Hill v. City of Phoenix
| Decision Date | 09 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-97-0409-PR,CV-97-0409-PR |
| Citation | 975 P.2d 700,193 Ariz. 570 |
| Parties | , 299 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 6 Fondia HILL, a single man, Plaintiff-Appellant. v. CITY OF PHOENIX, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona; City of Phoenix Police Department, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona; Maricopa County, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona; Maricopa County Attorney's Office, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona; Anthony Stedino, an Arizona resident, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
¶1 The plaintiff, Fondia Hill, brings this civil action against the City of Phoenix and City of Phoenix Police Department (the City), and Maricopa County, Maricopa County Attorney's Office and Anthony Stedino (the County) alleging that defendants wrongfully investigated, arrested, incarcerated and prosecuted him. Specifically, plaintiff alleges federal civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims of assault and battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and defamation.
¶2 The City and the County filed separate motions to dismiss on grounds that plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court heard oral argument and, on August 20, 1996, granted both motions in a single, unsigned minute order disposing of all claims against all defendants. The minute entry rulings were identical on all issues both as to the City and the County.
¶3 The County defendants lodged a judgment in their favor which was signed by the trial judge September 26, 1996, and entered by the clerk October 7, 1996. The County judgment made no reference to the City defendants. The City defendants subsequently lodged judgment in their favor, which was signed December 16, 1996, and entered January 2, 1997. The City judgment made no reference to the County defendants and neither judgment contained a certification of finality pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.
¶4 On October 25, 1996, plaintiff filed notice of appeal from the September 26, 1996 judgment and contemporaneously filed an affidavit in lieu of bond for costs on appeal. Plaintiff omitted from the notice any reference to a judgment or order dismissing the City and did not later file a separate notice of appeal from the December 16 judgment. Plaintiff, nevertheless, simultaneously mailed the October 25 notice of appeal along with the accompanying affidavit in lieu of bond both to the City and the County.
¶5 In November 1996, the City and the County each filed in the trial court objections to plaintiff's affidavit in lieu of bond and, on January 17, 1997, both the City and the County appeared at a hearing to argue their objections. The trial court upheld plaintiff's affidavit. In addition, on January 6, 1997, the City and the County participated jointly in a stipulation in the court of appeals to extend plaintiff's time for filing the opening brief.
¶6 On appeal, both the City and the County moved to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction, arguing that because the notice of appeal was premature as to the City, it was ineffective to confer jurisdiction to review the earlier judgment in favor of the County. The court of appeals properly rejected that argument in a ruling that is not challenged here.
¶7 Subsequently, a divided court of appeals, addressing the question of compliance with Rule 8(c), Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, 1 held that the notice of appeal filed October 25 violated the rule by failing to include an express notice that the appeal also included the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against the City. The court concluded the notice was inadequate since it did not reference the earlier minute order dismissing all claims against all parties and made no mention of any judgment as to the City. The court reasoned, pursuant to Flagstaff Vending Co. v. City of Flagstaff, 118 Ariz. 556, 561, 578 P.2d 985, 990 (1978), that it was without power to review matters not contained in the notice of appeal, 2 and that plaintiff's failure to name the City constituted more than a technical defect, therefore depriving the court of jurisdiction to review the City judgment. The court distinguished the notice of appeal defect in Hanen v. Willis, where this court found harmless error when the appellant incorrectly identified the judgment by the minute entry date and misidentified the appellee. 102 Ariz. 6, 423 P.2d 95 (1967). The dissent expressed the view that defects in the notice of appeal in Hanen and the present case, while technically distinct, are equitably and practically indistinguishable.
¶8 The court of appeals' majority characterized its decision as raising a "jurisdictional" issue involving notice procedure pursuant to Rule 8(c). In Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 186 Ariz. 221, 222-23, 921 P.2d 21, 22-23 (1996), we cautioned against the imprecise usage of the concept of jurisdiction. The appeal in the instant case clearly falls within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court of appeals, and the court also retains personal jurisdiction over all parties. As such, our inquiry is not whether the court of appeals possessed jurisdiction over the appeal but whether the court of appeals properly construed plaintiff's notice of appeal under Rule 8(c) as insufficient to notify the City that the appeal would include it as well as the County.
¶9 We conclude, on the basis of the entire record, not only that the City received notice, albeit scant, but, importantly, that the City fully understood that the appeal was intended to apply to it.
¶10 Arizona courts recognize that an overriding purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure is to dispose of cases on the merits where errors in procedure can be characterized as harmless and non-prejudicial. Hanen, 102 Ariz. at 9, 423 P.2d at 98 3 (citing Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Pacific Motor Trucking Co., 83 Ariz. 135, 138, 317 P.2d 562, 565 (1957) (Windes, J., joined by Struckmeyer, J., dissenting)). We have previously held that in assessing the validity of a defective notice of appeal, the necessary test is whether "sufficient notice of the appeal was conveyed to all of the appellees, neither misleading nor prejudicing them." Id. at 10, 423 P.2d at 99 (overruling Pacific Motor ). See also Boydston v. Strole Dev. Co., 193 Ariz. 47, 969 P.2d 653 (1998). Consequently, where adequate notice has been given an opposing party, fairness demands that "no mere technical error should prevent the appellate court from reaching the merits of the appeal." Hanen, 102 Ariz. at 9, 423 P.2d at 98. Moreover, we have recognized that where the record discloses an appellant's intent to appeal from a judgment, such as sending copies of a defective notice of appeal to all defendants, or where a notice of appeal substantially complies with the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, the notice of appeal should be construed as sufficient so long as the defect has neither misled nor prejudiced an opposing party. Id. at 9-10, 423 P.2d at 98-99.
¶11 The record here establishes the following facts. The trial court disposed of all claims against all parties in a single unsigned minute entry. The City and the County lodged separate judgments almost three months apart. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and an affidavit in lieu of bond which were timely as to the first judgment, though the judgment was not yet appealable due to the absence of a 54(b) certification. The notice of appeal referred only to the County judgment and did not mention the City or the City judgment which was yet to be entered. As to the latter judgment, the notice was premature.
¶12 Plaintiff nevertheless served the notice of appeal and the affidavit on the City as well as the County. Moreover, both the City and the County, after having been served, objected in the trial court to the affidavit in lieu of bond and also appeared in the court of appeals to stipulate formally with the plaintiff to extend the time for filing the opening brief. 4
¶13 In our view, the record demonstrates, and the City freely admits, that it has not been prejudiced by plaintiff's failure to reference the City judgment in the notice of appeal. Not only does the City acknowledge that it received the notice, it is equally clear from the record that the City knew it would be a party to the appeal.
¶14 The City argues that should this court construe plaintiff's defective notice of appeal as substantially compliant, a de facto harmless error standard for notice defects will have been created, thus inviting abdication from adherence to the rules of appellate procedure. We disagree. We do not, by finding plaintiff's notice sufficient in the instant case, adopt an unalterable harmless error standard for defective notices of appeal whereby Rule 8(c) becomes a procedural option. 5 On...
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