Hill v. Director General of Railroads

• Decision Date: 01 December 1920
• Docket Number: 478.
• Citation: 105 S.E. 184,180 N.C. 490
• Parties: HILL v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

105 S.E. 184

180 N.C. 490

HILL v. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS.

No. 478.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

December 1, 1920

Appeal from Superior Court, Rowan County; Lane, Judge.

Action by M. L. Hill, by his next friend, against the Director General of Railroads. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. No error.

See also, 178 N.C. 607, 101 S.E. 376.

In an action by a railroad employee struck by a switch post while riding on the running board of a work train carrying him from work, the question whether he was negligent in riding too far out, as well as whether he could have entered the car by reasonable efforts, held for the jury.

The facts deducible from the plaintiff's testimony, and the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, are as follows Plaintiff, 15 years of age, was employed by the defendant to work at the defendant's railroad shops at Spencer, N.C Plaintiff lived in Salisbury, N. C., and was carried to and from his place of employment by the defendant on an employee's train known as the "shop train," consisting of cattle cars, converted into cars for employees to ride in, which were without platforms, steps, and doors and were not equipped with bell ropes or signal cords, though there was a narrow entrance on the side of the car near its end. On the afternoon of 30th May, 1918, plaintiff boarded the rear car, or supply car, of the shop train to return home. The shop train proceeded toward Salisbury, stopped at the defendant's transfer shed, and plaintiff was requested by a Mr. Litton, who had charge of the supply car and who had been the plaintiff's foreman that day, to carry a rag wringer to the transfer shed office. Plaintiff immediately alighted from the supply car, ran to the transfer shed office, delivered the rag wringer, and ran back to the train which was then slowly moving off. No bell was rung and no signal of any kind given for the starting of the train. Plaintiff boarded the running board of the nearest car, the fourth car from the rear car of the train, and endeavored to get in it, but was unable to do so on account of the narrow passageway being crowded and blocked by employees. The speed of the train rapidly increased to a rate of twenty miles an hour, and, after riding a distance of approximately three hundred yards, plaintiff was struck by a switch post four and a half feet high, standing eighteen inches from the running board, and knocked beneath the wheels of the train. Plaintiff's left foot was crushed six inches above the ankle, and his right foot severely injured. The shop train ran by the plaintiff. The rear car stopped sixty feet from where plaintiff lay beside the track.

The jury returned a verdict finding negligence of defendant, contributory negligence of plaintiff, and assessed damages at $4,000. Judgment thereon, and defendant appealed.

Linn & Linn, of Salisbury, for appellant.

John C. Busby and A. H. Price, both of Salisbury, for appellee.

WALKER, J. (after stating the facts as above).

There was evidence tending to show negligence on the part of the defendant which was, and should have been, submitted to the jury. The plaintiff was ordered by one having authority to give the order to leave the train on which he was at the time, and deliver a rag wringer at the transfer shed office which order he obeyed, and before he could return to the train and to the position which he had previously occupied thereon the train started off. Plaintiff got upon the running board of the car safely, although the train was in motion and increasing its speed all the time, until it was running at the rate of 20 miles an hour, when he was struck by a switch post and knocked under the wheels of the train. There also was testimony that he could not get inside of the car, because it was so crowded with the hands as to prevent his doing so. It was the duty of the defendant, through its servants in charge of the train, to allow plaintiff sufficient time to do what he was ordered to do and to return to the car he had left, or, at least, to some safe place on the train. Instead, because of the crowded condition of the supply car, he was compelled to occupy a place of danger, where he was liable to be struck, and was struck, by the switch post, and injured as he described. At the time he was an employee of the defendant, and as such he was entitled to be furnished by him, in the exercise of due care, a reasonably safe place to perform his work while in his service. Atkins v. Madry, 174 N.C. 187, 93 S.E. 744; Taylor v. Power Co., 174 N.C. 583, 97 S.E. 432. If a master has a better opportunity to know of defects and dangers than his servant, to whom they are unknown, the obligation to exercise care is not exactly the same. Atkins v. Madry, supra. This duty which defendant owed to him was not fulfilled, and because of this failure of duty he was severely hurt. It cannot be successfully asserted that it was not the proximate cause of the injury. He was standing on the running board, the only place he could stand, and was struck by the switch post, which was placed near the side of the railroad track. The defendant knew of the danger, or should have known of it, and he should not have so acted as to expose the plaintiff to it. It was the combination of running board and switch post placed so near to each other as to strike one standing on the former that caused injury to plaintiff, who was unaware of the dangerous situation. Defendant should have placed them wider apart or he should have warned the plaintiff of the danger. Whether plaintiff exercised due care while holding onto the grabiron in order...