Hill v. California

• Decision Date: 19 January 1970
• Docket Number: No. 51,51
• Citation: 401 U.S. 797,91 S.Ct. 1106,28 L.Ed.2d 484
• Parties: Archie William HILL, Jr., Petitioner, v. State of CALIFORNIA
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

401 U.S. 797

91 S.Ct. 1106

28 L.Ed.2d 484

Archie William HILL, Jr., Petitioner,

v State of CALIFORNIA.

No. 51.

Argued Jan. 19, 1970.

Reargued Oct. 21, 1970.

Decided April 5, 1971.

Syllabus

Two men, who were driving petitioner Hill's car, were arrested for narcotics possession. A search of the car disclosed property stolen in a robbery the previous day. Both men admitted taking part in the robbery and implicated Hill, who shared an apartment with one of them. The guns used in the robbery and other stolen property were reported to be in the apartment. An investigating officer checked official records on Hill, verifying his association with one of the informants, his description, address, and make of car. The police, with probable cause to arrest Hill, but without a search or arrest warrant, went to his apartment, and there found a man matching Hill's description. The arrestee denied that he was Hill (and, in fact, he was not), and denied knowledge of any guns in the apartment, but the police, who spotted a gun and ammunition in plain view, arrested the man, searched the apartment, and seized guns, stolen property, other evidentiary items, and two pages of Hill's diary. Hill was convicted of robbery, substantially on the basis of items seized in the search. The trial judge ruled that the police acted in good faith in believing the arrestee was Hill. The District Court of Appeal agree that the officers acted in good faith and that the arrest was valid, but thought the search unreasonable. The California Supreme Court reversed, sustaining both the arrest and the search. Hill argues that Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, narrowing the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest, decided after the affirmance of his conviction by the state courts, should be applied to his case in this Court on direct review. Held:

1. Chimel, supra, is inapplicable to searches antedating that decision, regardless of whether the case is on direct or collateral review or involves state or federal prisoners. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 28 L.Ed.2d 388. P. 802.

2. The arrest and search were valid under the Fourth Amendment, since the police had probable cause to arrest Hill and reasonably believed the arrestee was Hill. Accordingly, they were entitled to do what the law allowed them to do had the arrestee in fact been Hill, that is, to search incident to arrest and to seize evi- dence of the crime they had probable cause to believe Hill committed. Pp. 802—805.

3. Since Hill's argument that the admission into evidence of pages of his diary violated his Fifth Amendment rights was not raised below, it is not properly before this Court. Pp. 805—806.

69 Cal.2d 550, 72 Cal.Rptr. 641, 446 P.2d 521, affirmed.

Joseph Amato, Santa Ana, Cal., for petitioner.

Ronald M. George, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of Court.

On June 4, 1966, four armed men robbed a resident in Studio City, California. On June 5, Alfred Baum and Richard Bader were arrested for possession of narcotics; at the time of their arrest, they were driving petitioner Hill's car, and a search of the car produced property stolen in the Studio City robbery the day before. Bader and Baum both admitted taking part in the June 4 robbery, and both implicated Hill. Bader told the police that he was sharing an apartment with Hill at 9311 Sepulveda Boulevard. He also stated that the guns used in the robbery and other stolen property were in the apartment. On June 6, Baum and Bader again told the police that Hill had been involved in the June 4 robbery.

One of the investigating officers then checked official records on Hill, verifying his prior association with Bader, his age and physical description, his address, and the make of his car. The information the officer uncovered corresponded with the general descriptions by the robbery victims and the statements made by Baum and Bader.

Hill concedes that this information gave the policy probable cause to arrest and the police undertook to do so on June 6. Four officers went to the Sepulveda Boulevard apartment, verified the address, and knocked. One of the officers testified: 'The door was open and a person who fit the description exactly of Archie Hill, as I had received it from both the cards and from Baum and Bader, answered the door. * * * We placed him under arrest for robbery.'

