Hill v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:14-cv-708-FtM-CM |
| Parties | CAROLINE HILL, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Plaintiff Caroline Hill seeks judicial review of the denial of her claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI") by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"). The Court has reviewed the record, the briefs and the applicable law. For the reasons discussed herein, the decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), sentence four.
Plaintiff raised three issues:1 (1) whether substantial evidence supports the finding of Administrative Law Judge Larry J. Butler (the "ALJ") that Plaintiff does not have a severe mental impairment; (2) whether the ALJ erred by failing to consider Plaintiff's mental impairments, fibromyalgia, and carpal tunnel syndrome in theassessment of Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC");2 and (3) whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's allegations of disabling limitations were not credible.
On September 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging a disability onset date of August 23, 2010. Tr. 71-72, 128-130. The claims initially were denied on January 4, 2011 and upon reconsideration on March 18, 2011. Tr. 71-74, 95, 97-98, 100. Plaintiff requested and received a hearing before the ALJ on September 19, 2012, during which she was represented by an attorney. Tr. 31-70. As of the date of the hearing, Plaintiff was forty-seven years old. Tr. 34. Plaintiff testified at the hearing. Tr. 31-70. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on May 6, 2013. Tr. 25.
The ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2014. Tr. 15. At step one, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, August 23, 2010. Id. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff "has the following severe impairments: atypical chest pain, cardiomyopathy, hypertension,cervical spinal stenosis, cervical radiculopathy, degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, neck and back pain, and obesity." Tr. 15. At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart B, Appendix 1 . . ." Tr. 18. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of light work.3 Tr. 19. He found that Plaintiff is able to occasionally lift/carry twenty pounds, frequently lift/carry ten pounds, stand/walk about six hours in an eight-hour workday, sit about six hours in an eight-hour workday, and has unlimited ability to push and pull including operation of hand and/or foot controls. Id. He further found that Plaintiff can frequently balance; and she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Id. He also found that Plaintiff can never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. Id. The ALJ noted that "frequently" is defined as less than two-thirds of an eight hour workday and "occasionally" is defined as less than one-third of an eight hour workday. Id.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments reasonably could be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but her statements concerning the intensity, persistence and the limiting effects of the symptoms are not fully credible. Tr. 20. Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant work as cashier (general), Department of Transportation ("DOT") #211.462-010, light exertion and unskilled with an SVP of 2. Tr. 24. In comparing Plaintiff's RFC with the physical and mental demands of this work, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is able to perform it as generally performed. Id. Thus, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been disabled through the date of the decision. Id. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision. Tr. 1-7. Accordingly, the ALJ's May 6, 2013 decision is the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff filed an appeal in this Court on December 5, 2015. Doc. 1. Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge, and this matter is now ripe for review. Doc. 9.
A claimant is entitled to disability benefits when she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to either result in death or last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1), 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis for evaluating a claim of disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; 416.920. The Eleventh Circuit has summarized the five steps as follows:
(1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) if so, whether these impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments; (4) if not, whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform his past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether, in light of his age, education, and work experience, the claimant can perform other work that exists in "significant numbers in the national economy."
Atha v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F. App'x 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4), (c)-(g), 416.960(c)(2); Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011)). The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through step four; and, at step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id.; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). The Eleventh Circuit has noted that the Commissioner's burden at step five is temporary, because "[i]f the Commissioner presents evidence that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy, 'to be considered disabled, the claimant must then prove that he is unable to perform the jobs that the Commissioner lists.'" Atha, 616 F. App'x at 933 (citing Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 n. 2 (11th Cir.2001)). The scope of this Court's review is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla, i.e., evidence that must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established, and such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion." Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560(11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted); see also Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) () (internal citation omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit recently has restated that "[i]n determining whether substantial evidence supports a decision, we give great deference to the ALJ's factfindings." Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 808 F.3d 818, 822 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Black Diamond Coal Min. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 95 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th Cir. 1996). Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). "The district court must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision." Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; see also Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (). It is the function of the Commissioner, and not the courts, to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Lacina v. Commissioner, 2015 WL 1453364, at *2 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Grant v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 656 (5th Cir.1971)).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff's anxiety and depression were not severe mental impairments. Doc. 13 at 7-10; Doc. 17 at 1-4. As a result, the ALJ also did not incorporate any mental limitations in evaluating Plaintiff's RFC. Doc. 13 at 7. The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports ALJ's decision to find Plaintiff's mental impairments non-severe. Doc. 14 at 5-6.
At the second step in the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); 416.920(a)(4)(ii). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that her impairments are severe and prevent the performance of her past relevant work. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. If the ALJ determines a claimant has a severe impairment, as here, the analysis moves to step three. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). "An impairment is not severe only if the abnormality is so slight and its effect so minimal that it would clearly not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work,...
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