Hill v. City of Lakewood

• Decision Date: 26 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 94CA0856,94CA0856
• Citation: 949 P.2d 107
• Parties: 21 Colorado Journal 889 Leila Jeanne HILL, Audrey Himmelmann, and Everitt W. Simpson, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD, Colorado; Gale A. Norton, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Colorado; and the State of Colorado, Roy Romer, Governor, Defendants-Appellees. . V
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 107

949 P.2d 107

21 Colorado Journal 889

Leila Jeanne HILL, Audrey Himmelmann, and Everitt W Simpson, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF LAKEWOOD, Colorado; Gale A. Norton, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Colorado; and the State of Colorado Roy Romer, Governor Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94CA0856.

Colorado Court of Appeals Div. V.

June 26, 1997.

Rehearing Denied July 24, 1997.

Certiorari Granted Jan. 12, 1998.

The American Center for Law & Justice, Jay Alan Sekulow, James Matthew Henderson, Sr., Washington, D.C.; Roger W. Westlund, Thornton, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Gorsuch Kirgis L.L.C., Roger W. Noonan, Maureen Herr Juran, Denver, for Defendant-Appellee City of Lakewood, Colorado.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, Carol D. Angel, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, for Defendants-Appellees Gale A. Norton and State of Colorado, Roy Romer, Governor.

Fairfield and Woods, P.C., Howard Holme, Denver; Legal Action for Reproductive Action, Celeste Lacy Davis, Roger K. Evans, New York City; Kevin C. Paul, Denver, for Amicus Curiae Planned Parenthood of the Rocky Mountains and The Center for Reproductive Law & Policy, Inc.

Joseph N. de Raismes, III, City Attorney, Boulder, for Amicus Curiae City of Boulder.

Opinion by Judge RULAND.

In Hill v. City of Lakewood, 911 P.2d 670 (Colo.App.1995) (Hill I ), we affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that § 18-9-122, C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.) did not violate the First Amendment. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court announced Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 117 S.Ct. 855, 137 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997).

The Supreme Court then granted a petition for certiorari to review Hill I. Hill v. Colorado, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1077, 137 L.Ed.2d 213 (1997). In disposition of that certiorari petition, the court has remanded the case to us for reconsideration in light of Schenck.

We requested supplemental briefs from the parties relative to the impact of Schenck on § 18-9-122. Having reviewed and considered those submissions, we again affirm the district court's judgment.

Section 18-9-122 provides:

(1) The general assembly recognizes that access to health care facilities for the purpose of obtaining medical counseling and treatment is imperative for the citizens of this state; that the exercise of a person's right to protest or counsel against certain medical procedures must be balanced against another person's right to obtain medical counseling and treatment in an unobstructed manner; and that preventing the willful obstruction of a person's access to medical counseling and treatment at a health care facility is a matter of statewide concern. The general assembly therefore declares that it is appropriate to enact legislation that prohibits a person from knowingly obstructing another person's entry to or exit from a health care facility.

....

(3) No person shall knowingly approach another person within eight feet of such person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person in the public way or sidewalk area within a radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door to a health care facility. Any person who violates this subsection (3) commits a class 3 misdemeanor.

(emphasis supplied)

As noted in Hill I, the statute was adopted by the General Assembly out of concern for public safety issues presented by the conduct of some protestors at various medical clinics that is directed both at patients and staff. These concerns include access for persons with various disabilities who lack the physical capability to move through crowds of protestors.

In Schenck, the Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to an injunction issued by the United States District Court in response to the conduct of protestors at abortion clinics in the Western District of New York. As pertinent here, the injunction banned "demonstrating within fifteen feet from either side or edge of, or in front of, doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and driveway entrances" to a clinic. This part of the injunction is referred to as the "fixed buffer zone."

In addition, the injunction banned demonstrations "within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to or leaving" a clinic--the "floating buffer zone."

The court upheld the fixed buffer zones around the doorways, driveways, and driveway entrances. The court stated:

These buffer zones are necessary to ensure that people in vehicles trying to enter or exit the clinic property or clinic parking lots can do so.... [T]he record shows that protestors purposefully or effectively blocked or hindered people from entering and exiting the clinic doorways, from driving up to and away from clinic entrances, and from driving in and out of clinic parking lots.

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, supra, 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 868, 137 L.Ed.2d at 22-23.

With reference to the floating buffer zone, the court stated:

We strike down the floating buffer zones around people entering and leaving the clinics because they burden more speech than is necessary to serve the relevant governmental interests. The floating buffer zones prevent defendants [the protestors] ... from communicating a message from a normal conversational distance or handing leaflets to people entering or leaving the clinics who are walking on the public sidewalks.... Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment and speech in public areas is at its most protected on public sidewalks....

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, supra, 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 868, 137 L.Ed.2d at 22-23.

The court also overturned the floating buffer zones around vehicles. The court held that a more limited injunction that keeps protestors away from driveways and parking lot entrances is sufficient to ensure that drivers are not confused about how to enter the clinic and are able to gain access to its driveways and the parking lots safely and easily.

Plaintiffs now contend...