Hill v. Durkin

• Decision Date: 11 April 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-397,77-397
• Citation: 374 N.E.2d 1147,16 Ill.Dec. 372,58 Ill.App.3d 1003
• Parties: , 16 Ill.Dec. 372 John Wesley HILL, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Lena Mae Hill, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas J. DURKIN, M.D., Defendant-Appellee, and Lutheran Hospital, Defendant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1147

374 N.E.2d 1147

58 Ill.App.3d 1003, 16 Ill.Dec. 372

John Wesley HILL, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Lena Mae Hill, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas J. DURKIN, M.D., Defendant-Appellee, and Lutheran Hospital, Defendant.

No. 77-397.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

April 11, 1978.

Anna I. Shinkle, Des Moines, Iowa, James W. Berry, Davenport, Iowa, for plaintiff-appellant; Dircks, Ridenour, Davis & Shinkle, P. C., Davenport, Iowa, W. Michael Shinkle, of counsel.

John V. Patton and James D. Mowen, Bozeman, Neighbour, Patton & Noe, Moline, for defendant-appellee.

ALLOY, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Rock Island County granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Thomas J. Durkin, M. D. The action was instituted by plaintiff, John Wesley Hill, for damages occasioned by the alleged negligence of defendants, Thomas J. Durkin, M. D. and Lutheran Hospital, in the treatment of plaintiff's wife, Lena Mae Hill, who died in the course of childbirth.

Plaintiff, on November 28, 1975, filed the complaint in this cause which alleged that defendants Durkin and Lutheran Hospital were negligent during the treatment of his wife, while she was giving birth to a child, as a result of which the said Lena Mae Hill, wife of plaintiff, died. The record discloses that on November 29, 1973, Lena Mae Hill was admitted to defendant Lutheran Hospital, under care of defendant Durkin, and that on November 30, 1973, subsequent to the birth of a child by "spontaneous frank breech delivery", Lena Mae Hill died of shock of undetermined cause.

On November 26, 1976, defendant Durkin filed a motion for summary judgment supported by the affidavit of defendant Durkin. Hearing on the motion for summary judgment was initially set for December 10, 1976. Plaintiff, however, was granted a continuance for the purpose of completing discovery and for filing of affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. After some continuances, hearing on the motion was finally set for April 29, 1977. In answers to interrogatories filed on March 15, 1976, plaintiff set forth that no expert had been retained at that time to testify in the cause. On September 27, 1976, the plaintiff filed a Supplementary Answer to the Supplementary Interrogatory where he stated that at that time no medical opinion had been obtained by plaintiff concerning the alleged acts of negligence in the complaint against Dr. Durkin. Plaintiff further answered, on November 6, 1976, by stating that at that time no medical opinion had been obtained concerning the negligent acts alleged in the complaint.

As we have indicated, the motion for summary judgment was filed on November 26, 1976, by defendant Durkin, supported by his affidavit. While that motion was scheduled for hearing on December 10, 1976, at the request of plaintiff (on December 8, 1976) the hearing was continued to permit discovery by plaintiff and to give plaintiff additional time to file affidavits or pleadings to meet the motion for summary judgment. That motion was supported by plaintiff's counsel's affidavit. All of the records in the possession or control of Dr. Durkin, and his personal attorney, were forwarded to plaintiff's attorney on December 10, 1976, and defendant Durkin filed answer to interrogatories on February 1, 1977. Dr. Durkin's motion for summary judgment was thereafter scheduled for hearing on February 24, 1977, but was then continued until March 8, 1977. On March 7, 1977, plaintiff filed a motion to strike and a motion to dismiss the motion for summary judgment. At the March 8, 1977 hearing, an order was entered setting forth that the motion for summary judgment was heard and taken under advisement until April 29, 1977. The motion to strike Dr. Durkin's affidavit, filed by plaintiff, was denied, and plaintiff was granted leave to file counter-affidavits on or before April 15, 1977. On April 4, 1977, Dr. Durkin's discovery deposition was scheduled and taken. By April 15, 1977, plaintiff had not filed counter-affidavits to the motion for summary judgment. At the next scheduled hearing on April 29, 1977, plaintiff requested a further continuance asserting he desired to obtain other and different counsel. Following that hearing, the court granted plaintiff's motion for continuance and continued the cause until May 25, 1977, and granted plaintiff an extension until May 25, 1977, to file counter-affidavits. The motion for summary judgment filed by Dr. Durkin originally on November 26, 1976, and taken under advisement on March 8, 1977, was allowed on May 25, 1977. Plaintiff appeared at such hearing pro se and stated that he had been unable to obtain new counsel and requested dismissal of the Durkin motion. The summary judgment was filed only on behalf of defendant Durkin. Defendant Lutheran Hospital is not involved in the appeal now under consideration.

On appeal in this Court, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Durkin and asserts that there were genuine issues of material fact in the affidavits and pleadings on file in the cause. We recognize that summary judgment is properly granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the court is to determine the existence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material facts from the affidavits, depositions, admissions, exhibits and pleadings in the case. As stated in Lewis v. Illinois Institute of Technology (1st Dist. 1977), 50 Ill.App.3d 418, 420, 8 Ill.Dec. 693, 695, 365 N.E.2d 1079, 1081;

"A court has the duty to construe evidence strictly against the moving party and liberally in favor of the opponent, and it is well established that the right to summary judgment must be free from doubt and determinable solely as a question of law."

As stated in Presto Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Formetal Engineering Company (1st Dist. 1977), 46 Ill.App.3d 7, 10, 4 Ill.Dec. 574, 575, 360 N.E.2d 510, 511:

" * * * if the facts admit of more than one conclusion or inference, including one unfavorable to the moving party, the motion for summary judgment should be denied."

In the instant case, the documents on file at the time of the granting of the motion for summary judgment by the trial court, included pleadings, interrogatories answered by plaintiff, interrogatories answered by defendant Durkin, an affidavit of plaintiff's trial counsel, and an affidavit of defendant Durkin in support of his motion for summary judgment. It was apparent from the affidavits that, at the time of her death, Lena Mae Hill was obese and multiparied, and that she had just given birth to her seventh child. The record shows that the child born to Lena Mae Hill on November 30, 1973, was delivered in the frank breech position (i. e. sacrum first delivery), rather than the normal head first delivery. It is also noted that subsequent to the delivery of the child on November 30, 1973, it became apparent to defendant Durkin, who had delivered the child, that Lena Mae Hill had developed a problem which Durkin diagnosed as a rupture of the uterus, and that defendant states, in his affidavit, that he then undertook measures to cope with such condition, which he asserted he did in accordance with the standards of practice applicable to such situation.

The standards for imposition for liability in medical malpractice cases are outlined in Scardina v. Colletti (1st Dist. 1965), 63 Ill.App.2d 481, 488, 211 N.E.2d 762, 765:

"In a malpractice action a physician will be held responsible for injuries resulting from his want of reasonable care, skill and diligence in his practice. The plaintiff must prove by affirmative evidence that defendant was unskillful or negligent and that his want of skill or care caused injury to the plaintiff. It is not enough to prove that he made a mistake or that his treatment harmed the plaintiff; proof of a bad result or mishap is no evidence of lack of skill or negligence.

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