Hill v. City Of Atlanta

• Decision Date: 10 May 1906
• Citation: 54 S.E. 354,125 Ga. 697
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: HILL. v. CITY OF ATLANTA.

54 S.E. 354

125 Ga. 697

HILL.

v.CITY OF ATLANTA.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 10, 1906.

1. Criminal. Law—Evidence—Judicial Notice—Ordinances.

In a trial before a municipal court, the recorder or other presiding judge may take judicial notice of the ordinances of the city, defining offenses against the same.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 14, Cent. Dig. Criminal Law, § 708; vol. 20, Cent. Dig. Evidence, § 42.]

2. Same.

Neither the Supreme Court, nor any other court than the municipal court, can take judicial cognizance of a municipal ordinance.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 14, Cent. Dig. Criminal Law, § 708; vol. 20, Cent. Dig. Evidence, § 42.]

3. Municipal Corporations — Violation of Ordinance —Certiorari.

When a petition for certiorari, brought to review a judgment rendered in a municipal court, assigns error upon the judgment of that court, on the ground that the same is contrary to the evidence, and the existence of the ordinance alleged to have been violated is admitted in the petition, but the provisions of the ordinance are not set out, either literally or in substance, it is impossible to tell whether any error has been committed, and this is a sufficient reason for a judge of a superior court to refuse to sanction the petition.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; J. T. Pendleton, Judge.

H. K. Hill was convicted of the violation of an ordinance of the city of Atlanta. From an order refusing certiorari, he brings error. Affirmed.

R. B. Blackburn, for plaintiff in error.

J. L. Mayson and W. P. Hill, for defendant in error.

COBB, P. J. The general rule is that courts do not take judicial notice of municipal ordinances. Mayson v. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 663; McDonald v. Lane, 80 Ga. 497, 5 S. E. 628. When a petition for certiorari, complaining of a conviction in a municipal court, sets forth the charge against the petitioner, it may be assumed that the act embraced therein has been made the substance of a valid ordinance. Carr v. Conyers, 84 Ga. 289, 10 S. E. G30, 20 Am. St. Rep. 357; Chambers v. Barnesville, 89 Ga. 739, 15 S. E. 634. But the rule is otherwise when the petition merely avers that the accused was arraigned for the violation of a given section of the City Code, or of an ordinance passed in a certain year, when there is nothing in the petition to indicate what were the provisions of the section of the City Code or the ordinance. If the petition alleges that there was no ordinance making penal the act of which the petitioner was convicted, the petition upon its face would show error. Phillips v. Atlanta, 78 Ga. 773, 3 S. E. 431; Walker v. Fitzgerald, 103 Ga. 423, 30 S. E. 253.

The recorder or judge of a municipal court may take judicial notice of the ordinances of the city. Neither the superior court, nor the Supreme Court, in reviewing the judgment of the recorder, is permitted to take judicial notice of the ordinances. Walker v. Fitzgerald, supra; Moore v. Jonerboro, 107 Ga. 704, 33 S. E. 435. It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner for a writ of certiorari to...