Hill v. Board of Educ.

Decision Date15 August 1997
Docket NumberI-009,No. 89503,J,89503
Parties121 Ed. Law Rep. 362, 1997 OK 107, 1997 OK 111 Marty and Peggy HILL, Parents and Guardians of Mark James Hill, a minor, Appellees, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, Districtones, Oklahoma, Appellant.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Linda Maria Meoli & Timothy M. Melton, The Center for Education Law, Inc., Oklahoma City, for Appellant.

Chuck Moss, Oklahoma City, for Appellees.

WATT, Justice.

¶1 Mark James Hill, a minor, and his parents [appellees] are residents of the Luther School District. Pursuant to earlier granted transfer requests, Hill has been enrolled as a student in the Jones School District since 1986 and will be a senior during the 1997-1998 school year. Both the Jones and Luther school districts are located in Oklahoma County which has a population in excess of 450,000 residents. For reasons not disclosed in the record, Hill's application to transfer to Jones High School for his senior year was denied by the appellant school district. 1

¶2 Hill's parents appealed the transfer's denial to the Oklahoma County District Court pursuant to the terms of 70 O.S.Supp.1993 § 8-103(C). The issue before the trial court was whether 70 O.S.Supp.1993 § 8-102(A)(3) mandated that the receiving school district approve Hill's transfer request. The court ruled in the appellees' favor, finding that the school district did not have the discretion to deny the transfer request. The court ordered the district to permit Hill to enroll in the Jones School System for his senior year. The school district appealed. This Court granted (1) the appellees' motion to expedite appeal on June 18, 1997, and (2) their motion to retain on June 24, 1997.

ISSUE

¶3 The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in holding that the terms of 70 O.S.Supp.1993 § 8-102(A)(3) require the school district to accept a transfer--over its objection--of a student who (a) was previously allowed to transfer into the district, (b) seeks the transfer for his senior year, and (c) lives in a county having a population of 450,000 or more residents. We hold that it did not and affirm the trial court.

DISCUSSION

¶4 The transfer of students between school districts is governed by various provisions of the Oklahoma School Code, 70 O.S.1991 §§ 1-101 et seq., as amended. Resolution of this case rests upon interpretation of § 8-102(A)(3) of the Code, whose pertinent terms provide:

A. The superintendent of the receiving school district shall grant an application for transfer of a child from the district in which the child resides if such transfer has been approved by the boards of education of both the resident and receiving districts as provided for in Section 8-103 of this title. A student granted a transfer may continue to attend the school to which he transferred unless the receiving district subsequently disapproves the transfer. Notice of such disapproval shall be given on or before April 10th, provided the student shall be entitled to continue attending the school until the end of the school year. Any brother or sister of such student may attend such school with the approval of the receiving school district only, provided that this provision shall not apply to:

* * * * * *

3. Graduating seniors in counties having a population of four hundred fifty thousand (450,000) or above who were previously legally enrolled in the school district to which such student wishes to transfer.

* * * * * *

Provided, however, if the grade such child is entitled to pursue is not offered in the district where such child resides, the transfer must be approved.

¶5 The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the Legislature's intention and purpose as expressed in a statute. Public Serv. Co. of Okla. v. State ex rel. Corp. Commission, 1992 OK 153, 842 P.2d 750, 752. In construing a statute's language, "relevant portions must be considered together, where possible, to give force and effect to each other." Id., quoting Ledbetter v. Okla. Alcoholic Bev. Laws Enforcement Commission, 1988 OK 117, 764 P.2d 172, 179. Because legislative intent must be derived from the entire act in light of its general purpose, TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington, 1992 OK 31, 829 P.2d 15, 20, we will also examine related transfer provisions of the Oklahoma School Code in determining the meaning and legislative intent of § 8-102(A)(3).

¶6 We must initially resolve whether the proviso "provided that this provision shall not apply to" refers only to "[a]ny brother or sister of [a previously transferred] student" or whether it refers to both a previously transferred student and his or her siblings. 2 As a general rule, "A proviso in a statute is presumed to refer only to the provision to which it is attached, and is generally deemed to apply to the clause or provision immediately preceding it." Goodin v. Brown, 301 P.2d 652, 654 (Okla.1956). However, a proviso need not be confined to the immediately preceding subject where it clearly appears to have been intended to apply to some other matter. Russell v. State, 488 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Okla.1971); Hudson v. Hopkins, 75 Okla. 260, 183 P. 507 (1919). In this case, both parties agree, and we concur, that the Legislature intended the proviso to apply to both a previously transferred student and his or her siblings. Any other construction would be illogical and contrary to the legislative history of § 8-102(A).

¶7 Ordinarily, where a student desires to transfer from the school district in which he/she resides (the "resident district") to another school district (the "receiving district") the student must receive permission from both districts' boards of education. When both school boards approve a transfer application, the superintendent of the receiving district is obligated by law to grant the transfer request. This dictate is clearly set forth in the first sentence of § 8-102(A).

¶8 The second sentence of § 8-102(A) declares that "[a] student previously granted a transfer may continue to attend the school to which he transferred unless the receiving district subsequently disapproves the transfer." Stated otherwise, a student who has previously transferred into a receiving district does not need to subsequently obtain permission from his resident district to continue attending school in the receiving district. The transferred student needs only the receiving district's annual acquiescence to continue attending school there. The first part of § 8-102(A)'s fourth sentence is comparable to its second sentence because it provides that any brother or sister of a transferred student may attend the receiving school "with the approval of the receiving district only." Like the earlier transferred student, the sibling of a transferred student only needs the receiving district's annual affirmation to attend school there. The sibling does not need the resident district's approval to effectuate the transfer. The last sentence of § 8-102(A) makes clear that, consistent with § 8-101 3, the receiving district must approve the transfer request of any student who resides in a district that does not offer the grade the student is entitled to pursue regardless whether that student has previously been granted a transfer into the district.

¶9 At issue in this proceeding is the meaning of the proviso and third exception enumerated in § 8-102(A). Appellees contend that where the exception is applicable to a previously transferred student, the receiving district has no discretion and must approve their subsequent transfer requests. The receiving district argues that mandatory transfers are required only under the limited circumstances listed in § 8-101 and that all other transfers are discretionary. The district also urges that where a § 8-102(A)(3) exception does apply and an earlier transferred student seeks a subsequent transfer, discretionary approvals from both the resident and receiving districts are required. For the reasons stated below, we reject the district's interpretation of this statute and agree with the appellees.

¶10 Undoubtedly, discretionary approvals by both the resident and receiving school districts are required for initial, regular student transfers. Additionally, the plain language of § 8-102(A)'s second sentence makes clear that the discretionary approval of the receiving district alone is necessary for later regular transfers of earlier moved students unless these students fall within the exceptions enumerated under § 8-102(A). It is the Legislature's intent expressed in the third of these exceptions--i.e., the one for graduating seniors in counties with populations in excess of 450,000 residents--that must be determined.

¶11 The language of § 8-102(A) is very clear that transfers after an initial one require only the approval of the receiving district. The district's position--that the...

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