Hill v. City of El Paso, Texas

• Decision Date: 05 January 1971
• Docket Number: No. 29844.,29844.
• Citation: 437 F.2d 352
• Parties: Joe HILL, Individually and d/b/a A-1 Auto Enterprises, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF EL PASO, TEXAS, George Rodriguez, Jr., Municipal Court Judge for the City of El Paso, Texas and Myron Davis, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

437 F.2d 352 (1971)

Joe HILL, Individually and d/b/a A-1 Auto Enterprises, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF EL PASO, TEXAS, George Rodriguez, Jr., Municipal Court Judge for the City of El Paso, Texas and Myron Davis, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 29844.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 5, 1971.

Gerald B. Shifrin, El Paso, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.

Travis White, City Atty., John C. Ross, Wade Adkins, Asst. City Attys., El Paso, Tex., for City of El Paso and George Rodriguez, Jr.

Before JONES, GEWIN and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

CLARK, Circuit Judge:

It is difficult to appreciate immediately that the resolution of a question so mundane as what constitutes "junk" in El Paso, Texas could create a legal Hydra. The proliferating problems and obstacles stem from the notion by one litigant that he will somehow fare better in a federal forum than in pending State court civil and criminal proceedings, because it ignores the basic truth that neither the State nor the federal court systems can discharge the function of preserving justice under law for the citizens of this republic without a scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the other system. Mutual interdependence and the need for a harmonious working relationship between the systems dictate that we affirm the district court's refusal to allow this litigant to swap systems in mid-course.

Joe Hill, the owner and operator of A-1 Auto Enterprises, filed a complaint in the United States District Court based upon 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1970) invoking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (1962) and 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201 and 2202 (1959). He sought an injunction against further prosecution of pending State civil and criminal proceedings against him, a declaratory judgment that the municipal ordinance on which the State suits depended was voidly vague, and compensatory and exemplary damages. The named defendants were the City of El Paso, Texas; George Rodriguez, Jr., a municipal court judge of the City of El Paso; and Myron Davis, Hill's next door neighbor.¹

The complaint alleged the following facts. The City through officials of its zoning department, the Judge in his judicial capacity, and Davis as a complaining witness, were conspiring to violate Hill's civil rights by instituting a civil action for a prohibitory injunction and numerous municipal court criminal proceedings to curtail or proscribe his commercial operations. For a number of years the City of El Paso had objected to his use of certain leased premises in the city for a business which he described as a public automobile garage claiming it was in violation of the zoning ordinances of the city. The present zoning classification, C-3, which applied to his property, expressly allowed the use and maintenance of the business he was conducting.² The named defendants had subjected Hill to continual harassment and prosecution by falsely claiming the business he was conducting on his leasehold premises was not a public garage, but rather was a junk yard, a use not permitted in a C-3 zone. The city ordinance which defined "junk" was indefinite, ambiguous, standardless and unconstitutional.³ In the alternative it was alleged that plaintiff did not sell or maintain any junk, as defined in the city ordinance, in the operation of his business on the subject premises. In addition to seeking an injunction against the pending State court litigation, the complaint sought a declaration of invalidity of the ordinance defining junk, and actual and punitive damages. In capsule, the substance of Hill's complaint is twofold: (1) the business that he is operating on the subject premises is a public garage within the meaning of the city's zoning requirements and is not a junk yard; and (2) the El Paso ordinance defining "junk" is unconstitutionally vague.

No answer was filed in the court below nor was any evidence taken. However, the record contains a transcribed colloquy between the court and counsel for Hill, in which it was asserted that Hill's business operations, at least in part, involved the presence of used automobiles and parts connected to such automobiles on the premises. It appears that Hill sells parts he takes from these old automobiles for further service as used parts. He does not sell these items as scrap or for any use other than that for which the part was originally intended.

The district court dismissed Hill's complaint without prejudice on the ground that he failed to exhaust his State remedies. Although we do not agree with the reason assigned for the district court's action, we affirm.

I. PARTIES.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 does not create a right of action against either the City of El Paso or its Municipal Judge. In terms, Section 1983 applies to any "person" who deprives another of a protected right. The Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), held that a municipal corporation is not a person within the meaning of this statute. Since Judge Rodriguez is being sued in his judicial capacity and since the subject matter of the action involves the performance of his official role, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) makes the statute inapposite as to him also. Guedry v. Ford, 431 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1970). In view of the death of the defendant, Davis, and the absence of any effort by Hill to comply with Fed.R.App.P. 43(a) the continued vitality of the action, which is left with no proper parties defendant, is dubious to say the least.

II. FEDERAL INJUNCTIONS AGAINST PENDING STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.

One ground of relief prayed for was a prohibitory injunction against the maintenance of civil and criminal actions in courts of the State of Texas. Perhaps unwittingly but ultimately unmeritoriously, Hill has raised an issue which in a different factual setting could have portentous and perplexing dimensions. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (1965) provides:

A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by an Act of Congress or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.

Most recently in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 90 S. Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970) the Supreme Court has this year interpreted this restraint on courts of the United States in stern and unmistakable language.

In 1954 when this Court interpreted this statute, it stated: "This is not a statute conveying a broad general policy for appropriate ad hoc application. Legislative policy is here expressed in a clear-cut prohibition qualified only by specifically defined exceptions." Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers, 348 U.S. 511, 515-516, 75 S.Ct. 452, 455, 99 L.Ed. 600 (1955). Since that time Congress has not seen fit to amend the statute and we therefore adhere to that position and hold that any injunction against state court proceedings otherwise proper under general equitable principles must be based on one of the specific statutory exceptions to § 2283 if it is to be upheld. Moreover since the statutory prohibition against such injunctions in part rests on the fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their courts, the exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction. Proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and ultimately this Court.

* * * Any doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings should be resolved in favor of permitting the state courts to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy. The explicit wording of § 2283 itself implies as much, and the fundamental principle of a dual system of courts leads inevitably to that conclusion.

See also Mistrot v. Wade, 433 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1970).

In the pending case, however, the complaint alleges a cause of action based upon 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343. The question of whether these are Acts of Congress which expressly authorize injunctions to stay proceedings in a State court is an important but unresolved question at this juncture in our jurisprudence. See Le Flore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1970), Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969), and Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969), which discuss the impact of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965), Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 85 S.Ct. 1751, 14 L.Ed.2d 715, and Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L. Ed.2d 444 (1967). See also C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 183-184 (2d ed. 1970); Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief against State Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 Texas L.Rev. 535 (1970); and The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute and Declaratory Judgments in Constitutional Litigation, 83 Harvard L.Rev. 1870 (1970).

When taken in light of the fact that (1) no First Amendment rights are asserted or arguably involved, and (2) Hill fails to show any danger of irreparable injury either "great" or "immediate"; Shaw v. Garrison, 293 F.Supp. 937 (E.D.La.1968), aff'd 393 U.S. 220, 89 S.Ct. 453, 21 L.Ed.2d 392 (1968), and Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943) compel us to the positive conclusion that this case presents a factual setting in which Section 2283 and the caveats of the Atlantic Coast Line case forbade the injunctive relief against the pending Texas civil and criminal proceedings which Hill sought. See Hughes v. District Attorney for Atlanta, Georgia, et al., 436 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1970).

III. ABSTENTION.

There is an equally substantial reason why the action of the lower court should be affirmed in toto. The complaint presented an appropriate, indeed a compelling,...