The police had neither an arrest nor a search warrant. After arresting the man who answered the door, they asked him whether he was Hill and where the guns and stolen goods were. The arrestee replied that he was not Hill, that his name was Miller, that it was Hill's apartment and that he was waiting for Hill. He also claimed that he knew nothing about any stolen property or guns, although the police testified that an automatic pistol and a clip of ammunition were lying in plain view on a coffee table in the living room where the arrest took place. The arrestee then produced identification indicating that he was in fact Miller, but the police were unimpressed and proceeded to search the apartment living room, bedroom, kitchen area, and bath—for a period which one officer described as 'a couple of hours.'

During the course of the search, the police seized sev- eral items: rent receipts and personal correspondence bearing Hill's name from a dresser drawer in the bedroom; a starter pistol, two switchblade knives, a camera and case stolen in the Studio City robbery, and two hoodmasks made from white T-shirts, all from the bedroom; a .22-caliber revolver from under the living room sofa; and two pages of petitioner Hill's diary from a bedroom dresser drawer.¹

On October 20, 1966, Hill was found guilty of robbery on the basis of evidence produced at the preliminary hearing and the trial.² Eyewitnesses to the robbery were unable to identify Hill; the only substantial evidence of his guilt consisted of the items seized in the search of his apartment. In sustaining the admissibility of the evidence, the trial judge ruled that the arresting officers had acted in the good-faith belief that Miller was in fact Hill.³ The District Court of Appeal agreed that the officers acted in good faith and that the arrest of Miller was valid but nonetheless thought the incident search of Hill's apartment unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 67 Cal.Rptr. 389 (1968).⁴ The California Supreme Court in turn reversed, sustaining both the arrest and the search. 69 Cal.2d 550, 72 Cal.Rptr. 641, 446 P.2d 521 (1968). We granted certiorari, 396 U.S. 818, 90 S.Ct. 112, 24 L.Ed.2d 68 (1969), and now affirm the judgment of the California Supreme Court.

I

Petitioner argues that Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), decided after his conviction was affirmed by the California Supreme Court, should be applied to his case, which is before us on direct review. Chimel narrowed the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest, but in Williams v. United States and Elkanich v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 28 L.Ed.2d 388, we held Chimel inapplicable to searches occurring before the date of decision in that case regardless of whether a case was still on direct review when Chimel was decided, see Williams, supra, or whether a Chimel challenge was asserted in a subsequent collateral attack on a conviction. See Elkanich, supra. We also stated that in light of past decisions there was no difference in constitutional terms between state and federal prisoners insofar as retroactive application to their cases of a new interpretation of the Bill of Rights is concerned. At 656, 91 S.Ct., at 1154. The search of Hill's apartment, permissible in scope under pre-Chimel standards, will not be retrospectively invalidated because of that decision.

II

Based on our own examination of the record, we find no reason to disturb either the findings of the California courts that the police had probable cause to arrest Hill and that the arresting officers had a reasonable, good faith belief that the arrestee Miller was in fact Hill, or the conclusion that '(w) hen the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest.' 69 Cal.2d, at 553, 72 Cal.Rptr. at 643, 446 P.2d, at 523. ⁵ The police unquestionably had probable cause to arrest Hill; they also had his address and a verified description. The mailbox at the indicated address listed Hill as the occupant of the apartment. Upon gaining entry to the apartment, they were confronted with one who fit the description of Hill received from various sources.⁶ That person claimed he was Miller, not Hill. But aliases and false identifications are not uncommon.⁷ Moreover, there was a lock on the door and Miller's explanation for his mode of entry was not convincing.⁸ He also denied knowledge of firearms in the apartment although a pistol and loaded ammunition clip were in plain view in the room. ⁹ The upshot was that the offi- cers in good faith believed Miller was Hill and arrested him. They were quite wrong as it turned out, and subjective good-faith belief would not in itself justify either the arrest or the subsequent search. But sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and on the record before us the officers' mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time.

Nor can we agree with petitioner that however valid the arrest of Miller, the subsequent search violated the Fourth Amendment. It is true that Miller was not Hill; nor did Miller have authority or control over the premises, although at the very least he was Hill's guest. But the question is not what evidence would have been admissible against Hill (or against Miller for that matter) if the police, with probable cause to...