Lawrence, however, contends Moore prepared the memorandum as an after-the-fact justification for the discriminatory employment decision. According to Lawrence, the memo was written at the direction of National Westminster Bank's human resources office once the termination decision was made. Furthermore, Lawrence claims Moore did not actually believe he was incapable of performing at a satisfactory level. At his deposition, Moore conceded he had no reason to believe Lawrence was incapable; rather, he thought Lawrence did not want to implement the kind of changes envisioned by Moore and the bank's new leadership. A jury could find Lawrence's account credible.

To substantiate his account, Lawrence relies on depositions of his subordinates, which portray his performance in a favorable light. According to Edward Hofmann, a Trust Portfolio Manager for the Trust Department, and Leonard Nedswick, an Administrative Officer in the Trust Department, Lawrence was competent and expressed an enthusiastic and positive attitude toward his work. Hofmann described him as "a thorough investment professional, very interested in his business" and as "a very good portfolio manager." Nedswick said he considered Lawrence qualified to service the accounts on which they worked together. Moreover, in contrast to National Westminster Bank's assertions, Nedswick stated he had never heard of an instance where Lawrence failed to inspire his co-workers, and based on his experience working with...

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