Hill v. Boston, H.T. & W.R. Co.
| Citation | 144 Mass. 284,10 N.E. 836 |
| Parties | HILL v. BOSTON, H.T. & W.R. CO. |
| Decision Date | 23 March 1887 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Solomon Lincoln, for plaintiff.
The plaintiff assumes that it is settled law in Massachusetts that a common carrier is responsible for all losses of chattels intrusted to its charge, occasioned by its own negligence, or that of its servants, and that it cannot completely relieve itself from this responsibility by any contract. This rule prevails almost universally in the other states of the Union, and is adopted by the courts of the United States. Squire v. Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 240; Judson v. Western R. Co., 6 Allen, 486; School-district v. Boston, H. & E.R.R., 102 Mass 552; Ball v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 83 Mo. 574; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Lawson Cont. 31. See, also, Graves v. Lake Shore & M.S.R.R., 137 Mass. 33. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the full value of the animal lost, unless he is estopped to make this claim. Defendant claims that the plaintiff is thus estopped by reason of having, through his duly-authorized agent, executed a contract which fixes the value of the animal lost, and confines the measure of damages to the amount thus fixed. The question is therefore one of the rule of damages; and this, in turn, depends upon the construction of a contract, viz., the live-stock shipping agreement. It is the contract of the carrier, in the sense that the carrier originated it, framed it, and in a sense imposed it. The contract is to be construed strictly against the carrier. 17 Wall. 357, supra; 137 Mass. 33, supra. The plaintiff submits that the contract does not create an estoppel against him. It contains no express language which can have this effect. The language of the contract is not such as would attract the attention of the forwarder as concluding an agreement. In cases in which the carrier has been protected by a special contract, the language of that contract has been distinct and explicit. Squire v. New York Cent. R. Co. , ubi supra; Graves v Railroad Co., supra. Nor is any protection to be found for the defendant in those cases in which the carrier limits its liability as an insurer in all cases to a fixed sum, unless otherwise agreed; as, for example, Judson v. Western R.R. supra; Green v. Boston & L.R.R., 128 Mass. 221. Even if it should be held that the word "estimated" is here equivalent in law to "agreed," the plaintiff submits that the agreement goes no further than the needs of the contract require. The portion of the contract as to rates contains no agreement, but merely a statement of rates. If this language in any way limits liability, it must be held to limit for reasons heretofore considered only in case of collision. While the forwarder is presumed to know the contents of a contract which he signs, whether he reads it or not, it is presuming much, and construing a contract strictly against him, to hold that an "estimate" made without reference to liability, and solely for the purpose of fixing rates of transportation which were determined by the carrier, and in which, as matter of fact, the forwarder, through his agent, took only a formal part, and cannot be presumed, as matter of law, to have taken any part, estops him from recovering the value of his property lost through the negligence of the carrier. The plaintiff further submits that his agent had no authority to bind him in a valuation of the animals transported. The duty of the agent related merely to transportation, and his authority extended only to such acts as promoted that end.
G.A. Torrey, for defendant.
The question for the court in this case is, can the plaintiff treat this as a $75 animal when there is anything to pay, and as a $5,000 animal when there is anything to receive. Whether the defendant can contract for entire exemption from its own negligence or not is still an open question in this state. It is clear that the carrier has a right to arrange his tariff according to the value of the goods. This doctrine has never been questioned. If this be so, it is equally clear that if a person represents his merchandise to be of small value, in order to avail himself of a low rate of freight, the courts would aid him in the perpetration of a fraud if they permitted him to recover a larger sum in case of loss. Every point in this case is amply sustained by authority. It is said that the plaintiff's agent was not authorized to make this agreement. But it is held that an authority to deliver goods to a carrier implies authority to receive the consent of the carrier, and to agree to the terms of carriage. Squire v. New York Cent. R.R., 98 Mass 239; Nelson v. Hudson R.R., 48 N.Y. 498. The general rule of law that authority intrusted to an agent to do a particular thing implies an authority to do everything necessary to accomplish that thing, is sufficient to cover this point. It is said that the agent did not read the agreement. This condemns the agent, but does not affect us. Squire v. New York Cent. R.R., 98 Mass. 239; Grace v. Adams, 100 Mass. 507; Grindle v. Eastern Exp. Co., 67 Me. 317. The agreement is applicable to the defendant as a connecting road. Whitworth v. Erie R.R., 87 N.Y. 413; Manhattan Oil Co. v. Camden & A.R.R., 52 Barb. 72; Lamb v. Same, 2 Daly, 454; Maghee v. Same, 55 N.Y. 514; Taylor v. Little Rock, M.R. & T.R.R., 32 Ark. 393. Upon the general question of the limitation of liability to the price stated in the agreement, the cases are numerous. Squire v. New York...
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